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Abstract
My dissertation aims at understanding the impact of uncertainty and disagreement on asset prices.
It contains three main chapters. Chapter One gives a general introduction into the topic of partial
information and heterogeneous beliefs.
Chapter Two explains the link between credit spreads and the heterogeneous formation of expectations
in an economy where agents with different perception of economic uncertainty disagree about future
cash flows of a defaultable firm. The intertemporal risk-sharing of disagreeing investors gives rise to
three testable implications: First, larger belief heterogeneity increases credit spreads and their volatility.
Second, it implies a higher frequency of capital structure arbitrage violations. Third, it reduces expected
equity returns of low levered firms, but the link can be reversed for high levered firms. We use a data-set
of firm-level differences in beliefs, credit spreads, and stock returns to empirically test these predictions.
The economic and statistical significance of the intertemporal risk-sharing channel of disagreement is
substantial and robust to the inclusion of control variables such as Fama and French, liquidity, and
implied volatility factors.
Chapter Three studies the link between market-wide uncertainty, difference of opinions and co-movement
of stock returns. We show that this link plays an important role in explaining the dynamics of equilib-
rium volatility and correlation risk premia, the differential cross-sectional pricing of index and individual
options, and the risk-return profile of several option trading strategies. We use firm-specific data on ana-
lyst forecasts and test the model predictions. We obtain the following novel results: (a) The difference of
index and individual volatility risk premia is linked to a counter-cyclical common disagreement compo-
nent about future earnings; (b) This common component helps to explain the differential pricing of index
and individual volatility smiles in the cross-section, as well as the time-series of correlation risk premia
extracted from option prices; (c) The time series of returns on straddle and dispersion option portfo-
lios reflects a significant time-varying risk premium, which compensates investors for bearing common
disagreement risk; (d) Common disagreement is priced in the cross-section of option strategy returns.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
When in December 1912 John Pierpont Morgan was asked before a congressional inves-
tigating committee how he decided whether to make an investment or not, he replied
“The first thing is character.” The lawyer skeptically questioned whether not money or
property would be more important, and Morgan countered “A man I do not trust could
not get money from me on all the bonds in Christendom.” The gist of this anecdote
is simple: Credit business is based on trust and confidence.1 In an economy absent of
confidence, banks hoard money and market liquidity evaporates. Does not this sound
all too familiar?
While trying to come to an end with this thesis, we find ourselves in the midst of the
severest recession since the 1930ies, and some might even argue that the D-word is just
around the corner. Shocking as the disaster on equity markets might be, the freezing up
of the flow of credit is far more damaging to the overall health of the economy. Central
banks and Treasury departments all around the world have been desperately trying to
fight that gridlock and scarcely one day goes by without any new dramatic intervention.
The injected liquidity is going through revolving doors and now that interest rates are
almost zero, central banks in Europe, Japan, and the U.S. have turned to quantitative
1In fact, the root of the word credit comes from credo, Latin, for I believe.
1
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easing. Historically, central banks have been the lender of last resort to banks, now,
they are becoming the last resort to everyone.2
The current situation from the viewpoint of a financial economist is briefly summarized
by the chief economist at Goldman Sachs: “No sane banker with good contacts and
clients would do this [hoard money]. It would be a huge arbitrage profit if they wanted
to lend, but they don’t.” The reason for this “insanity” is economic uncertainty which
started as a local problem with the increase of subprime mortgage defaults and has now
affected the real economy. Unquestionably, the concept of economic uncertainty and its
measurement is elusive and abstract. In this thesis, I seek at explaining more thoroughly
how uncertainty can arise and its potential impact on asset prices.
To give solid ground to my hypotheses, I plot in Figure 1.1 the uncertainty proxies for
a cross-section of different industries to illustrate the huge surge of uncertainty in the
current crisis. I proxy economic uncertainty by the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts about
future earnings of firms.3 There are two notable points: First, an increase of uncertainty
is not particular to the current crisis. For example, both around the economic crisis of
2001 and 2008, the Russian default in 1998, and the terrorists’ attacks in September 2001
uncertainty increases and decreases short after. Second, higher uncertainty is observed
across all sectors, no matter how different they might be, so one could argue that there
is some systemic component in uncertainty which is common across all industries.
Interestingly, the surge in uncertainty emasculates rather quickly. If these effects are
transitory, why should we care4 one might ask correctly? The reason is that uncertainty
has real effects. To see that uncertainty shocks have an impact on the real economy, I
2The definition of the central bank acting as the lender of last resort goes back to the 18th century
(see Thornton, 1802 and Bagehot, 1873). The idea was that banks finance opaque assets with a long
maturity and short-lived liabilities – a combination that is vulnerable to sudden loss of confidence. To
avoid preventable disasters when confidence evaporates, the classical view is that the central bank should
lend to illiquid but solvent banks, at a penalty rate, and against collateral deemed to be good under
normal times.
3Economic uncertainty can be measured in many different ways. For instance, Bansal and Yaron
(2004) use a GARCH process to proxy consumption volatility, Bloom (2009) uses realized stock markets
volatility and Alexopoulos and Cohen (2009) extract an index of economic uncertainty on the number
of articles that appear in the New York Times which use the terms uncertain and/or uncertainty and
economic and/or economy. The drawback of these measures is their inherently backward-looking nature.
GARCH or realized volatility and number of newspaper articles can only be calculated from an ex post
perspective using historical data. Information extracted from option prices provides fertile ground to
extract future expectations of economic agents. Indeed, the VIX, an index constructed from implied
volatilities of a continuum of options on the S&P 500, is often used as a proxy of fear or economic
uncertainty. However, in the models I study, implied volatility is an endogenous quantity driven by
uncertainty/belief disagreement.
4Or worse, write a thesis on it.
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Figure 1.1: Cross-Section of Uncertainty
I plot sector-wide uncertainty for six different sectors. Industries are defined according to the two-digit
GICS code. The yellow shaded areas represent financial crises, the gray shaded areas economic crisis as
defined according to the NBER. Data is monthly and runs from March 1997 to December 2008.
estimate a VAR on monthly data using a set of macro-economic variables together with
an industry-wide uncertainty proxy.5
Figure 1.2 plots the impulse response functions for industrial production (left panel)
and employment (right panel) to a one standard deviation shock. We note that both
industrial production and employment drop around 0.2% within 10 months and then
rebound after almost 20 months for industrial production and 25 months for employment.
5The variables in the estimation order are log(industrial production), log(employment), hours,
log(consumer price index), log(average hourly earnings), money stock (M2), Federal Funds Rate, in-
dustry wide uncertainty, and log(S&P500). This ordering is based on the assumptions that shocks
instantaneously influence the stock market, then prices (wages, the CPI, and interest rates) and finally
quantities (hours, employment and output). Including the stock returns as the first variable in the VAR
ensures the impact of stock returns is already controlled for when looking at the impact of uncertainty
shocks. All variables are Hodrick-Prescott (HP) detrended.
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What is striking is that the effect of uncertainty is by order of magnitude larger than
for instance other standard policy instruments like the federal funds rate or the money
stock.
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Figure 1.2: Impulse Response Functions
The left panel plots the impulse response function to a one standard deviation change in the correspond-
ing variables with respect to industrial production. The right panel plots the same but for employment.
The focus of this thesis is not so much the macroeconomy as a whole but I aim at
studying in more detail the implications of economic uncertainty on asset prices. Clearly,
the current crisis gives a vivid example of how an increase in default risk is coupled with
economic uncertainty. To see this, I plot in Figure 1.3, the uncertainty proxies together
with their sector-wide asset swap spread, which is a measure of default risk in this
industry.6
There seems to be a strong co-movement between the asset swap spread and the uncer-
tainty proxies. Indeed, I find that the unconditional correlation between these series is
around 0.69 with a p-value for testing the null hypothesis of zero correlation almost at
zero. The implied volatility of near maturity options is said to be a good proxy of agent’s
6I define the asset swap spread as the difference between the yield on the corporate bond and the
LIBOR.
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Figure 1.3: Cross-Section of Uncertainty and Asset Swap Spreads
I plot sector-wide uncertainty and asset swap spreads for six different sectors. Industries are defined
according to the four-digit GICS code. The yellow shaded areas represent financial crises (LTCM debacle
and terrorists’ attacks), the gray shaded areas economic crisis as defined according to the NBER. Data
is monthly and runs from March 1997 to December 2008.
future expectations and therefore a measure of economic uncertainty.7 However, as the
measure itself is extracted from prices and prices are endogenously determined by poten-
tially many variables, it is natural to assume that the implied volatility itself is driven
by these variables. I find that economic uncertainty/disagreement not only impacts on
default risk, but also on the implied volatility of individual and index options. I plot
in Figure 1.4 the sector-wide uncertainty proxies together with a sector-wide implied
volatility index which is calculated from near maturity call and put options. Again, we
note a remarkably high correlation between the implied volatilities and the uncertainty
proxies.
7As opposed to realized volatility itself which is said to be a backward looking measure of uncertainty.
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Figure 1.4: Cross-Section of Uncertainty and Implied Volatility
I plot sector-wide uncertainty and implied volatility for six different sectors. Industries are defined
according to the four-digit GICS code. Implied volatility is defined as the average 30 day at-the-money
implied volatility from put options. The yellow shaded areas represent the terrorists’ attacks, the gray
shaded areas economic crisis as defined according to the NBER. Data is monthly and runs from March
1997 to December 2008.
The fact of hightened uncertainty during crises periods suggests the existence of a sys-
temic uncertainty component which is common to individual uncertainty proxies. In
Figure 1.5, right panel, I plot such a common uncertainty proxy constructed from the
cross-section of all firm-specific uncertainty proxies together with the default spread de-
fined as the difference between the Moody’s Baa and Aaa bond yields. Again, we note a
remarkably high co-movement between these two series. Indeed, a simple linear regres-
sion from the default spread on the common uncertainty yields a t-statistic of more than
10 and the R2 is 44%. On the left panel, we plot the common uncertainty together with
the VIX which is an index of implied volatilities of options on the S&P 500. Running
a regressions from the VIX on the common uncertainty yields a highly significant beta
coefficient with a R2 of almost 20%.
Starting from these observations, I seek to build a parsimonious model of partial informa-
tion that entails salient features found in credit, equity, and option markets. Uncertainty
is a central pillar in the economics and finance literature and the most common way to
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model imperfect information is a Bayesian inference framework (see Kandel and Stam-
baugh, 1996, Lewellen and Shanken, 2001, and Pa´stor, 2000).8 The main feature of this
modeling approach is that if a parameter is unknown, a prior distribution is assumed
for this parameter and agents update their beliefs using Bayes’ law. Another way of
introducing model uncertainty would be to assume that agents are ambiguous about
the data generating process itself. In these models of Knightian uncertainty, rational
agents distinguish between situations where they know the probability distributions of
random variables (known unknowns) and situations where they do not have this infor-
mation (unknown unknowns).9 In this thesis, I abstract both from the important work
on ambiguity aversion and incomplete information but homogeneous beliefs. In the lat-
ter class of work, the representative agent learns, by applying Bayes’ law,10 about the
hidden state of the economy which evolves over time as a Markov process. The early
literature analyzes the portfolio problem of a investor who does not observe the true
state of the economy (see e.g. Detemple, 1986, Gennotte, 1986, and Ghysels, 1986).
Veronesi (1999) studies the impact on asset prices and shows that agents react more at
times when uncertainty is high which generates higher asset price volatility. This in-
duces risk-averse investors to demand higher returns for bearing this risk. David (1997)
derives similar results in a production economy.
Surprisingly little effort has been undertaken to distinguish the learning uncertainty
component in asset prices from the dispersion in beliefs both theoretically and empir-
ically. Massa and Simonov (2005) empirically decompose the learning component into
the learning uncertainty and dispersion in beliefs using forecasts errors from a state
space model. They show that both components are priced risk factors and contribute
different portions to the explanation of risk premia. Similarly, Ozoguz (2008) extracts
dispersion of beliefs and Bayesian uncertainty from time series of state probabilities es-
timated from a regime switching model. The author finds in predictability regressions
that both the learning uncertainty and disagreement predict first and second moments
8A very different way to consider economic uncertainty is found in the long-run risk models of Bansal
and Yaron (2004) or Bekaert, Engstrom, and Xing (2008). In these models, economic uncertainty is
modeled as the time-varying volatility of consumption and dividend growth together with recursive
preferences.
9Dow and Werlang (1992), Epstein and Wang (1994, 1995), and Epstein and Miao (2003) use multi-
prior expected utility preferences as in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Anderson, Hansen, and Sargent
(2000), and Uppal and Wang (2003) follow another line whereby in their models uncertainty is modeled
by a set of priors and the investor’s aversion to it is introduced via a penalty function. Recently, the
literature has adopted a learning plus ambiguity approach. Hansen (2007) summarizes the literature.
10Brandt, Zeng, and Zhang (2004) also analyze alternative learning rules.
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of the aggregate market return. While a deeper distinction in a learning uncertainty
and dispersion component is highly desirable, I leave this for future research.
One of the most compelling features of heterogeneous beliefs models is that they induce
trade among agents. When agents have different beliefs, optimal portfolios in equilibrium
depend on the investors’ relative wealth and their beliefs. My thesis seeks at extending
this growing literature on models with differences in beliefs amongst agents regarding
the fundamentals and some signal process in an incomplete information economy.
The literature on heterogeneous beliefs is vast and one line of the literature, e.g., Harris
and Raviv (1993), Detemple and Murthy (1994, 1997), and Basak (2000), assumes that
agents hold heterogeneous prior beliefs about unobservable economic variables. In these
models, agents continue to disagree with each other even after they update their beliefs
using identical information, but the difference in their beliefs deterministically converges
to zero. Therefore, the belief dispersion in these models can only have a temporary effect.
In another strand of the literature, e.g., Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), Dumas, Kurshev
and Uppal (2008), Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006) and David (2008) heterogeneous beliefs
arise from agents’ different prior knowledge about the informativeness of signals and
the dynamics of unobservable economic variables.11 In the models of Scheinkman and
Xiong (2003) and Hong, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006), risk neutral investors subject
to short-selling constraints update their beliefs based on their personal interpretations
of incoming news. It follows that trade occurs whenever investors valuations “cross”,
i.e. whenever the more optimistic investor switches to being the more pessimistic. In a
world in which investors interpret news differently, the greater news stimulus associated
with an asset leads to a higher time-series variability of investors’ relative valuations
and larger trading volumes via the “crossing”. At the same time, the short-sales con-
straint make some assets overpriced relative to others, so that their valuation reflects
the value-weighted average opinion. Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal (2008) study a similar
economy as Scheinkman and Xing (2003) and refer to the speculative risk of unexpected
movements in competitors’ beliefs as sentiment risk. In these kind of models, behavioral
biases such as overconfidence prevent the agents from learning the true parameters in the
model. In David (2008) agents have different underlying models of the data generating
process as opposed to differing initial priors. In his model, the difference in beliefs does
11Another appealing way to prevent Bayes’ law to die out, would be to assume that two groups of
investors receive two different pieces of information opposed to receiving the same piece of information
and processing it differently. This approach is studied in the work of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980),
Admati (1985) and many others.
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not converge asymptotically to zero because the drift of the underlying fundamentals is
allowed to switch according to a two-state Markov process.
The distinction between an incomplete information rational expectations model and a
model incorporating behavioral biases might not always be so trivial. For instance,
Anderson, Ghysels, and Juergens (2005) simply sidestep the potential behavioral as-
pects of their framework, meaning whether the contribution of disagreement on as-
set prices could also be interpreted as an overreaction of irrational agents. Brav and
Heaton (2002) demonstrate that from a mathematical point the rational expectations
incomplete information economy and an economy with irrational agents are hard to
distinguish. Irrationality-induced anomalies cannot survive the presence of rational ar-
bitrageurs unless there are limits to arbitrage that prevent the effectiveness of rational
bets against mispricing.12 Unquestionably, behavioral biases are appealing,13 however,
my motivation to remain in the class of rational beliefs is a practical one: The empirical
quantification of these biases in beliefs or probability such as overconfidence or anchor-
ing on a firm-specific level is difficult if not impossible.14 I choose to remain in the
class of rational beliefs and economic agents update their beliefs based on the available
information using Bayes’ rule. The difference in their posteriors can arise either from a
difference in agents’ priors or a difference in subjective parameters of the dynamics of
cash flows or signals. In particular, I assume that the volatility of the signal growth rate
is perceived differently by the two agents in my economy. In this way, belief dispersion
does not converge to zero even asymptotically. I aim at investigating these properties
both theoretically and empirically in two different projects: First, in the context of an
equilibrium structural model of credit risk and second, in option markets for individual
and index options.
The first essay studies the potential relation between firm-specific and common economic
uncertainty and credit risk in an economy with heterogeneous beliefs. Merton’s (1974)
12Even if the rational agent’s victory over the overconfident agent in the model of Dumas, Kurshev,
and Uppal (2008) is only in the “fairly long run”.
13I fully acknowledge that financial economics is a social science and we can learn much by studying
how people effectively process data and take decisions. I cite Knight (1964): We perceive the world
before we react to it, and we react not to what we perceive but always to what we infer.
14It would be important to distinguish between price or survey data based indices. Baker and Wurgler
(2006) form a composite index of sentiment that is based on six known proxies for sentiment (closed-
end fund discount, share turnover, dividend premium etc.). They show that sentiment indeed affects
stock returns, but there are a size-, a volatility and some other effects which influence the impact of
sentiment on prizes. www.sentix.de provides sentiment indices for all major stock indices, interest rates,
and currencies from weekly web-based surveys. It would be interesting to see whether survey based
measures of belief heterogeneity and these sentiment indicators have similar properties.
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Common Uncertainty and Default Spread
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Figure 1.5: Common Uncertainty, Default Spread and VIX
I plot a common uncertainty proxy together with the default spread and the VIX. The default spread is
defined as the difference between the yield on the Moody’s Baa and Aaa bond. The yellow shaded areas
represent financial crises (LTCM debacle and terrorists’ attacks), the gray shaded areas economic crisis
as defined according to the NBER. Data is monthly and runs from March 1997 to December 2008.
structural model of credit risk, and its extensions in, e.g., Black and Cox (1976), offer
a framework for pricing corporate debt as a contingent claim on the value of the firm.
An appealing property of structural models is that they motivate a very explicit link
between credit spreads and a set of firm-specific variables. The empirical performance of
standard structural models is, however, mixed, as these models tend to predict counter-
factually low credit spreads, especially for short-term, high quality bonds. In the first
essay, we aim at taking a different stance. We consider an economy in which the growth
rate of a firm’s cash flows is unknown and agents have different perceptions of the (un-
known) volatility of expected future cash flows, i.e. the level of economic uncertainty.
A higher (lower) volatility of expected cash flow growth in such an economy is directly
linked to a higher (lower) economic uncertainty. Since expected cash flow growth is
unobservable, agents estimate it from a common set of observable variables and agree to
disagree about the firm’s future cash flows and a common signal. In order to estimate a
firm’s expected growth rate of cash flows, they observe a firm-specific signal (firm’s cash
flows themselves) and a systematic (market wide) signal. The systematic signal is linked
to the aggregate state of the economy and is correlated with firm’s cash flows expected
growth rate. This setting allows us to investigate the role played by both the systematic
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and firm-specific belief disagreement components raised by economic uncertainty, and to
study their effects on credit spreads both in the cross-section and the time series. The
introduction of uncertainty and belief disagreement extends the classical Merton (1974)
structural model to an incomplete information economy with heterogenous beliefs. In
this economy, changes in beliefs modify individual allocations into defaultable securities
in order to balance ex-ante differences in expected marginal utilities across good and bad
states of the economy. We solve the model and obtain testable empirical predictions for
the impact of economic uncertainty and differences in beliefs on credit spreads and asset
prices. We merge a dataset of firm-specific differences in beliefs and credit spreads and
test these predictions empirically. We find five important sets of results that are new
to the literature: (a) Counter-cyclical uncertainty is positively related to a common dis-
agreement component about future earning opportunities by financial analysts; (b) The
common component of the difference in beliefs in earning forecasts is the most signifi-
cant variable in time-series regressions for credit spreads. At the same time, firm-specific
difference in beliefs is the most significant component in the cross-section; (c) Uncer-
tainty induces a significant co-movement between credit spreads and stock volatility; (d)
During the 2008 Credit Crisis the link between uncertainty and credit spreads is even
stronger than in previous crisis periods; (e) Uncertainty and belief heterogeneity have
significant explanatory power for no-arbitrage violations implied by single factor models
in credit markets
This essay is joint work with Fabio Trojani (University of Lugano) and Andrea Buraschi
(Imperial College London).
The second essay studies the differential pricing of index options and single-stock options
and their difference in volatility risk premia, despite the relative similarity of the under-
lying distributions (see e.g., Bakshi, Kapadia, and Madan, 2003 and Bollen and Whaley,
2004). In particular, single-stock options appear to be cheaper and have a volatility
risk premium which is virtually zero, while the risk premium on the index options is
potentially large. We extend the standard Lucas (1978) economy to two investors and
multiple goods. The growth rates of the different firms are not observable and have to be
estimated by the investors who agree to disagree about the firms’ future dividends and
a business cycle indicator. The wedge between the index and individual volatility risk
premium is mainly driven by a correlation risk premium which emerges endogenously
due to the following model features: In a full information economy with independent
fundamentals, returns correlate solely due to the correlation of the individual stock with
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the aggregate endowment (“diversification effect”). In our economy, stock return correla-
tion is endogenously driven by idiosyncratic and systemic (business-cycle) disagreement
(“risk-sharing effect”). We show that this effect dominates the diversification effect,
moreover it is independent of the number of firms and a firm’s share in the aggregate
market. In equilibrium, the skewness of the individual stocks and the index differ due
to a correlation risk premium. Depending on the share of the firm in the aggregate
market, and the size of the disagreement about the business cycle, the skewness of the
index can be larger (in absolute values) or smaller than the one of individual stocks. As
a consequence, the volatility risk premium of the index is larger or smaller than the in-
dividual. In equilibrium, this different exposure to disagreement risk is compensated in
the cross-section of options and model-implied trading strategies exploiting differences
in disagreement earn substantial excess returns. We test the model predictions in a set
of panel regressions, by merging three datasets of firm-specific information on analysts
earning forecasts, options data on S&P 100 index options, options on all constituents,
and stock returns. Sorting stocks based on differences in beliefs, we find that volatility
trading strategies exploiting different exposures to disagreement risk in the cross-section
of options earn high Sharpe ratios. The results are robust to different standard control
variables and transaction costs and are not subsumed by other theories explaining the
volatility risk premia.
This essay is joint work with Fabio Trojani (University of Lugano) and Andrea Buraschi
(Imperial College London).
All chapters are self-contained and can be read independently of each other.
Chapter 2
Economic Uncertainty, Disagreement and
Credit Markets
joint with Andrea Buraschi and Fabio Trojani
Introduction
Structural models with additive preferences find it difficult to explain the joint behavior
of corporate bond spreads and stock returns. The credit spread puzzle is determined
by the difficulty to generate large average credit spreads of high-quality bonds, while
keeping model-implied default and recovery rates at the empirically observed levels. It
is intrinsically related to the broader challenge of standard theories to explain asset
prices based on realistic assumptions about cash-flow innovations and discount rates.
Notable well-known manifestations of this challenge for the US stock market are the
equity premium and excess volatility puzzles.
Motivated by the need to understand these puzzling features of asset prices, a large liter-
ature has explored from different perspectives and with different approaches the general
equilibrium link between uncertainty and asset returns. An important strand of the more
recent literature has investigated in a variety of dynamic models the structural link be-
tween uncertainty, the properties of agents’ subjective beliefs and asset prices. Three
major directions have been followed. The first explores homogenous agents economies,
in which incomplete information about the investment opportunity set is modeled with a
13
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(single-prior) Bayesian belief formation mechanism that causes equilibrium asset prices
deviating from their complete-information values (e.g., Veronesi, 1999 and 2000 and
Pa´stor and Veronesi, 2003). A second strand of literature maintains the representative
agent assumption and studies the asset pricing implications of partial information and
learning when investors are averse to Knightian uncertainty. In these models, learning
is linked to a whole set of beliefs. However, agents’ concern to follow decisions robust to
uncertainty leads them to focus on the most conservative (pessimistic) belief. This belief
distortion can create even larger deviations of asset prices from their equilibrium values
under complete information (e.g., Epstein and Schneider, 2008 and Leippold, Trojani,
and Vanini, 2008). The third stream of literature investigates partial information and
learning in heterogenous agents economies where investors have diverse beliefs. In these
models, agents agree to disagree and their equilibrium risk-sharing behavior creates in-
teractions with non trivial asset pricing implications (e.g., Basak, 2000, Scheinkman and
Xiong, 2003, Buraschi and Jiltsov, 2006).
The different aspects of uncertainty studied in these models can produce quite distinct
effects on asset returns. For instance, in Veronesi (1999) a higher Bayesian uncertainty
can increase expected returns because of an increased sensitivity of the marginal utility
to news. Leippold, Trojani, and Vanini (2008) show that ambiguity aversion coupled
with learning further increases the equilibrium equity premium when the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution is larger that one. Uncertainty can lead to opposite impli-
cations for expected returns in models with diverse beliefs, depending on the tightness
of trading constraints. Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) draw inspiration from Miller’s
(1977) hypothesis and show that, when risk-neutral agents face short-selling constraints
and agree to disagree, equilibrium prices reflect the beliefs of overconfident investors. In
this context, a more disperse belief heterogeneity implies lower excess returns. Basak
(2000), Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006) and Dumas, Krushev, and Uppal (2009), among
others, study the risk-sharing mechanism that takes place in a frictionless economy with
risk averse investors. Their results show that when disagreement is large the resulting
stochastic discount factor effect yields larger excess returns in equilibrium. Credit mar-
kets provide a useful laboratory to produce sharp evidence on the direction of the effect
of uncertainty and diversity of beliefs on asset prices. While most equities can be easily
sold short, the search costs of an over-the-counter market like the corporate bond mar-
ket can be significant, implying short-selling constraints that are likely more binding.
Therefore, an empirical rejection of Miller’s (1977) hypothesis for the corporate bond
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and stock markets is a potentially strong evidence in favor of the risk-sharing-induced
impact of belief heterogeneity on asset returns.
In order to understand the equilibrium implications of this risk-sharing effect on credit
spreads and stock returns, we solve a frictionless structural Merton (1974)-type credit
risk model, in which we derive explicit testable restrictions for the equilibrium link
between belief heterogeneity, credit spreads and stock returns. In our model, agents
have different perceptions of future firm cash flows and their degree of uncertainty,
captured by the volatility of expected cash flows growth. They form individual forecasts
of firm cash-flow growth using a common set of observable variables and agree to disagree
based on these beliefs. The common observable variables include both a firm-level signal
(firm’s cash flows themselves) and a systematic (market-wide) signal correlated with
firm’s cash-flow growth. The specification of a common uncertainty component linked
to market-wide economic growth is motivated by the empirical observation that proxies
of difference in beliefs across firms share a large common component that surges during
recessions and periods of financial crises, when there is less confidence about future
macroeconomic conditions and firm’s cash flows, which suggests that belief-driven risk-
sharing effects are stronger in phases of market downturn. Kurz (1994) discusses this
link and explains how higher uncertainty can lead economic agents to have more disperse
beliefs. There is also evidence that credit spreads systematically widen in bad economic
states: A simple analysis reveals that the default spread, given by the difference of
Moody’s Baa and Aaa bond yields has a monthly correlation of 60% with the first
principal component of the dispersion of analyst forecasts.1
The equilibrium stochastic discount factor in our economy is a direct function of the
(stochastic) degree of belief heterogeneity. This feature gives rise to a stochastic firm
value volatility and risk-neutral skewness. The equilibrium risk-sharing mechanism be-
tween optimistic and pessimistic agents implies that a higher uncertainty or belief het-
erogeneity produces at the same time a lower equilibrium firm value, a higher firm value
volatility, and a more negative firm value risk-neutral skewness. Therefore, the market
price of default risk stays in an unambiguously positive relation to the latent degree of
uncertainty and diversity of beliefs. This general equilibrium structure has the follow-
ing testable implications for the joint relation between belief-driven risk-sharing effects,
credit spreads and stock returns.
1This correlation is higher than the one of any other risk factor used in the literature. For instance,
the correlation between the default spread and the VIX index (another proxy often used to measure
uncertainty) around crisis times is only 28%.
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First, higher uncertainty and belief heterogeneity are unambiguously linked to higher
credit spreads. Since this feature arises mostly via the price of default risk, and less
through the probability of default, we can find model parameter choices that imply
together realistic credit spreads and default probabilities. Second, the sign of the relation
between belief heterogeneity and stock returns is ambiguous and leverage-dependent:
It is positive for high leverage firms, but it can turn negative for less levered firms.
This finding is striking, because it arises in a frictionless economy.2 It is due to the
different skewness sensitivity of the default options embedded in the stock: For low (high)
leverage companies, this option is far out-of-the-money (closer to be in-the-money) and
its value is more (less) sensitive to changes in skewness. Third, in contrast to single-
factor structural models of credit risk, the equilibrium joint distribution of credit spreads
and stock returns implies an ambiguous leverage-dependent sign for their correlation.
This feature gives rise to equilibrium violations of standard capital structure arbitrage
relations implied by single factor models, which are less likely for highly levered firms.
We test empirically these three model predictions using a variety of panel and Logit
regressions. We first construct measures of individual cash-flow disagreement for a large
cross-section of 337 US firms, using earning forecast data from the Institutional Brokers
Estimate System (I/B/E/S) in the period from 1996 to 2005. In a second step, we
compute an empirical proxy for the systematic component of the disagreement and
estimate by dynamic factor analysis a common component from the whole panel of
individual disagreement proxies. We find that this common component is highly counter-
cyclical and that it explains a large fraction of the variation in individual proxies, thus
supporting the conjecture that cross-sectional firm’s cash-flow uncertainty is largely
systematic.
We support the first model prediction by showing that disagreement proxies have an
unambiguously positive impact on credit spreads. A one standard deviation increase
in firm-specific disagreement increases credit spreads by approximately 18 basis points,
which is more than one third the credit spread sample standard deviation in our data.
Similarly, a one standard deviation increase in systematic disagreement increases the
2This finding can potentially help reconcile the mixed sign of the empirical link between disagreement
and stock returns found in the literature. Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) find a negative relation
between dispersion iof analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock returns. Johnson (2004) argues that if
dispersion proxies for idiosyncratic risk the return of a levered firm should decrease with dispersion.
Qu, Starks, and Yan (2004) find a positive lin between disagreement and returns using a different
scaling variable. Anderson, Ghysels, and Juergens (2005) and Banerjee (2011) also estimate a positive
relation. Avramov, Chordia, Jostova, and Philipov (2009) indicate that the negative relation between
stock returns and dispersion could be a manifestation of financial distress.
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average credit spread by about 10 basis points. These results are robust to the inclusion
of various other predictors of credit spreads, the choice of the sample period, and different
econometric methods. Our tests of the second model prediction find that disagreement
has a strong explanatory power for stock returns, but the sign of this relation depends on
leverage, a possibility that is included in the implications of the equilibrium risk-sharing
dynamics in our model. We find that one third of the firms with lowest leverage features a
negative relation, but the remaining two thirds of firms imply instead a positive relation.
Third, disagreement significantly increases the conditional likelihood of an empirical
violations of capital structure no-arbitrage restrictions implied by single-factor credit risk
models. We find that Merton’s and similar structural models’ negative relation between
credit spreads and stock prices is often empirically violated, with a frequency between
14% and 19% that tends to decrease with firm leverage.3 These patterns of arbitrage-
free violations can be well reproduced within our calibrated model and empirical proxies
of disagreement are the most significant variables in explaining the likelihood of such
violations.
Several papers have studied structurally the impact of uncertainty in equity markets, but
little is known for corporate bond markets. David (2008) extends the Merton (1974)
model to a structural regime-switching economy, in which higher uncertainty implies
higher corporate credit spreads via a convexity effect generated by the time-variation in
the solvency ratio over the business cycle. Cremers and Yan (2010) extend the intuition
in Pa´stor and Veronesi (2003) to study the effects of uncertainty about profitability
in a single period model with both equity and corporate debt. They show that the
convexity effect generated by a higher uncertainty increases stock valuations and typ-
ically dampens corporate bond prices, where this effect is stronger if firm’s leverage is
higher. Empirically, they support a positive association between stock valuation and
uncertainty, for most but not all uncertainty measures. However, they do not support
the positive association between uncertainty and credit spreads, particularly for uncer-
tainty proxies related to firm age. Korteweg and Polson (2010) take a distinct Monte
Carlo Markov Chain approach and directly add parameter uncertainty in a structural
credit risk model with exogenous firm value dynamics. Their estimation results show
that parameter uncertainty can explain up to 40% of the credit spread that is typi-
cally attributed to liquidity, taxes and jump risk, without significantly raising default
probabilities. Finally, Gu¨ntay and Hackbarth (2010) find empirically a positive relation
3Recently, Kapadia and Pu (2008) give further support to our findings by showing that the frequency
of violations in credit default swap markets can be as large as 35%.
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between credit spreads and uncertainty, based on firm-specific measures of dispersion in
analyst forecasts.
The contribution of our paper is different along several dimensions. First, we develop
a structural equilibrium model with disagreeing investors in which the predictions of
uncertainty and diversity of beliefs for the joint distribution of credit spreads and stock
returns can be consistently studied. Second, we validate empirically the model predic-
tions, while controlling for other potentially endogenous effects. Consistently with the
findings in Gu¨ntay and Hackbarth (2010), we estimate a positive link between diversity
of beliefs and credits spreads. In addition to their results, we first find that this link is
not subsumed by firm-specific explanatory variables measuring volatility or jump risk,
which are endogenously driven by uncertainty in our theoretical model. Second, our es-
timation results show that while belief disagreement systematically rises credit spreads,
it generates an ambiguous correlation with stock returns that has strong explanatory
power for the likelihood of an arbitrage-free violation in credit markets, as predicted by
our theoretical model.
Our paper also borrows from the asset pricing literature studying the effects of difference
in beliefs. Basak (2000) shows that the risk of an extraneous process uncorrelated with
fundamentals can be priced in equilibrium. Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal (2009) study
the relation between overconfidence and the excess volatility of stock returns. Buraschi
and Jiltsov (2006) analyze an economy in which belief disagreement makes options non
redundant assets and study empirically the implications for the joint behavior of index
option prices and trading volume. Our approach follows the earlier literature, but cru-
cially departs from this research by introducing the default risk dimension. This feature
complicates the solution of the equilibrium, as stocks and corporate bonds are deriva-
tives on an endogenous firm value process with stochastic volatility and skewness, and
gives rise to novel model predictions for this literature.4 Such predictions include the
ambiguous leverage-dependent character of the correlation between credit spreads and
stock returns and the direct dependence of the likelihood of a credit market arbitrage-free
violation on the degree of diversity of opinions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.1 introduces our structural
equilibrium model of credit risk with uncertainty. It then presents and discusses the
equilibrium solutions for asset prices. Section 2.2 investigates in detail the empirical
4See also a related point raised in Longstaff and Wang (2008).
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model predictions. Section 3.3 describes our data set and Section 3.4 presents the
empirical findings. Section 2.5 provides robustness checks and Section 2.6 concludes.
Proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2.1 The Economy with Uncertainty and Disagreement
We study asset prices in an economy where macro-economic uncertainty is linked to
investors’ heterogeneous beliefs on the growth opportunities of a firm financed by both
equity and debt. In reality the growth rate of future earnings and cash flows is typ-
ically unknown to economic agents and financial analysts largely disagree on it. This
additional element of uncertainty is not surprising since future cash flows depend on
several variables that are difficult to predict, like future sales and costs, the regulatory
environment, and general business conditions.
We borrow from the literature and consider a Bayesian inference framework to model
agents’ heterogeneous beliefs and learning. One line of the literature, e.g., Harris and
Raviv (1993), Detemple and Murthy (1994), Morris (1996), Basak (2000) and Buraschi
and Jiltsov (2006) assumes agents with heterogeneous prior beliefs about unobservable
economic variables. In these models agents disagree even after they update their beliefs
using identical information, but the difference in their beliefs typically converges to
zero asymptotically. In a second strand of the literature, e.g. Scheinkman and Xiong
(2003) and Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal (2009), heterogeneous beliefs follow from agents’
different perception on either the informativeness of signals or the parameters in the
dynamics of some economic variable. We follow this route in order to allow for a truly
stochastic steady-state dynamics of the disagreement process. This feature allows us to
capture the relevant link between uncertainty and belief disagreement. In our economy
investors observe the same piece of information. To circumvent the no-trade theorem
and induce trading in equilibrium, we follow the standard assumption that heterogeneous
priors are not motivated by private information, so that it is rational for agents to “agree
to disagree”.
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2.1.1 The Model
We start from the structural model of Merton (1974) and take the dynamics of the asset
cash flows of the firm as a primitive.5 The main departure from the Merton (1974)
model is the introduction of heterogeneous investors who disagree about the growth
rate of future cash flows. Investors are identical in all other aspects, such as preferences,
endowments, and risk aversion. The firm has a simple capital structure consisting of
debt and equity, where debt is the sum of two defaultable zero bonds with different
seniority and identical maturity. Since cash flows are stochastic, the firm may default
on its obligations. It follows that in equilibrium the value of the debt depends on the
probability that the firm will be able to generate enough cash flows to cover its liabilities.
Let the assets’ cash flows A(t) follow the process:
d logA(t) = µA(t)dt+ σAdWA(t),
dµA(t) = (a0A + a1AµA(t))dt + σµAdWµA(t),
where µA(t) is the cash flow’s expected growth rate, σA > 0 its volatility, a0A ∈ R the
growth rate of expected cash flow growth, a1A < 0 its mean-reversion parameter and
σµA > 0 the volatility. The vector composed of WA(t) and WµA(t) is assumed to be a
standard two–dimensional Brownian motion.
The cash flow process A(t) is observable by all investors in the economy, but the ex-
pected growth rate µA(t) is unknown and must be estimated. The volatility parameter
σµA measures the objective uncertainty of the expected future growth of firm cash flows.
It is linked to the subjective degree of uncertainty among investors via their Bayesian
updating rules and the observed realizations of A(t). Denote by mA(t) the estimated
value of the true growth rate µA(t). In practice, estimating future earnings or cash flows
is the goal of financial analysts. These forecasts inherently display some degree of sub-
jective uncertainty about firms’ future earnings. Thus, agents may eventually disagree
and have different values for miA(t), for i = 1, 2. This apparently innocuous departure
from the basic Merton model conveys some important implications. First, whereas in
Merton’s model the value of assets can be taken as exogenous, in our model it depends
on agents’ relative demands, which are functions of their subjective beliefs. This simple
5Merton’s (1974) model of credit risk assumes an exogenous firm value process with constant volatility.
Even if we treat the firm value as endogenous, the predictions of our model for the case in which there
is no disagreement are identical to those of Merton (1974).
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feature makes the equilibrium value of the firm a function of the degree of uncertainty
and belief disagreement in the economy. Second, due to market incompleteness, contin-
gent claims on the firm value cannot be priced by standard replication arguments: A
dynamic portfolio investing in the firm assets and the risk-free bond does not replicate
the payoffs of equity and corporate bonds. Additional financial assets are needed to
complete the market and their prices depend on equilibrium portfolio demands.
To reproduce a common business cycle component of belief disagreement, we assume
that the expected growth of firm cash flows is linked to a market-wide risk factor related
to the business cycle and the competitive landscape.6 We model this feature by a signal
z(t) that analysts can use to improve the estimation of the cash-flow growth rate. The
dynamics of z(t) follows a Gaussian process with a drift that is related to the drift of
firm cash flows:
dz(t) = (αµA(t) + βµz(t))dt+ σzdWz(t),
dµz(t) = (a0z + a1zµz(t))dt + σµzdWµz(t),
where σz > 0 is the volatility of the signal, a0z ∈ R the long-term growth rate of
expected signal growth, a1z < 0 the mean-reversion parameter and σµz > 0 the volatil-
ity. (Wz(t),Wµz (t))
′ is a standard two-dimensional Brownian motion independent of
(WA(t),WµA(t))
′. Investors use observations of both A(t) and z(t) to make inferences
about µA(t). When β = 0, the expected change in z(t) is perfectly correlated with
µA(t) and z(t) contains pure information about the expected growth rate of firm’s cash
flows. When β 6= 0, the expected change in z(t) is a mixture of µA(t) and the growth
rate µz(t) of another systematic risk factor, which can be linked, e.g., to market–wide
information about the state of the economy. In this way one can interpret µz(t) as the
part of aggregate expected growth rate in the economy that is orthogonal to the firm
6Therefore, it is optimal for analysts to use information that goes beyond simple evidence on historical
firm-specific cash flows (Buyd, Hu, and Jagannathan, 2005 and Beber and Brandt, 2006). Malmendier
and Tate (2005) find that especially during the new economy boom in 2000 the accounting values of some
companies were not very reliable. An imprecisely observed firm value is treated in Duffie and Lando
(2001), who show that the quality of the firm’s information disclosure can affect the term structure of
corporate bond yields. Yu (2005) finds empirically that firms with higher disclosure rankings tend to
have lower credit spreads. An imperfectly observed firm value is also modeled by C¸etin, Jarrow, Protter,
and Yildirim (2004), who assume that investors can access only a coarsened subset of the manager’s
information set. Giesecke (2004) develops a model with an imperfectly observed default boundary.
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Helwege (2003) assume that firm values are observed with one time-lag.
An industry implementation of these academic concepts is presented in CreditGradesTM, as described
in the RiskMetrics (2002) technical document, which models the unobservable distance to default by a
latent process explicitly.
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specific expected growth rate µA(t). The volatility parameter σµz then measures the
aggregate uncertainty associated with this market–wide component.
2.1.2 Modeling Uncertainty and Disagreement
We consider a simple specification for the uncertainty and disagreement in our economy.
Economic agents update their beliefs based on the available information using Bayes’
rule. The difference in their posteriors can arise either from a difference in agents’
priors or a difference in some subjective parameter value of the dynamics of cash flows
or signals. In the second case, a parsimonious model can be based on the realistic
assumption that the uncertainty parameter σµz of the market-wide expected component
µz(t) is agent dependent. We follow this assumption below when we derive a set of
testable empirical predictions of our model.
Given that the model–implied state dynamics is conditionally Gaussian, the Bayesian
prior updating rules of each agent follow with standard arguments, and the heterogeneity
in beliefs can be completely summarized by the differences in meansmi(t) and covariance
matrices γi(t) across agents.
Let mi(t) := (miA(t),m
i
z(t))
′ := Ei
(
(µA(t), µz(t))
′|FYt
)
, where FYt := FA,zt is the in-
formation generated by A(t) and z(t) up to time t, and Ei(·) denotes expectation rel-
ative to the subjective probability of investor i = 1, 2. Let also Y (t) = (logA(t), z(t)),
b1 = diag(σ1µA , σ
1
µz), a0 = (a0A, a0z)
′, a1 = diag(a1A, a1z), B = diag(σA, σZ) and
A =
(
1 0
α β
)
. The (posterior) belief dynamics of agent one then follows by a standard
application of the Kalman-Bucy filter:
dm1(t) = (a0 + a1m
1(t))dt+ γ1(t)A′B−1dW 1Y (t), (2.1)
dγ1(t)/dt = a1γ
1(t) + γ1(t)a′1 + b
1b1′ − γ1(t)A′(BB′)−1Aγ1(t), (2.2)
with initial conditionsm1(0) = m10 and γ
1(0) = γ10 , where dW
1
Y (t) := B
−1 (dY (t)−Am1(t)dt)
is the innovation process induced by the first investor’s belief and filtration.7 To com-
pletely specify the disagreement structure in the economy, we finally specify the dis-
agreement process implied by the learning dynamics of agent two. This process is the
7A formal proof of this result can be found in Liptser and Shiryaev (2000); see also the technical
Appendix.
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key state variable driving all equilibrium quantities in our economy. It is defined by the
two dimensional process:
Ψ(t) :=
(
ΨA(t)
Ψz(t)
)
=
(
(m1A(t)−m2A(t))/σA
(m1z(t)−m2z(t))/σz
)
.
The first component of Ψ(t) measures disagreement about the expected growth rate of
future firm cash flows, while the second component measures the disagreement about
the market-wide signal z(t). Since the market wide uncertainty parameter σµz influences
the subjective dynamics of each individual belief mi(t), it also has implications for the
stochastic properties of the disagreement process itself. The dynamics for Ψ(t) follows
directly:
dΨ(t) = B−1
(
a1B + γ
2(t)A′B−1
)
Ψ(t)dt+B−1(γ1(t)− γ2(t))A′B−1dW 1Y (t), (2.3)
with initial conditions Ψ(0) = (m1A(0) − m2A(0))/σA, (m1z(0) − m2z(0))/σz , where γ2(t)
satisfies the same differential equation as γ1(t), but with agent specific parameter b1
replaced by b2. The dynamics of m1(t) and Ψ(t) completely characterize the beliefs in-
duced by investors’ priors and filtrations. Heterogeneity in prior beliefs alone is sufficient
to let investors disagree about µA(t) and µz(t) at all times, even when they agree on the
dynamics of cash flows and signals (i.e. b1 = b2), but in this case heterogeneity in beliefs
vanishes asymptotically.8 If prior variances are also identical (γ1(0) = γ2(0)) then the
disagreement process is deterministic, as in the model solved by Buraschi and Jiltsov
(2006). We consider a model with truly stochastic disagreement dynamics, in which
heterogeneity in beliefs does not vanish asymptotically, by assuming that b1 6= b2, i.e.,
we allow for the presence of heterogeneous subjective uncertainty across agents. Note
that since both µA(t) and µz(t) are unobservable, the parameter b
i cannot be uniquely
inferred by investors from the quadratic variation of these processes. Moreover, we
emphasize that the average level and the heterogeneity of the subjective uncertainty
parameters across agents both impact directly on the steady-state distribution of the
disagreement process implied by dynamics (3.1). This feature offers a natural interesting
link between economic uncertainty and the stochastic properties of the heterogeneity in
beliefs, which motivates the use of belief disagreement proxies as indicators of economic
uncertainty in our tests of the main empirical predictions of the model.
8Acemoglu, Chernozhukov, and Yildiz (2008) show that when agents are uncertain about a random
variable and about the informativeness of a signal even an infinite sequence of signal observations does
not lead agents’ heterogeneous prior beliefs to converge.
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Remark: Our way of modeling disagreement and the economy with heterogeneous beliefs
is related to, but distinct from models that study the impact of behavioral biases on
asset prices. In Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) and Hong, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006),
risk neutral investors subject to short-selling constraints update their beliefs based on
their personal interpretations of incoming news. It follows that trading occurs whenever
investors valuations “cross”, i.e., whenever the more optimistic investor switches to
being the more pessimistic. In a world in which investors interpret news differently, the
greater news stimulus associated with an asset leads to a higher time-series variability
of investors’ relative valuations and larger trading volumes via the “crossing”. At the
same time, the short-sales constraint makes some assets overpriced relative to others,
so that their valuation reflects more the opinion of the optimist. In contrast, in an
economy without constraints the stock price simply reflects the value-weighted average
opinion.9 In our model, agents are rational, but risk averse, and short-selling is allowed.
The local volatility of the growth rate of the underlying state variables is unknown and
cannot be estimated from the quadratic variations of the drift, because the drift itself is
unobservable. Thus, agents can disagree without imposing an axiomatic behavioral bias
assumption. Even without short-selling constraints, uncertainty affects asset prices in
our economy. This is consistent with the less important role of short-selling restrictions
in bond markets; see, e.g., Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005).
2.1.3 The Link Between Economic Uncertainty and Belief Disagree-
ment
An important characteristic of the data is an apparent link between economic uncer-
tainty and belief disagreement. This relationship is well motivated within our model
setting because the disagreement dynamics (3.1) explicitly depend on the value of the
subjective uncertainty parameter σiµz , i = 1, 2, of investors. Intuitively, a higher value
of subjective uncertainty impacts more on the drift of Ψ(t), while the difference in sub-
jective uncertainty between agent 1 and 2 will mainly have an impact on the diffusion of
Ψ(t). Note that if the subjective uncertainty parameters of agent 1 and 2 are identical,
i.e. σ1µz = σ
2
µz , then the disagreement process is deterministic. On the other hand, we
9Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2002) derive similar implications for a setting with heterogeneous
beliefs in which short-selling is allowed but costly.
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find that the higher the average subjective uncertainty (subjective uncertainty variabil-
ity) across agents in the model, the higher is the average disagreement (disagreement
variability).
The steady state distribution of Ψ(t) in our economy is Gaussian and follows easily from
equation (3.1):
Ψ(t)|Ψ(0) ∼ N
(
etMΨ(0), tetMB−1
(
γ1 − γ2)A′(BB′)−1A (γ1 − γ2)B−1etM),
where M = B−1
(
a1B + γ
2A′B−1
)
; the solution γi of the matrix Riccati equation
0 = a1γ
i + γia′1 + b
ibi
′ − γiA′(BB′)−1Aγi ; i = 1, 2, (2.4)
is the steady state variance covariance matrix of the learning dynamics of agent i = 1, 2
in the model. The closed-form expression for γi is given by:
γi =
(
F
1/2
i −
(
a′1 + a1
)
/2
)−1
bibi′, (2.5)
where F
1/2
i is the square root of matrix Fi = b
ibi′A′(BB′)−1A + a1a′1, and it makes
explicit the dependence of the moments of the steady state distribution of Ψ(t) on
the subjective uncertainty parameters σµ1z and σµ2z . Even if this dependence is highly
nonlinear and dependent on all model parameters, we find that the first and second
moments of the steady-state distribution of Ψ(t) are both increasing in the average
subjective uncertainty σ¯µz ≡ 12
(
σ1µz + σ
2
µz
)
. Similarly, the variance of this distribution
is increasing in the cross sectional uncertainty heterogeneity ∆σµz ≡ σ1µz − σ2µz .
To illustrate concretely these model features, we depict in Figure 2.1 the comparative
statics of the steady state mean and standard deviation of Ψz(t) with respect to the
average subjective uncertainty σµz and the difference in uncertainty ∆σµz .
An increase in σ¯µz (∆σµz) increases the expectation (variance) of the steady-state distri-
bution of Ψz(t). These findings give a theoretical support in our model for the positive
link between uncertainty and disagreement in the data. ∆σµz has virtually no effect on
the expected value of Ψz(t), so that average disagreement is indeed mostly driven by
the the average subjective uncertainty in the economy. The variance of Ψz(t), instead,
is mostly driven by the heterogeneity in subjective uncertainty in the economy. When
∆σµz is zero, the variance of the disagreement process vanishes. Average uncertainty
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Figure 2.1: Disagreement as a Function of Average Uncertainty and Differ-
ence in Uncertainty
We plot the first and second moment of the steady state distribution of Ψz as a function of the average
uncertainty, i.e. σ¯µz ≡
1
2
(
σ1µz + σ
2
µz
)
and the agent perceived difference in uncertainty, i.e. ∆σµz ≡
σ1µz − σ
2
µz .
σ¯µz also increases the variance of Ψz(t). This last effect is more pronounced for settings
of low average uncertainty and large uncertainty heterogeneity. These features suggest
that periods of high average subjective uncertainty and high uncertainty heterogene-
ity might be those associated with the largest average disagreement and disagreement
variability over time. Overall, our model suggests a clear link between uncertainty and
belief disagreement, which motivates our interpretation of common and firm specific
belief disagreement proxies as indicators of economic uncertainty.
Remark: The role of economic uncertainty has been studied from a different angle by
Bansal and Yaron (2004), among others, who find that time varying uncertainty directly
affects the risk premia of financial assets in a representative agent economy displaying
recursive preferences. In a similar spirit, Lettau, Ludvigson, and Wachter (2008) study
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macroeconomic risk and investigate a learning model where both first and second mo-
ments of consumption growth can switch according to a Markov Chain. In these mod-
els, objective economic uncertainty carries a risk premium if and only if agents have
Epstein-Zin recursive utility. Bekaert, Engstrom, and Xing (2008) study an economy
with a time-varying conditional variance of fundamentals and external habit utility.
In this way, the authors disentangle the different implications of a time-varying risk
aversion and economic uncertainty. In our model, subjective uncertainty influences the
dynamic properties of the disagreement process and the optimal risk sharing among
agents. This feature generates direct asset pricing implications also when investors have
time-additive preferences. Economic uncertainty in our setting also has a distinct role
in the growing literature based on (recursive) multiple-priors utility; see, for instance,
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and Epstein and Schneider (2008).10 In our model, in-
dividual investors are uncertain about future growth opportunities but do not display
any ambiguity aversion as they make their decisions using a single prior. The difference
in beliefs approach has the important empirical advantage that it can be more easily
proxied from the data than individual-specific multiple priors.
2.1.4 Investors’ Preferences, Financial Markets and Equilibrium
We work in a standard two-agent economy populated by investors with heterogeneous
beliefs, but identical in all other aspects. Agents maximize life-time expected power
utility subject to their budget constraint:11
V i = sup
ci
Ei
(∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
ci(t)
1−γ
1− γ dt
∣∣∣FY0
)
, (2.6)
where ci(t) is the consumption of agent i = 1, 2 at time t, γ > 0 is the relative risk
aversion coefficient, and ρ ≥ 0 is the time preference rate. Investors finance their con-
sumption plans by trading in financial assets. In contrast to Merton’s (1974) structural
10There is also a number of important applications linked to multiple-priors utility in the context of
robust optimal control problems (Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini, 1999, Cagetti, Hansen, Sargent, and
Williams, 2002, Maenhout, 2004, Leippold, Vanini, and Trojani, 2008). None of these papers studies
the equilibrium interaction of heterogeneous agents. In most of these models, ambiguity averse investors
typically act as if assuming a worst case scenario in terms of mean earnings.
11In many standard models without disagreement, power utility implies low credit spreads and a
low equity premium. In the attempt to solve for these tensions, Chen, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein
(2008) and Bhamra, Ku¨hn, and Strebulaev (2008) study representative agent economies with recursive
preferences.
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model, trading in the risk-less bond and the assets of the firm does not complete the mar-
ket. Uncertainty influences the prices of all financial assets, which – from the perspective
of agent one – can be written as functions of the two-dimensional filtered Brownian mo-
tion W 1Y (t) in equation (3.1). It follows that at least one additional financial asset is
needed to determine a unique stochastic discount factor. We focus on an economy in-
cluding corporate bonds and equity. We denote with r(t) the interest rate on the risk-less
bond, assumed to be in zero net supply, with S(t) the price of the stock of the firm, in
positive net supply, and with Bs(t) (Bj(t)) the price of the senior (junior) bond, also in
positive supply. V (t) denotes the value of the single firm in our economy.
Definition 2.1 (Equilibrium). An equilibrium consists of a unique stochastic discount
factor such that: (I) given equilibrium prices, all agents in the economy solve the op-
timization problem (3.2), subject to their budget constraint. (II) Good and financial
markets clear.
The equilibrium is solved using the martingale approach, originally developed by Cox
and Huang (1986). The extension to the case of heterogeneous beliefs has been stud-
ied, among others, by Cuoco and He (1994), Karatzas and Shreve (1998), and Basak
and Cuoco (1998). In this extension, a stochastic weighting process λ(t) captures the
equilibrium impact of belief disagreement. Optimal consumption policies are of the
form ci(t) =
(
yiξ
i(t)
)−1/γ
, where yi is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the static
budget constraint of agent i and ξi is the state-price density of this agent. Under the
given assumptions, closed-form expressions for ci(t) and ξ
i(t) in terms of the exogenous
state-variables follow with standard computations.
In equilibrium, the individual state price densities of agent one and two are:
ξ1(t) =
e−ρt
y1
A(t)−γ
(
1 + λ(t)1/γ
)γ
, ξ2(t) =
e−ρt
y2
A(t)−γ
(
1 + λ(t)1/γ
)γ
λ(t)−1,
where the weighting process λ(t) = y1ξ
1(t)/(y2ξ
2(t)) follows the dynamics:
dλ(t)
λ(t)
= −ΨA(t)dW 1A(t)−
(
αΨA(t)
σA
σz
+ βΨz(t)
)
dW 1z (t) . (2.7)
Individual state price densities are functions of the exogenous cash flow process A(t)
and the weighting process λ(t). The dynamics of λ(t) is completely described by the
disagreement process Ψ(t), which determines the volatility of λ(t). Thus, in contrast to
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the classical Merton (1974) model, the stochastic discount factor is a function of both
A(t) and Ψ(t). When agents agree, i.e. Ψ(t) = 0 and b1 = b2, we obtain as a special
case Merton’s economy with identical agents, the relative weight λ(t) is equal to one
and optimal consumption plans across investors are proportional.12 When agents have
different subjective beliefs, i.e. Ψ(t) 6= 0, they implement different optimal consumption
plans. Optimistic investors consume more in states associated with high aggregate cash
flows, at a lower marginal utility of consumption, because they perceive these states as
more likely. Similarly, pessimistic investors have a lower marginal utility in states of
low aggregate cash flows. It follows that the relative consumption share of the optimist
is higher (lower) in states of high (low) aggregate cash flows.13 This feature has direct
implications for the equilibrium stochastic discount factor.
The impact of disagreement on the stochastic discount factor yields another important
difference with respect to the classical Merton (1974) model for the shape of the risk
premia.
Let θiA and θ
i
z be the subjective market prices of risk for cash flow and signal shocks of
agent i. Itoˆ’s Lemma applied to the state price density equilibrium expressions implies
the following well-known result:
θ1A(t) = γσA +ΨA(t)
(
1 + λ(t)1/γ
)−1
λ(t)1/γ , θ1z(t) =
(
1 + λ(t)1/γ
)−1
λ(t)1/γ
(
αΨA(t)
σA
σz
+ βΨz(t)
)
,
θ2A(t) = γσA −ΨA(t)
(
1 + λ(t)1/γ
)−1
, θ2z(t) = −
(
1 + λ(t)1/γ
)−1 (
αΨA(t)
σA
σz
+ βΨz(t)
)
.
The market prices of firm cash flow shocks θiA(t) is the sum of two terms. The first
term is the standard price of risk that is also found in the homogeneous Merton (1974)
economy. It is the product of relative risk aversion and cash flow risk. The second
term is due to the belief heterogeneity. Since the stochastic discount factor depends on
λ(t), the market prices of risk contain a term related to the volatility of this process,
which is proportional to the disagreement index Ψ(t). This is due to the fact that belief-
dependent state prices are necessary in order to support belief-dependent consumption
shares. When Ψ(t) 6= 0, the market-wide signal is priced. When this signal is related
to cash flow growth (α > 0), agents use it to improve their beliefs on future firm cash
12To focus on the impact of disagreement, we always assume identical initial endowments of the total
cash flow stream A(t) across investors.
13The cyclical behavior of the consumption share is reflected in the dynamics of the stochastic weight
λ(t): If agent one (agent two) is optimistic about future cash flows, the stochastic weight is counter-
cyclical (pro-cyclical) because the individual marginal utilities of consumption are proportional to the
price of the underlying state.
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flows. At the same time, higher signal volatility generates higher asset price volatility.14
The market prices of risk perceived by the optimist are greater than those perceived by
the pessimist. The economic intuition is simple: In equilibrium, trading occurs between
investors who have to finance their different optimal consumption plans. The pessimist
buys financial protection against low cash flow states from the optimist. This excess
demand lowers the price of securities with positive exposure to cash flow shocks, and the
risk implied by bad cash flow states is transferred to the optimist. If a negative state
occurs, the more optimistic agent is hit twice: First, because the aggregate endowment
is lower; second, because her relative consumption share is lower due to the protection
agreement. The size of this risk transfer is proportional to the size of the disagreement
among agents Ψ(t).
2.1.5 Pricing of Financial Assets
Given the expressions for the individual state price densities ξ1(t) and ξ2(t), we can
price any contingent claim in the economy by computing expectations of its contingent
payoffs weighted by state price densities.
We assume that the firm repayment structure satisfies a strict priority rule, in which
payments to the junior bond holders are made only if the contractual payments to the
senior bond holders have been made. As in the Merton (1974) model, default occurs
only at maturity of the corporate bonds, if the value of the assets of the firm is less than
the face value of these bonds. We assume zero-bankruptcy costs. Therefore, in the event
of default, equity holders are left with a zero price of equity and the corporate bond
holders share the residual firm value according to the pre-specified seniority rules. To
focus on the implications of disagreement in credit risk, we keep the default structure as
simple as possible and do not explore more general default rules or more flexible default
and liquidation procedures.15 In this setting, the price of the senior bond is the sum of
the prices of the zero-coupon bond and the price of a short put option on the firm value.
14Since the signal is not an explicit argument of consumer preferences, the economy generates dynamics
that could be interpreted or labeled as having “excess volatility”. It is also interesting to notice that
even if there would be no disagreement on the dynamics of the market-wide signal z(t), but agents were
to disagree on the firm’s factor loadings β, then the risk of unexpected innovations in the signal would
still affect agents optimal behavior and equilibrium market prices.
15See, e.g., Black and Cox (1976) for a model with premature default. Anderson and Sundaresan
(1996) and Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) model strategic debt service. Broadie, Chernov, and
Sundaresan (2007) propose a setting that incorporates Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 issues.
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Similarly, the price of equity is the firm value residual in excess of the price of the total
corporate debt.
To compute the expectations in the relevant pricing expressions, the joint density of
A(t), λ(t), and the contingent claim payoff is needed, since the equilibrium stochastic
discount factor is a function of both A(t) and λ(t). The joint distribution of A(t) and
λ(t) is typically unavailable in closed-form. However, we can calculate their joint Laplace
transform in closed-form, which can be used, in a second step, to price more efficiently
all securities using Fourier transform methods. In this way, we can avoid a pricing
approach that relies exclusively on Monte Carlo simulation methods, which would be
too computationally intensive in our setting, especially in the computation of corporate
credit spreads and stock prices. For convenience, we compute the Laplace transform of
A(t) and λ(t) in the case σ1µz 6= σ2µz , which admits a steady-state distribution for the
relevant state variables in our model. The following technical Lemma, which draws upon
Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal (2009), gives the required result.16
Lemma 2.2. The joint Laplace transform of A(t) and λ(t) under the belief of agent one
is given by:
E1t
((
A(T )
A(t)
)(λ(T )
λ(t)
)χ)
= Fm1A
(m1A, t, T ; )FΨA,Ψz (ΨA,Ψz, t, T ; , χ) , (2.8)
where
Fm1A
(m1A, t, T ; ) = exp
(

a1A
(
−a0Aτ +
(
a0A
a1A
+m1A
)
(ea1Aτ − 1)
)
+
1
2
(− 1)σ2Aτ
+
2
4a21A
(
γ2A
σA
)2 (
3− 4ea1Aτ + e2a1Aτ + 2a1Aτ
)
+
2γ2A
a1A
(
−τ + 1
a1A
(ea1Aτ − 1)
))
, (2.9)
with τ = T − t and
FΨA,Ψz(ΨA,Ψz, t, T ; , χ) = e
A0(τ)+B1(τ)ΨA+B2(τ)Ψz+C1(τ)Ψ
2
A+C2(τ)Ψ
2
z+D0(τ)ΨAΨz , (2.10)
for functions A0, B1, B2, C1, C2 and D0 detailed in the proof in the Appendix.
16In contrast to Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal (2009), however, we can reduce the system of ordinary
differential equations for functions A0, B1, B2, C1, C2 and D0 to a system of matrix Riccati equations.
Matrix Riccati equations can be linearized using Radon’s Lemma. In this way, we obtain fully explicit
expressions for the coefficients in the exponentially quadratic solution for the Laplace transform.
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The Laplace transform in Lemma 2.2 depends on m1A(t), ΨA(t), and Ψz(t). The de-
pendence on m1A(t) is exponentially affine. The dependence on ΨA(t) and Ψz(t) is
exponentially quadratic. Using the closed–form characteristic function of A(t) and λ(t),
we can now price the contingent claims in the economy by Fourier inversion and Monte
Carlo methods. The spirit of the Fourier inversion approach is similar to the one used to
price derivatives in stochastic volatility models, such as Heston (1993), Duffie, Pan, and
Singleton (2000), and Carr, Geman, Madan, and Yor (2001), or in interest-rate models,
such as Chacko and Das (2002).
The pricing expressions for the contingent claims in our economy are summarized in the
next technical Lemma.
Lemma 2.3. Let
G(t, T, x; ΨA,Ψz) ≡
∫
∞
0
(
1 + λ(T )1/γ
1 + λ(t)1/γ
)γ [
1
2pi
∫ +∞
−∞
(
λ(T )
λ(t)
)
−iχ
FΨA,Ψz(ΨA,Ψz, t, T ;x, iχ)dχ
]
dλ(T )
λ(T )
.
1. The equilibrium firm value is:
V (t) := V (A,m1A,ΨA,Ψz) = A(t)
∫
∞
t
e−ρ(u−t)Fm1
A
(m1A, t, u; 1− γ)G(t, u, 1− γ; ,ΨA,Ψz)du.
2. The equilibrium price of the corporate zero-coupon bond is:
B(t, T ) := B(t, T ;m1A,ΨA,Ψz) = e
−ρ(T−t)Fm1
A
(m1A, t, T ;−γ)G(t, T,−γ; ΨA,Ψz).
3. The equilibrium price of the senior defaultable bond is:
Bs(t, T ) := Bs(t, T ;A,m1A,ΨA,Ψz),
= B(t, T )− E1t
(
e−ρ(T−t)
(
A(t)
A(T )
1 + λ(T )1/γ
1 + λ(t)1/γ
)γ
(K1 − V (T ))+
)
.
4. The equilibrium price of the junior defaultable bond is:
Bj(t, T ) := Bj(t, T ;A,m1A,ΨA,Ψz),
= E1t
(
e−ρ(T−t)
(
A(t)
A(T )
1 + λ(T )1/γ
1 + λ(t)1/γ
)γ (
(V (T )−K1)+ − (V (T )− (K1 +K2))+
))
.
5. The equilibrium price of equity is:
S(t) := S(t, T ;A,m1A,ΨA,Ψz) = V (t)−Bs(t, T )−Bj(t, T ).
Chapter 2. Economic Uncertainty, Disagreement and Credit Markets 33
Firm value and risk-less zero bond prices are in semi-closed form, up to a numerical
integration. We note, however, that corporate bond and stock prices, which are options
written on the firm value, require a Monte Carlo simulation step in their computation.
From the expressions in Lemma 2.3, we can study the dependence of corporate credit
spreads and the price of equity on the degree of disagreement about cash flows and the
market-wide signal. In this way, we can obtain testable empirical predictions of our
model for the joint behavior of belief disagreement, credit spreads, and stock returns.
We focus on the following main questions, which give rise to the null hypotheses tested
in the empirical part of the paper:
Q1. What is the relation between uncertainty, belief disagreement, and credit spreads?
Q2. Does time variation in uncertainty create a structural link between stock returns
volatility and credit spreads?
Q3. What is the link between stock returns, uncertainty, and belief disagreement?
Q4. Does heterogeneity in beliefs help to explain no arbitrage violations of single factor
credit risk models?
2.2 Model Predictions
We use the solutions of the model to develop empirical predictions for the joint behavior
of credit spreads, stock prices, and stock volatility, as a function of the difference in
beliefs. We compute equilibrium quantities with respect to the steady-state distribution
of beliefs, which is non–trivial, assuming that agents disagree about σµz . We then
calibrate the model to the cash–flow dynamics of a representative firm in our sample.
Table 3.1 summarizes the set of calibrated parameters. We assume a level of risk aversion
equal to 2 and a firm cash flows volatility equal to 7% (Zhang, 2006).17 The calibrated
values of the learning parameters are consistent with the estimates obtained in Xia
(2001) and Brennan and Xia (2001). The median difference in beliefs of firms’ future
earnings in our I/B/E/S forecast data is 0.22. Consequently, in our comparative statics
we consider disagreement ΨA(t) and Ψz(t) between zero and 0.2.
17Brennan and Xia (2001), Aı¨t-Sahalia, Parker, and Yogo (2004) and Chen, Collin-Dufresne, and
Goldstein (2008) use risk aversion parameters between six and ten. The main focus of these studies,
however, is the equity premium puzzle.
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Table 2.1: Choice of Parameter Values and Benchmark Values of State Variables
This table lists the parameter values used for all figures in the paper. We calibrate to the mean and
volatility of the time-series average of operating cash flow for all firms present in our database. Operating
cash flow is earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat item 18) minus total accruals, scaled by
average total assets (Compustat item 6), where total accruals are equal to changes in current assets
(Compustat item 4) minus changes in cash (Compustat item 1), changes in current liabilities (Compustat
item 5), and depreciation expense (Compustat item 14) plus changes in short-term debt (Compustat
item 34). The initial values for the conditional variances are set to their steady-state variances. Agent
specific values are consistent with estimated values from Brennan and Xia (2001).
Parameters for Cash Flow
Long-term growth rate of cash flow growth a0A 0.01
Mean-reversion parameter of cash flow growth a1A -0.01
Volatility of cash flow σA 0.07
Initial level of cash flow A 1.00
Initial level of cash flow growth m1A 0.01
Parameters for Signal
Long-term growth rate of signal a0z 0.01
Mean-reversion parameter of signal a1z -0.03
Volatility of signal σz 0.06
Agent specific Parameters
Relative risk aversion for both agents γ 2.00
Time Preference Parameter ρ 0.02
2.2.1 Credit Spreads and the Volatility of Stock Returns
It is well–known that the Merton (1974) model implies corporate credit spreads which are
on average too low. Structural credit risk models fail to explain credit spreads especially
for firms with high credit ratings; see, e.g., Eom, Helwege, and Huang (2004), Huang
and Huang (2004) and David (2007) for an alternative explanation. This is known as
the “credit spread puzzle”. We find that belief disagreement can help to explain this
puzzle: An increase in the difference in beliefs reduces the firm value and increases the
risk premium for the default event, by lowering the risk-neutral skewness of the firm.
These features generate the higher credit spreads, even if the probability of default is
held below 4% for low leverage firms. To illustrate this effect, the right panel of Figure
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2.2 shows that as ΨA(t) and Ψz(t) increase from zero to 0.2, the senior credit spread
increases by 29%, from 123 to 159 basis points, even for moderate levels of risk aversion.
This increase is larger than the standard deviation of credit spreads for senior debt in
our data set. For a larger relative risk aversion γ = 3, the increase in credit spreads is
as large as 45 basis points.
These features give rise to a testable empirical prediction, which is directly related to
the question Q1 raised at the end of Section 2.1:
• H1: Uncertainty-DiB and credit spreads are positively related.
Another main implication of our model is that disagreement increases at the same time
the volatility of equity.18 This feature is important because Campbell and Taksler
(2003) have documented empirically a positive co-movement between credit spreads and
the volatility of stock returns, which even exceeds the co–movement predicted by stan-
dard structural models.19 Our model offers a structural explanation for these findings,
in which the co–movement between credit spreads and equity volatility follows endoge-
nously from the time-variation of the difference in beliefs. The left panel of Figure 2.2
shows, for the same scenario as above, that the volatility of equity increases from 7%
to 29% as disagreement increases; see the left panel of Figure 2.2. For firms with lower
leverage, not shown in Figure 2.2, the volatility increases to 20%. These volatilities are
consistent with the average volatility of stock returns in our data set.
These findings give rise to a second testable empirical prediction, related to question Q2
at the end of Section 2.1:
• H2: As Uncertainty-DiB varies, credit spreads and stock volatility co-move posi-
tively.
2.2.1.1 Understanding the Link between Difference in Beliefs and the Price
of Default
To understand the economic link between belief disagreement, stock volatility and the
price of default risk, it is convenient to investigate the equilibrium properties of the firm
18The detailed specification of the equity volatility is derived in the technical Appendix.
19This finding has been documented also by Zhang, Zhou, and Zhu (2006), and Avramov, Jostova, and
Philipov (2007), using reduced form models. Chen, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein (2008) and Bhamra,
Ku¨hn, and Strebulaev (2008) obtain similar effects from two consumption-based equilibrium models.
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Figure 2.2: Equity Volatility and Senior Bond Credit Spreads for High
Leverage Ratio
These figures plot equity volatility (left panel) and senior bond credit spreads (right panel) for a high
leverage ratio ratio as a function of difference in beliefs ΨA(t) and the common disagreement, Ψz(t).
The parameter values used are given in Table 3.1.
value process in our economy. When ΨA(t) = Ψz(t) = 0 the model implications are
those of Merton’s (1974): At the calibrated parameters the firm value is 161 and the
constant firm value volatility is 7%. Disagreement across investors affects the equilibrium
stochastic discount factor and thus prices of all financial assets. Figure 2.3 (left panel)
shows that the firm value decreases with disagreement about cash flows and the signal
between agent one and two: An increase in ΨA(t) and Ψz(t) from zero to 0.2 reduces
the equilibrium (asset) value of the firm by approximately 1.5%. Therefore, this effect
has a negative impact on corporate bond prices, which contain a short put position on
the firm value.
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Figure 2.3: Firm Value, Firm Value Volatility, and Risk-Neutral Skewness
These figures plot the firm value, the firm value volatility, and the firm value risk-neutral skewness as a function of belief disagreement about cash flow
ΨA(t) and the common disagreement, Ψz(t). The parameter values used are given in Table 3.1.
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To understand this finding, it is helpful to compare the discount factor of the optimistic
agent in our model with the stochastic discount factor in Merton’s (1974) model. The
stochastic discount factor of the optimist can be written as:
ξi(t) =
1
yi
e−ρtA(t)−γsi(t)
−γ , (2.11)
where si(t) = ci(t)/A(t) is this investor’s share of total consumption A(t) and ξi(t)
is proportional to the marginal utility of a stochastic share si(t) of total consumption
A(t). In the economy with homogeneous beliefs, this share is a constant that depends
only on the tightness of the individual budget constraints (i.e., the ratio y1/y2). Thus,
the discount factor is simply proportional to the marginal utility A(t)−γ of aggregate
consumption. In the economy with disagreement, the random share si(t) is greater
(lower) when A(t) is higher (lower). Therefore, in good (bad) cash flow states, the
marginal utility of the optimist has a larger (lower) impact on the stochastic discount
factor. Since in good (bad) states the marginal utility of the optimist (pessimist) is
lower, the present value of future cash flows is lower, implying a lower equilibrium firm
value than in the economy with homogeneous beliefs. To implement the optimal ex-ante
consumption plan, the optimist (pessimist) buys financial assets that finance the higher
future consumption share in good (bad) cash flow states. Therefore, in the competitive
equilibrium the optimist sells financial protection against low cash flow states to the
pessimist. It follows that the additional risk created by the stochastic consumption
share in the economy is compensated to investors in an asymmetric way because the
individual state prices are proportional to different marginal utilities. Since the optimist
(pessimist) perceives a lower (higher) state price for large cash flow states, the market
price of risk of cash flow shocks is higher (lower) for the optimist (pessimist).
An important feature of the stochastic discount factor (2.11) is that its volatility is
stochastic when the consumption share is stochastic. When disagreement is zero, si(t)
is constant and the volatility of dξi(t)/ξi(t) is proportional to the volatility of firm cash
flows: The firm value process features a constant volatility as in Merton’s (1974) model.
When beliefs are heterogeneous, the volatility of si(t) is stochastic and proportional to
Ψ(t) because it depends on the volatility of the ratio of individual marginal utilities of
optimal consumption. It follows that the volatility of the firm value is also stochastic
and increasing with the degree of belief disagreement. A higher uncertainty about future
state prices therefore increases the volatility of the discounted value of future cash flows.
Figure 2.3 (middle panel) shows a plot of the firm value volatility (obtained from Itoˆ’s
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Lemma). At the calibrated parameters an increase in ΨA(t) and Ψz(t) to 0.2 increases
the equilibrium firm value volatility from 7% to approximately 12.5%. Since equity is a
call option on the firm value, a higher volatility of the underlying in the economy with
heterogeneous beliefs produces a higher stock volatility. At the same time, it further
reduces corporate bond prices.
As disagreement varies over time, we obtain a negative co–movement between firm value
and firm value volatility. This feature generates a moderate negative skewness of the
physical distribution of the firm value, which yields a moderate increase of the physical
probability of default from 3.2% (5.6%) to 4% (7.1%) for low (high) leverage firms.20 It
is well-known that negative skewness can also be obtained in partial equilibrium models
with jumps.21 In our model, negative skewness arises endogenously, even if cash flows
and security prices do not include a jump component. This follows from the form of
the equilibrium stochastic discount factor. Using Itoˆ’s Lemma, the diffusion term of the
dynamics of the individual stochastic discount factors is given by:
dξi(t)/ξi(t)− Et[dξi(t)/ξi(t)] = − (γσA + (1 − si(t))ΨA(t)) dW iA(t)
−(1− si(t))
(
αΨA(t)
σA
σz
+ βΨz(t)
)
dW iz(t), (2.12)
where si(t) = ci(t)/A(t) is the share of agent i of total consumption. It follows that
the volatility of the individual state prices is asymmetric and systematically related to
the consumption share of agents in the economy: A positive cash flow or signal shock
lowers the volatility of the individual stochastic discount factors, and vice versa. This
feature is due to the decreasing marginal utility of consumption of the two investors and
generates endogenously the negative skewness in the economy.
A second key point in the understanding of the behavior of the price of default-dependent
securities in our economy is the link between Uncertainty-DiB and the firm value risk
neutral skewness, which directly measures the price of likely default states. Consistent
with the feature for the physical measure, the model also generates endogenously a
pronounced negative risk–neutral skewness. Figure 2.3, right panel, illustrates the link
between difference in beliefs and risk–neutral skewness: An increase in ΨA(t) and Ψz(t)
20For comparison, the average default probability of senior secured bonds between 1980 and 2006 is
4.3%, according to Moody’s Corporate Default and Recovery Rates Report 2007. The positive relation
between default probabilities and volatility is consistent with the recent evidence documented in Bharath
and Shumway (2008). Further recent studies on default probabilities include Vassalou and Xing (2004),
Duffie, Saita, and Wang (2006), and Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008).
21See Pan (2002) for an application in option pricing, and Zhang, Zhou, and Zhu (2006), Cremers,
Driessen, and Maenhout (2008) and Tauchen and Zhou (2006), in credit risk
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from zero to 0.2 decreases the risk-neutral skewness of the firm value from zero to -0.5.22
This feature is important because it generates a further effect that directly influences
corporate bonds and equity prices, given that they are non-linear claims on firm’s asset
values. It implies a large disagreement-induced risk premium for the default event, which
can have a substantial impact on the price of default-dependent securities, even if the
physical probability of default at the calibrated parameters is less than 4%.
2.2.2 Price of Equity, Skewness of Stock Returns and Capital Struc-
ture Arbitrage
Credit risk models inspired by the structural (partial equilibrium) approach of Merton
(1974) imply negative correlations between stock prices and credit spreads. In this
approach, corporate debt and equity are different (non-linear but monotonic) contingent
claims collateralized by the same balance sheet. Since firm’s cash flows act as the
single pricing factor, negative cash-flow shocks reduce the value of any claim in the
capital structure. The correlation between corporate bond spreads and equity prices is
restricted, by no-arbitrage, to be negative at all times and states. This link forms the
basis of capital structure arbitrage strategies, which are based on relative value analysis
and implemented using different parts of the capital structure, as well as over-the-counter
contracts such as CDS.
In our economy, the volatility and risk-neutral skewness of the firm value are stochastic.
For firms with different degrees of leverage, we find that the price of equity can either
increase or decrease with disagreement. This feature has important implications for
the sign of the co–movement of credit spreads and stock prices, which is crucial for the
successful implementation of capital structure arbitrage strategies.
Figure 2.4 illustrates the different effects of an increase in the disagreement ΨA(t) and
Ψz(t), conditional on a low or a high firm leverage.
For high leverage firms, an increase in ΨA(t) and Ψz(t) to 0.2 lowers the price of equity
by 1 percent. For low leverage firms, the price increases by 3.1 percent. From the results
in the previous sections, it follows that in the first case the price and the volatility of
22To compute the risk-neutral skewness, we follow Bakshi and Madan (2000), who show that any
payoff function can be spanned by a continuum of out-of-the-money calls and puts: When the risk-
neutral distribution is left skewed, the combined cost of the positioning in puts is larger than the one of
the combined positions in calls. The expression for the risk-neutral skewness of the firm value returns is
provided in the technical Appendix.
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Figure 2.4: Firm Equity Price for High and Low Leverage Ratio
The price of equity with high leverage ratio (left panel) and low leverage ratio (right panel) is plotted
as a function of the difference in beliefs ΨA(t) and the common disagreement, Ψz(t). The parameter
values used are given in Table 3.1.
equity co–move negatively. A positive co–movement arises in the second case. This is
an important departure from Merton’s (1974) model – with immediate implications for
capital structure arbitrage strategies – because it implies that the standard hedge ratio
might even change sign.
To understand why these features exist, note that the price of equity can be represented
as a portfolio consisting of a long position in the firm value V (t), a short position in K1
risk–less zero bonds with price ZCB(t), and a long position in an out-of-the-money put
on the firm value, with strike K1 and price P (t):
23
S(t) = V (t)−K1 · ZCB(t) + P (t,K1) .
The first term, V (t), is independent of leverage and is decreasing in disagreement. The
price of the zero coupon bond can be shown to be decreasing in disagreement for a
relative risk aversion parameter greater than one. Thus, the effects of the first two
components of the price of equity tend to offset each other, with the second component
increasing proportionally to firm leverage. The last term – i.e. the price of the put
option P (t,K1) – has a positive impact on the price of equity, but the size of the effect
depends significantly and in a non monotonic way on firm’s leverage. For some regions
of leverage, we find that this effect can be large enough to reverse the negative impact
23We consider for brevity of exposition a firm without junior debt.
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of the change in the value of the firm:
dS
dΨ
+/−
=
dV
dΨ
−
−K1 · dZCB
dΨ
−
+
[ Delta: +︷ ︸︸ ︷dP
dV
−
· dV
dΨ
−
+
Vega: +︷ ︸︸ ︷
dP
dσV
+
· dσV
dΨ
+
+
Skewness: +︷ ︸︸ ︷
dP
dSkV
−
· dSkV
dΨ
−
]
. (2.13)
When leverage is high, the dominating effect on the price of equity comes from the first
two terms in (2.13), as the Delta, Vega, and Skewness effects on the put price are all
small in relative terms. For very low leverage values, the values of the put option and
the position in the zero bond are a small fraction of firm value. Therefore, the price
of equity is dominated by the first term in (2.13). It follows that for high and very
low leverage the value of equity is decreasing with disagreement at the calibrated model
parameters. For the intermediate leverage region, however, the price of the embedded
out-of-the-money put option can be a non–negligible fraction of the firm value, and its
sensitivity to increases in negative skewness (the last term in square brackets) is high.
We find that the last effect can be high enough to compensate the negative change of
the firm value and make the price of equity increase. Figure 2.5 illustrates the trade-off
between these effects as ΨA(t) changes from 0 to 0.20, dependent on firm leverage.
For levels of leverage between approximately 0.01 and 0.03 the effect of the higher
negative skewness is large enough to increase the price of equity as beliefs dispersion
increases. The leverage region in which disagreement and stock price have a positive
co–movement depends on the calibrated parameters in the model. For instance, for a
relative risk aversion parameter γ = 4 this region is broader and contains leverage ratios
between 0.01 and 0.06.
Overall, the following additional empirical predictions, which are the direct counterparts
to question Q3 and Q4 in Section 2.1, arise from our analysis:
• H3: The relation between stock returns and heterogeneity in beliefs is negative for
highly levered firms, but it can switch sign for firms that are moderately levered.
• H4: The co-movement of credit spreads and stock returns tends to be positive
for highly levered firms but is more likely to turn negative for firms that are less
levered when Uncertainty-DiB is higher.
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Figure 2.5: Change in the Equity Price
This figure plots the change in the equity price as a function of the bonds face values. We split up
the total variation of equity, into four main effects: The Delta effect, which is due to a change in the
underlying, the Vega effect, which is due to a change in the firm value volatility, a Skew effect, which is
due to a change in the risk-neutral skewness, and a bond effect.
Remark: Similar to the findings for the firm value, the endogenous stochastic co–
movement between the price and the volatility of equity generates an asymmetric phys-
ical stock price density. However, in contrast to the unambiguously negative sign of the
skewness of firm value, the skewness of stock returns can be both positive and negative
in our model: The positive (negative) co–movement between the price and the volatility
of equity tends to generate stock returns that are positively (negatively) skewed. This is
interesting because skewness has been found by several authors to be a key determinant
of stock returns; see, among others, Kraus and Litzenberger (1976), Harvey and Siddique
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(2000) and Dittmar (2002).24 Moreover, these features have important implications for
the co-movement between stock and corporate bond prices and for the relation between
disagreement and firm-specific measures of distance to default. As disagreement in-
creases, the price of the corporate bond decreases, but the price of equity can increase
if the firm is moderately levered. It follows that in our model the higher credit spreads
do not have to be coupled with, for example, a lower distance to default.
2.3 The Data Sets
To empirically test the main implications of our model, we merge four data sets and
match, for each firm, information on professional earnings forecasts, balance-sheet data,
corporate bond spreads, stock returns, and stock option prices. The merged data set
contains monthly information on 337 firms for the period 1996 – 2005.
2.3.1 Bond Data
The bond data is obtained from the Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD) on cor-
porate bond characteristics and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC) database on bond transactions. The FISD database contains issue and issuer-
specific information for all U.S. corporate bonds. The NAIC data set contains all trans-
actions on these bonds by life insurance, property and casualty insurance, and health
maintenance companies, as distributed by Warga (2000). This database is an alternative
to the no longer available database used by Duffee (1998), Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and
Mann (2001), and Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001). U.S. regulations stip-
ulate that insurance companies must report all changes in their fixed income portfolios,
including prices at which fixed income instruments were bought and sold. Insurance
companies are major investors in the fixed income market and, according to Campbell
24Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) study a CAPM with investors that have preferences for skewness.
Harvey and Siddique (2000) show that stocks with increasing prices when volatility spikes up have a
positive skewness. Moreover, investors with preferences for skewness bid up the prices of assets with
positive (co)skewness. Dittmar (2002) studies the impact of a non-linear pricing kernel in an economy, in
which agents are averse to kurtosis and prefer positive skewness. Barberis and Huang (2007) study the
impact of a preference for skewness in a Prospect Theory–type model with exogenously distorted beliefs.
Brunnermeier, Gollier, and Parker (2007) analyze preferences for skewness in general equilibrium and
find that positively skewed assets have lower expected returns. Recently, Conrad, Dittmar, and Ghysels
(2007) link the higher prices of assets with positive skewness to the existence of stock market bubbles.
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and Taksler (2003), they hold about one-third of outstanding corporate bonds. These
data represent actual transaction data and not trader quotes or matrix prices.25
Initially, we eliminate all bonds with embedded optionalities, such as callable, putable,
exchangeable, convertible securities, bonds with sinking fund provisions, non-fixed coupon
bonds, and asset-backed issues. The data set contains information on the seniority level
of the bonds. We are thus able to divide our data sample into senior secured and junior
subordinated bonds. We manually delete all data entry errors. Moreover, to control
for the possibility of residual errors, we windsorize our database at the 1% and 99%
level. We are then left with a final database of 337 firms with senior secured bonds and
junior subordinated bonds. Finally, to compute corporate bond credit spreads, we use
zero-coupon yields available from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).
2.3.2 Uncertainty-DiB Proxy
To obtain a proxy of belief disagreement, we use analyst forecasts of earnings per share,
from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database. This database
contains individual analyst’s forecasts organized by forecast date and the last date the
forecast was revised and confirmed as accurate. To circumvent the problem of using
stock-split adjusted data, as described in Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002), we use
unadjusted data. In an initial step, we match analysts forecast data with the bond data.
We extend each forecast date to its revision date.26 If an analyst makes more than one
forecast per month, we take the last forecast that was confirmed.
Firm-Specific Disagreement:
In our model, belief disagreement of firms future earnings is defined as
m1A−m2A
σA
, i.e., the
difference between the subjective expected growth of a firm’s cash flows scaled by the
volatility of cash flows. We proxy disagreement about future cash flows by computing
for each firm the mean absolute difference in the available earnings forecasts, scaled by
an indicator of earnings uncertainty. Since the data on subjective earnings uncertainty
of analyst forecasts is not available in our data set, we proxy earnings uncertainty by the
standard deviation of earnings forecasts. Therefore, our measure of disagreement is the
25Earlier data sets offered only indirect information about actual market prices since values of non-
traded bonds were estimated based on matrix algorithms.
26E.g., if a forecast is made in July and last confirmed in September, then we use this information for
the months July, August, and September.
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ratio of the mean absolute difference and the standard deviation of earnings forecasts.27
The average firm-specific disagreement is 0.22. Firm-specific disagreement is highly
volatile and exhibits a substantial cross-sectional variation. The minimum disagreement
is 0.01 and the maximum 0.82, with an average time-series standard deviation of 0.14.
Common Disagreement:
The common disagreement is defined as m
1
z−m2z
σz
, i.e., the difference between the subjective
expected growth of the signal, scaled by the signal volatility. To empirically form a
common Uncertainty-DiB measure, we extract the first principal component from the
cross-section of individual uncertainty proxies, where each individual uncertainty proxy
is weighted by the market capitalization of the firm.28
2.3.3 Option Data
The option data is taken from OptionMetrics, LLC. This database covers all exchange
listed call and put options on U.S. equities. With each trade, OptionMetrics reports
the option’s implied volatility. Implied volatilities are calculated using LIBOR and
Eurodollar rates, taking into account European and American exercise styles. We apply
the following data filters to eliminate possible data errors. First, we exclude options
which mature in the given month, since it is known (see, e.g., Bondarenko, 2003) that
these suffer from illiquidity. Second, we eliminate all observations for which the ask is
lower than the bid, for which the bid price is equal to zero, or for which the bid ask
spread is lower than the minimum ticksize.29 In a first step, we take implied volatilities
of single-stock options which are closest to at-the-money since these are known to be
the most liquid ones. The implied volatility skew is calculated as the difference between
the implied volatility of a put option with moneyness 0.92 and the implied volatility of
an at-the-money put, scaled by the difference 0.92 − 1 in strike to spot ratios.
27We checked the robustness of our disagreement proxy with respect to other measures and found
our measure to dominate. To save space, we omit these results here. However, they are available upon
request.
28As a robustness check, we also applied an equally weighted scheme. However, the results do not
change quantitatively.
29The minimum ticksize equals USD 0.05 for options trading below USD 3 and USD 0.1 in any other
case.
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2.3.4 Control Variables
A large empirical literature has studied the determining factors of credit spreads and
stock returns. A first obvious control variable in all our regressions is firm leverage,
which is defined as total debt divided by the sum of total debt and the book value of
shareholders’ equity. In the regression for credit spreads, we additionally control for
firm size, defined as the log total book value of assets. Leverage and firm size data are
retrieved from the COMPUSTAT database. We also add to our regressions earnings
volatility, defined as the time-series sample standard deviation of quarterly earnings per
share over the last eight quarters, scaled by lagged stock price. A second set of natural
control variables captures business–cycle and term structure effects, as well as further
systematic pricing factors. To this end, we include in the regressions for credit spreads
and stock returns a NBER dummy, the monthly S&P500 returns and non-farm payroll.
The NBER dummy is taking the value 1 in expansion periods, as defined by the NBER.
A third set of control variables are the Fama and French factors. Fama and French
show that a zero-cost factor mimicking portfolio exposed to the size and value premia
can explain a considerable component of the cross-section of equity returns. Although
corporate bonds and equity are different non-linear contingent claims, they are written on
the same firm’s balance sheet. Thus, one might expect their dynamics to be driven by the
same value/risk drivers and the Fama and French factors to be significant in explaining
the cross-section of corporate bonds. Fourth, the recent literature studying determinants
of corporate credit spreads emphasizes the role of liquidity risk. This literature is large
and one of the debates is about the most appropriate measure of liquidity for corporate
bond and equity pricing; see Mahanti, Nashikkar, Subrahmanyam, Chacko, and Mallik,
2008 for a discussion.30 We apply two different proxies of liquidity. For the corporate
bond spreads, we follow Fontaine and Garcia (2011) and use their measure of aggregate
liquidity, which is extracted from U.S. Treasuries.31 For equity returns, we apply the
Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity measure.32
30Chacko (2006) and Downing, Underwood, and Xing (2007) study the pricing of liquidity risk in credit
markets by constructing direct measures from the bond market. These studies focus on the impact of the
liquidity level per se. de Jong and Driessen (2006) build liquidity risk factors, which represent systematic
liquidity shocks in equity and government bond markets, similar to Acharya and Pedersen (2005), and
show that corporate bond prices carry a substantial liquidity risk premium. Fontaine and Garcia (2011)
extract an aggregate liquidity measure from the cross-section of on-the-run premia and show that this
measure has a significant impact on risk premia for on-the-run and off-the-run bonds, LIBOR loans,
swap contracts, and corporate bonds.
31We thank Rene´ Garcia for providing us their data.
32Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) find that during months with low liquidity, the correlation between
their liquidity proxy and the return on corporate bonds is found to be as large as -27%. However, in our
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2.4 Empirical Analysis
2.4.1 The Dynamics of Disagreement
We investigate the cross-sectional and time-series properties of our proxies of disagree-
ment. A first result is striking: A single dynamic common component explains more
than 87% of the time-series variation in the cross-section of individual firm disagree-
ment proxies. This is indeed remarkable given that we are considering a cross-section of
more than 337 firms, thus suggesting a large systematic component driving difference in
beliefs on firms’ growth opportunities. The common disagreement component is highly
time varying and exhibits a counter-cyclical behavior. It has an average of 0.38, with
a minimum (maximum) of 0.12 (0.78), and a standard deviation of 0.13. It typically
rises in the six months before crisis periods and decreases shortly afterwards: The aver-
age increase in the six months before a crisis period is 41% and the average decrease six
month after the crisis is around 34%. The average firm-specific disagreement component
is 0.22. The firm-specific disagreement is also highly volatile and it exhibits a substantial
cross-sectional dispersion: The minimum (maximum) firm-specific disagreement is 0.01
(0.82), and its average time-series standard deviation is 0.14.
In what follows, we study systematically the empirical links between disagreement and
asset prices suggested by our theoretical model. First, we use panel regression techniques
to investigate the impact of individual and common disagreement proxies on corporate
credit spreads and stock returns, after controlling for other explanatory factors. Second,
we study the joint testable implications for capital structure arbitrage strategies.
2.4.2 The Dynamics of Credit Spreads
In our model, belief disagreement unambiguously increases credit spreads. We investi-
gate the relevance of disagreement proxies with respect to several empirical reduced-form
models in the literature and we consider the following empirical specifications, which
embody specific sets of control variables previously studied in this literature: (1) Im-
plied volatility and option-related factors; (2) Macro-financial factors; (3) Firm-specific
data, we find a very weak relationship between their measure and corporate credit spreads. We therefore
prefer the liquidity measure by Fontaine and Garcia (2008), which they show has a significant impact
on corporate credit spreads, using the same data as we do. Vice versa, their measure has a marginal
impact on the equity market. We therefore rely on the Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) measure in this
case.
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factors, (4) Fama and French, liquidity, and volatility factors. Model (5) includes all
determinants, while model (6) includes only statistically significant regressors.
In model (1), we control for the equity implied volatility and other option-related vari-
ables. This aspect is important as Cremers, Driessen, Maenhout, and Weinbaum (2006)
and Cao, Yu, and Zhong (2010) find that the option-implied volatility and skewness are
powerful explanatory factors of corporate credit spreads. They interpret these variables
as proxies for a volatility and jump risk premium component in credit spreads. In our
model, the option implied volatility and skewness are indeed important and are corre-
lated with credit spreads. However, both option implied volatility and credit spreads
are endogenously driven by heterogeneity in beliefs, so that the information contained
in option-implied volatility should be subsumed by heterogeneity in beliefs. Table 2.2
summarizes the results for model (1). Indeed we find that, after controlling for the
difference in beliefs, the option-implied volatility, which is significant in univariate re-
gressions, is no longer statistically significant. This result suggests that option-implied
(risk neutral) volatility is highly correlated with uncertainty, rather than being a pure
proxy for measurable and uncertainty-free jump risk. The two disagreement proxies and
the option-related variables explain 58% of the variation in corporate credit spreads.
Both the individual uncertainty and common uncertainty proxies are highly statistically
significant and the estimated coefficient has the expected positive sign. We also find
that the marginal impact of changes in disagreement on credit spreads is economically
important. Given that the cross-firm average of the standard deviation of a monthly
change in belief disagreement is 0.18, the slope parameter estimates imply that a one-
standard deviation change in the firm-specific belief disagreement leads to an increase
of approximately 18 basis points in corporate credit spreads. The effect of the common
disagreement is slightly smaller. The standard deviation of the common disagreement
is 0.13, hence, a one standard deviation change in the common disagreement leads to
an increase of approximately 10 basis points. The adjusted R2 of the regression is 0.54.
This means that the disagreement proxies together with the option implied variables
explain half of the time-series and cross-sectional variation of corporate credit spreads.
In model (2), we include macro-financial variables as controls. Controlling for these vari-
ables is relevant for three reasons. First, Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001)
show that macro-financial variables such as the risk-free rate level and the slope of the
yield curve are correlated with credit spreads. Thus, in addition to these variables, we
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also consider a NBER dummy. Second, Huang and Kong (2007) show that macroe-
conomic announcements of business-cycle related variables have a significant effect on
corporate credit spreads. Among many possible announcement variables, we use non-
farm pay-roll as a further control for the state of the economy. These variables are clearly
potentially important, as macroeconomic conditions are related to both the probability
of default and the recovery rate. Non-farm pay-roll is labeled by Andersen and Boller-
slev (1998) the “king” of announcements. Moreover, Beber and Brandt (2009) document
that it is the most influential macro announcement variable. Third, given the relative
importance of a single market-wide factor in explaining the dynamics of differences in
beliefs, it is interesting to measure the extent to which the role of the differences in beliefs
is subsumed by the realizations of macro-financial and macro-economics variables. Does
disagreement play an independent role? The results in Table 2.2 (second column) show
that, in addition to the firm-specific and common uncertainty proxy, the risk-free rate
and non-farm pay-roll are highly significant.The NBER dummy is significant and has an
expected negative sign. The sign of the coefficient for the other macro-financial variables
is consistent with the findings in Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001). We find
that, even after controlling for macroeconomic factors, the disagreement measures are
both statistically and economic significant. Interestingly, however, when we control for
these factors the size of the slope coefficient on the common component of the difference
in beliefs declines from 0.718 to 0.476, supporting the conjecture that market-wide dis-
agreement interacts with macroeconomic announcements (non-farm payroll and NBER
recessions).
Model (3) controls for firm-specific features. Leverage is an obvious control variable as
it is positively related to the probability of default in structural models of credit risk,
and it is found to be an important explanatory variable of credit spreads, as documented
– among others – by Avramov, Jostova, and Philipov (2007). We also control for firm
size, to proxy for the higher sensitivity of smaller firms to business–cycle factors (Fama
and French, 1993). In the third column of Table 2.2, the regression results show that
both the individual and common disagreement proxies are highly significant, despite the
significance of leverage and firm size. Consistent with economic intuition, these vari-
ables have a positive estimated coefficient. Moreover, their significance is robust to the
inclusion of additional control variables in model (6). If we compare their coefficients
with the size of the disagreement slope coefficients, we find that given a standard de-
viation of 0.08, a one standard deviation change in leverage leads to a 3 basis points
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increase in corporate credit spreads, which is six times smaller than the contribution
of the systematic disagreement, for instance. Firm size contributes to approximately 4
basis points.
In model (4), we control for the Fama and French, liquidity, and volatility factors. Schae-
fer and Strebulaev (2008) find that corporate bond prices are significantly influenced by
two Fama-French factors and the VIX implied volatility index. In our regressions, we
use implied volatilities from individual stock options, rather than the aggregate index
option implied volatility, to improve the granularity of the information provided by the
risk neutral implied volatility. Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005) find that a large
fraction of the non-default component of corporate credit spreads can be related to illiq-
uidity, and Fontaine and Garcia (2008) show that their aggregate measure of liquidity
extracted from on-the-run premia is a good predictor of the default spread. The fourth
column of Table 2.2 shows that even after controlling for these factors, both the indi-
vidual and common disagreement measures are highly significant with t-statistics well
above 5. Some of the additional explanatory variables, which are significant in univari-
ate regressions, such as the market and Fama-French factors, are no longer significant
after controlling for the disagreement measures. There are three important exceptions:
earning volatility,33 SMB factor, and aggregate liquidity. Earnings volatility and the size
factor have the expected positive sign and the liquidity factor has the expected negative
sign. The result on the earning volatility is interesting since this variable plays a key role
in any Merton-type structural model of credit spreads. Our regressions confirm this link
but add a potentially interesting element to our understanding of it. When we regress
credit spreads on both earning volatility and differences in beliefs, we find that a one
standard deviation change in earnings volatility accounts for an approximate increase
of 4 basis points in credit spreads. On the other hand, the effect of disagreement is
statistically more significant and economically seven times larger.34
In model (5), we run a regression including all explanatory factors. The statistical
significance of the individual and common disagreement proxies remain remarkably high.
Quite surprisingly, the economic significance remains stable even when we include all
other variables. In terms of adjusted R2, we find that all determinants together explain
33We use a one-year moving average to calculate the volatility. Moreover, the earning volatility is
scaled so that it has the same time-series standard deviation as the corresponding average implied
volatility.
34Avramov, Jostova, and Philipov (2007) also find that Fama and French factors loose their significance
for credit spreads when combined with other control variables.
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approximately 80% of the time series and cross-sectional variation of corporate credit
spreads.
In model (6), finally, we run the regression with only the explanatory factors that were
found significant in the previous specifications (1)-(5). The main result do not change.
Overall, our results show that the explanatory power of both the individual and common
disagreement for credit spreads is high and robust with respect to several common control
variables. These findings are remarkably robust also with respect to a stratification of
the sample with respect to firm leverage.
2.4.3 Capital Structure No-Arbitrage Violations
Capital structure arbitrage has become increasingly popular among long/short, multi-
strategy, event driven hedge funds. The success of these strategies depends on the
empirical realism of the key assumptions on the joint behavior of the value of debt and
equity, such as the sensitivities of corporate bond prices to changes in the price of equity.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that this relationship often fails. However, although it is
very relevant from a practical point of view, we know very little about this link both at an
empirical and theoretical level. Nonetheless, the joint behavior of the value of debt and
equity offers powerful additional information about alternative models of credit spreads.
While much of the literature has focussed on predicting corporate bond price levels,
second moment predictions like hedge ratios have so far been mostly neglected. The
hedge ratio of standard single-factor models takes the form (1/∆S − 1)S/D, where
∆S is the sensitivity of the price of equity to the underlying price of the corporate
bond and S/D is the inverse leverage ratio. In contrast to single-factor models such as
the Merton model, our theory implies that the sign of ∆S might be both positive or
negative, depending on the leverage of the firm, and that disagreement could play a role
in explaining some of the violations.35 To simplify our discussion, we first specify the
35A prominent example of a failure of capital structure arbitrage occurred in May 2005, when General
Motors (GM) and Ford got downgraded to junk status. Before May 2005, many hedge funds sold CDS
on GM and hedged their exposure by shorting the equity (or by creating a long volatility position in
GM options). The rationale for this strategy was that, consistent with the structural Merton model,
wider credit spreads would be accompanied by a drop in the share price (or an increase in the option
implied volatility). After the downgrade of GM to junk status by Standard & Poors, credit spreads on a
10 year CDS increased by almost 200 basis points in one month. The share price, however, rose almost
25% to 32.75 USD, and the implied volatility of short-term at-the-money options on GM increased by
50% to reach 62.73%. Many widely known hedge funds engaging in capital structure arbitrage posted
large losses and the state of the hedge fund industry obtained center stage in the financial press.
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Table 2.2: OLS Panel Regression Results for Credit Spreads
Using data running from January 1996 to December 2004, we regress credit spreads on corporate bonds
on a set of variables listed below. ? denotes significance at the 10% level, ?? denotes significants at the
5% level and ? ? ? denotes significance at the 1% level. Model (1) corresponds to the regression model
with option-implied determinants (see Cremers, Driessen, and Maenhout (2008)). Model (2) corresponds
to macro determinants. Model (3) corresponds to firm specific variables, Model (4) corresponds to the
regression model with systematic risk factors and Model (5) includes all determinants. Model (6) is
the regression with significant values only. All estimations use autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity-
consistent t-statistics.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.756??? 0.613??? 0.594??? 0.420??? 0.639??? 0.508???
[8.45] [6.38] [7.39] [5.29] [6.38] [5.99]
Individual DiB 0.976??? 0.837?? 0.837??? 0.880??? 0.820??? 0.735???
[8.56] [8.93] [8.31] [7.73] [7.27] [7.11]
Common DiB 0.718??? 0.476??? 0.521??? 0.469??? 0.560??? 0.489???
[3.85] [4.09] [5.10] [5.28] [5.83] [5.00]
Implied Volatility 0.713 0.672? 0.523
[1.43] [1.77] [1.43]
IV Skew −0.256? −0.231
[-1.65] [-1.38]
Slope of TS −0.412? −1.746? −1.652?
[-1.71] [-1.67] [-1.87]
Risk-free Rate −0.532??? −0.429??? −0.493???
[-4.35] [-3.43] [-3.84]
Non-Farm Payroll −0.632??? −0.561??? −0.461???
[-4.33] [-3.56] [-3.98]
NBER Dummy −2.545? −1.939
[-1.73] [-1.63]
Leverage 0.375??? 0.564??? 0.488???
[4.13] [3.34] [3.43]
Firm Size 0.045??? 0.035?? 0.027??
[3.40] [2.45] [2.31]
Liquidity −0.124?? −0.102?? −0.120??
[-2.51] [-1.99] [-2.01]
Rm −Rf −0.632 -0.541
[-1.02] [-1.01]
SMB 0.427??? 0.321?? 0.308?
[3.22] [1.99] [1.76]
HML 0.321? 0.491? 0.410?
[1.77] [1.67] [1.64]
Earnings Volatility 0.400?? 0.391?? 0.418??
[2.47] [2.30] [2.34]
Adjusted R2 0.54 0.68 0.70 0.68 0.80 0.80
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main object of our analysis.
Definition 2.4. We define a violation event when ∆CS · ∆S > 0, where ∆CS is the
change in the credit spread and ∆S the change in the corresponding individual stock
price.
The leverage-dependent co-movement of stock returns and credit spreads in our model
suggests that a violation according to Definition 2.4 is more likely for low leverage firms
and when disagreement is large. This gives rise to the following testable implication
related to question Q2:
• Arbitrage violations according to Definition 2.4 are more likely to arise for mod-
erately levered firms and when disagreement is high.
In the sequel, we first compare the empirical and model-implied frequencies at which
arbitrage violations of single-factor models occur. Then, we use panel Logit techniques
to learn additional conditional properties of the data.
2.4.3.1 Unconditional Violations and Disagreement
We use the calibrated parameters in Table 3.1 to simulate our model and calculate the
occurrence frequencies of a credit violation. The results are collected in Table 2.3, Panel
A.
The unconditional average frequency of a violation in the data is approximately 13.9%
(see Table 2.3, Panel B). This is a large number, considerably higher than other no-
arbitrage restriction violations studied in index option markets. For instance, Bakshi,
Cao, and Chen (2000) study violations of the one factor Black and Scholes (1973) model
in index option markets and find that the probability that the delta of a call (put)
is negative (positive) is between 1% and 4%, depending on the moneyness level. The
frequency of occurrence of capital structure violations is larger by a factor of almost 5.
When we simulate our model with disagreement using the calibrated parameters in Table
3.1, we find that the model generates capital structure violations: The model-implied
frequency is 14.2%, which is quite close to what is observed empirically. After we stratify
the sample with respect to firm’s leverage, we find that the empirical violation frequency
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Table 2.3: Simulated and Empirical Occurrence of Violations
This table shows the violation frequencies implied by the Monte Carlo simulation of our model (Panel A).
The reported numbers are the simulated fractions of the violation occurrence across 10,000 simulation
trials of the model. Panel B summarizes the empirical frequency arbitrage violations as a percentage of
total observations at a given leverage. Low, Average, and High refer to the leverage ratios.
Panel A: Simulated Violations
Low Average High
15.3 14.2 12.2
Panel B: Empirical Violations
Low Average High
18.9 15.4 14.3
is substantially higher (18.9%) for firms with low leverage than for firms with high
leverage (14.3%). This result is consistent with the results obtained from the simulation
of the model, where we find that the violations are 15.3% for low leverage firms and
12.2% for high leverage firms. Thus, the model helps to explain another feature of the
data that traditional models cannot explain. This finding is relevant since it implies a
co-movement of different parts of the capital structure that is consistent with the role
of disagreement, after taking into account cross-sectional differences in leverage.
2.4.3.2 Conditional Violations and Disagreement
The previous unconditional results do not necessarily imply that disagreement is the
only factor able to explain no-arbitrage violations, since they might be generated, e.g.,
by a misspecification of the Merton (1974) model or by market frictions. For instance,
Acharya, Schaefer, and Zhang (2008) study in much detail the GM and Ford downgrade
of 2005 and find empirical evidence that institutional frictions and liquidity are respon-
sible for a segmentation of equity and credit markets at this time. Capital structure
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arbitrage strategies can be set up as a convergence trade and illiquidity of a market in-
creases transaction costs as well as risks of these trades.36 More generally, the liquidity
of the underlying securities impacts arbitrage activities in these markets. Even though
the results in Acharya, Schaefer, and Zhang (2008) focus on two particular firms, their
evidence is suggestive of the potential importance of a joint study of liquidity factors
and disagreement.
We consider two different liquidity factors in our Logit regressions: The Fontaine and
Garcia (2008) liquidity measure and the Pa`stor and Stambaugh (2003) measure. As
capital structure arbitrage requires trading in the corporate bond and the stock, both
the liquidity in the credit and equity market might be relevant.37 We also add as controls
the Fama and French size and book-to-market factors to our regressions, as they turn
out to be significantly related to the corporate bond spreads, and the VIX index.
We study how belief disagreement is linked to the conditional probability of a violation
in credit markets. To this end, we estimate a set of panel Logit regressions, in which
the binary variable y(it), denoting the occurrence of a violation at time t for firm i, is
regressed onto a set of variables that include both disagreement proxies. The probability
that a violation occurs at time t for firm i is specified as:
P (y(it) = 1) = F (β0 + β1 log Ψi(t) + β2 logΨz(t) +
2∑
j=1
δjFij(t) +
7∑
k=1
γkTk(t)),
where F is the cumulative distribution function of a logistic distribution, β1 and β2
are the loadings on the individual and common disagreement proxies, δj the loading
of implied volatility and leverage, and γk the loading of the VIX, the equity market
liquidity, the credit market liquidity, market, size, book-to-market mimicking factors,
and earnings volatility. The model is estimated by Maximum-Likelihood. The results
are given in Table 2.4.
We find that individual and common disagreement increase the conditional probability
of a violation, with an estimated coefficient that is highly significant and stable across the
36Convergence trading strategies are popular among hedge funds. A typical convergence trading
strategy is to bet that the price difference between two assets with similar characteristics will narrow
in the future. The collapse of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) is often cited as a chatoyant
example illustrating the interplay of convergence trades and a deterioration of liquidity, together with
its impact on asset prices and volatility (see Xiong, 2001).
37The unconditional correlation between the two liquidity proxies is fairly low: In the period from
December 1985 to December 2007 the unconditional correlation is only -10%.
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Table 2.4: Logit Regression of Arbitrage Violations on Credit Markets
This table summarizes the Logit regression results for the violation frequency in credit markets. The
probability that a violation event occurs is specified as:
P (y(it) = 1) = F (β0 + β1 log Ψi(t) + β2 log Ψz(t) +
2∑
j=1
δjFij(t) +
7∑
k=1
γkTk(t)),
where Ψi is the individual disagreement, Ψ is the common disagreement, Fj the implied volatility and
leverage, and T indicate the VIX, Pastor and Stambaugh Liquidity proxy (PS Liquidity), Fontaine and
Garcia Liquidity (FG Liquidity) proxy, Fama and French factors (market, size, and book-to-market),
and earnings volatility. t-values are in brackets. ? denotes significance at the 10% level, ?? denotes
significants at the 5% level and ? ? ? denotes significance at the 1% level, respectively.
Dependant Leverage
Low Average High
Constant −0.21?? −0.32?? −0.37??
[-2.39] [-2.19] [-2.43]
Individual DiB 0.17??? 0.18??? 0.23???
[3.32] [3.83] [4.27]
Common DiB 0.12?? 0.18?? 0.13??
[2.40] [2.36] [2.43]
Implied Volatility 0.19? 0.26? 0.18?
[1.68] [1.75] [1.90]
VIX 0.05? 0.04? 0.02
[1.67] [1.66] [1.38]
Leverage 0.13?? 0.18?? 0.21?
[2.02] [2.30] [1.71]
PS Liquidity −0.16 −0.12 −0.11?
[-1.22] [-1.58] [-1.73]
FG Liquidity −0.17? −0.20?? −0.21??
[-1.88] [-2.01] [-2.29]
Rm −Rf 0.05 0.10 0.12
[1.32] [1.57] [1.63]
SMB 0.24? 0.17 1.28?
[1.90] [1.43] [1.91]
HML 0.18 0.23 0.48??
[1.47] [1.62] [2.52]
Earnings Volatility 0.40? 0.49? 0.42?
[1.69] [1.91] [1.75]
Pseudo R2 0.19 0.19 0.22
different leverage levels. Leverage positively impacts the conditional probability of a vi-
olation and the estimated coefficients are significant. The implied volatility of individual
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options increases the probability of an arbitrage violation in credit markets. However,
the estimated coefficients are significant at the 10% level only. The estimated coefficients
for the equity market liquidity proxy (PS liquidity) are negative and marginally signifi-
cant for the highest leverage bin. They are not distinguishable from zero for the other
leverage ratios. In contrast, the estimated coefficients for the credit market liquidity
proxy (FG liquidity) are significant across all leverage bins. The coefficients are nega-
tive and the size increases in absolute terms with leverage, implying (i) that a higher
liquidity reduces the probability of an arbitrage violation and (ii) that liquidity becomes
more important in explaining these violations for firms in more distress. This finding
is similar to Kapadia and Pu (2008), who find that liquidity of the credit market is
significant in linking equity and credit markets, while equity market liquidity has no
effect.
Overall, we obtain corroborating evidence that belief disagreement is a missing factor in
structural models, explaining part of the empirical no-arbitrage violations of single-factor
models in credit markets.
2.4.4 Stock Returns
As shown by the calibrated structural model a positive (negative) relation between
disagreement and future equity returns is more likely for higher (lower) levels of leverage,
since the skewness effect of the firm value tends to vanish for increasing leverage levels.
Thus, we investigate in further details this testable implication of the model.
We stratify by leverage by introducing a dummy variables according to three differ-
ent, equally weighted, leverage bins: The low/medium/high bins corresponds to the
first/second/third leverage terciles.38 Table 2.5 summarizes the results.
We find two regularities. First, in the credit spread regression the significance and
the size of the estimated coefficients for disagreement are monotone cross-sectionally,
with a sign independent of leverage. Second, in equity return regressions (last column),
the estimated coefficient of disagreement is statistically significant across all leverage
bins, but the sign of the estimated coefficient for the low leverage firms is negative.
This finding is interesting for two reasons. First, it provides further evidence of the
38The three terciles correspond to leverage ratios below 0.045, between 0.045 and 0.35, and above
0.35, respectively.
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Table 2.5: OLS Panel Regressions with Dummies
Using data running from January 1996 to December 2004, we regress credit spreads on corporate bonds
and firm stock returns on a set of variables listed below. The coefficients for Dispersion (HL), Dispersion
(AL), and Dispersion (LL) are obtained by multiplying the coefficient with a dummy variable that takes
the value 1 if the firm is in the high, average, and low leverage bin and zero otherwise. The same applies
to the variables Implied Volatility, Implied Volatility Skewness, and Leverage. ? denotes significance at
the 10% level, ?? denotes significants at the 5% level and ? ? ? denotes significance at the 1% level. All
estimations use autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics.
Credit Spreads Stock Returns
Constant 0.653??? 0.001???
[3.83] [5.35]
Individual DiB (LL) 0.756??? −0.012??
[6.82] [-2.31]
Individual DiB (AL) 0.786?? 0.001?
[2.48] [1.83]
Individual DiB (HL) 0.859?? 0.002??
[2.39] [2.42]
Common DiB 0.721?? 0.007??
[2.22] [2.31]
Implied Volatility (LL) 0.625? −0.001
[1.93] [-1.11]
Implied Volatility (AL) 0.520 −0.001
[1.09] [-1.01]
Implied Volatility (HL) 0.492 −0.002
[1.00] [-1.00]
Implied Volatility Skew (LL) −0.261 −0.026
[-1.38] [-1.10]
Implied Volatility Skew (AL) −0.324 −0.017
[-1.44] [-1.31]
Implied Volatility Skew (HL) −0.529 −0.015
[-1.30] [-1.00]
Slope of Term Structure −0.377
[-1.34]
Risk-free Rate −0.506???
[-3.10]
Non-Farm Payroll −0.597?? 0.013
[-2.42] [1.38]
NBER Dummy −1.657 -0.002
[-1.09] [-1.07]
Leverage (LL) 0.427??? 0.017?
[3.45] [1.73]
Leverage (AL) 0.287??? 0.015
[3.01] [0.83]
Leverage (HL) 0.265??? 0.013
[3.00] [0.93]
Liquidity −0.129?? 0.029?
[-2.28] [1.74]
Rm − Rf −0.532 0.001
???
[-1.03] [4.39]
SMB 0.417?? 0.002???
[2.37] [4.94]
HML 0.313? 0.001???
[1.73] [2.99]
Earnings Volatility 0.373? −0.002?
[1.71] [-1.68]
Adjusted R2 0.75 0.05
importance of credit risk in the context of a structural model of a levered firm, in which
skewness effects generated by an increases in the difference in beliefs tend to vanish for
high leverage. Second, it can help to explain the contradicting result found by previous
empirical reduced-form equity return literature.39
39Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) find a negative coefficient and interpret the result as sup-
porting evidence for the behavioral style model; Anderson, Ghysels, and Juergens (2005) run a similar
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2.5 Robustness
In this section, we assess the robustness of our results by studying (i) the extent to
which our disagreement proxies capture other sources of risk and (ii) a setting with time
dummies and firm fixed effects, in order to explore to what extent our disagreement
proxies measure cross-sectional versus time-series variation.
2.5.1 Idiosyncratic Volatility
Idiosyncratic volatility is a potentially important risk factor for stock returns and credit
spreads. Johnson (2004), for example, studies a model, in which stock returns of a
levered firm are decreasing in the asset’s idiosyncratic risk. Chen, Collin-Dufresne, and
Goldstein (2008) emphasize that the credit spread puzzle is closely related to the ratio
of idiosyncratic and total volatility of stock returns. Campbell and Taksler (2003) em-
pirically document that idiosyncratic stock return volatility is an important explanatory
factor for the cross-section of credit spreads. Even if firm-level belief disagreement is not
itself a measure of pure idiosyncratic risk, it is a natural robustness check to investigate
the extent to which it proxies for idiosyncratic volatility. To this end, we calculate the
time-series standard deviation of daily market adjusted stock returns 180 days preceding
each observation, and use it as a further explanatory variable in our regressions, leading
to the results in Table 2.6.
Confirming the results in Campbell and Taksler (2003), idiosyncratic risk significantly
and positively affects corporate credit spreads. However, it does not have an impact on
either the economic or statistical significance of our belief disagreement proxy, which
is the most significant variable in the model. The adjusted R2 of the regressions with
idiosyncratic risk without disagreement are slightly lower than those of our benchmark
regressions without idiosyncratic risk. The estimated coefficient for disagreement in the
aggregated regression for stock returns is highly significant. The one of idiosyncratic
volatility is negative and significant, but only at the 10 percent significance level.40
Interestingly, in the regression for stock returns with dummy variables for leverage, our
regression using a different dataset of firms and find a positive slope coefficient. They interpret the result
as supporting evidence of a neoclassical model.
40This last finding is consistent with the results in Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006) and Guo
and Savickas (2006).
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Table 2.6: OLS Panel Regressions with Idiosyncratic Volatility
Using data running from January 1996 to December 2004, we regress credit spreads on corporate bonds
and firm stock returns on a set of variables listed below. The variable Idiosyncratic Volatility is the
time-series sample standard deviation of daily stock returns 180 days preceding the observation. We
standardize the variable to have it the same standard deviation as the option implied volatility, to make
it comparable. ? denotes significance at the 10% level, ?? denotes significants at the 5% level and ? ? ?
denotes significance at the 1% level. All estimations use autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity-consistent
t-statistics.
Credit Spreads Stock Returns
Constant 0.283??? 0.001???
[4.82] [3.29]
Individual DiB 0.762??? 0.018???
[7.48] [5.56]
Common DiB 0.432?? 0.001??
[2.34] [1.99]
Implied Volatility 0.329? −0.001
[1.78] [-1.00]
Implied Volatility Skew −0.233 −0.019
[-1.47] [-1.28]
Idiosyncratic Volatility 0.332?? −0.001?
[2.27] [-1.74]
Slope of Term Structure −0.210
[-1.29]
Risk-free Rate −0.220?
[-1.95]
Non-Farm Payroll −0.492?? −0.004
[-2.01] [-1.17]
Leverage 0.372??? 0.038?
[3.93] [1.95]
Liquidity −0.113?? 0.017?
[-2.18] [1.94]
Rm −Rf −0.219 0.001??
[-1.00] [1.98]
SMB 0.126 0.001??
[1.58] [1.90]
HML 0.124? 0.001??
[1.66] [2.34]
Adjusted R2 0.75 0.04
proxy for disagreement consistently maintains a significant explanatory power, but the
idiosyncratic volatility does not.
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2.5.2 Time and Firm Fixed Effects
To prevent potential biases due to a spurious time series correlation, we add time dum-
mies to our baseline regressions. The results are summarized in Table 2.7. We note that
the time dummies have very little effect on the coefficients of disagreement. For the
idiosyncratic disagreement, the coefficients remain similar as in the regressions without
time effects and the t-statistics remain essentially the same. The coefficient of the com-
mon disagreement proxy is lower and significant at the 10% level. This is not surprising,
since the systematic disagreement picks up time variation only. Similar findings apply
to the other time-series variables. For example, non-farm payroll and the slope of the
risk-free rate lose almost all their explanatory power. The adjusted R2 remains almost
unchanged, which means that our determinants already account for low frequency time
variation. To gauge more intuition about the cross-sectional variation, we run a firm
fixed effects regression. The coefficients of the idiosyncratic disagreement remain almost
unchanged and their estimates remain highly statistically significant, with t-statistics
of 7.4 for credit spreads and 5.2 for expected stock returns. The largest effect can be
observed for the coefficient of leverage. For the credit spreads regression, the coefficient
drops from a 1% significance level to a 5% significance level. This means that leverage
is more closely related to individual cross-sectional variation in credit spreads, and less
related to time-series variation.
2.6 Conclusion
In a frictionless Merton (1974) type credit risk model, we derive equilibrium implications
of risk-sharing between heterogeneous agents and we study its impact on credit spreads
and stock returns. In our model, investors have different perceptions of future cash
flows and their degree of uncertainty, captured by the volatility of expected cash flow
growth. They agree to disagree and form forecasts of cash flow growth using a common
set of observable variables. The intertemporal risk-sharing gives rise to three testable
implications. First, higher disagreement unambiguously implies higher credit spreads
and volatility. Second, it leads to a higher frequency of capital structure violations.
Third, it can reduce expected equity returns of low leverage firms, but it increases
expected equity returns for high levered firms.
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Table 2.7: OLS Panel Regressions with Year Dummies and Fixed Effects
Using data running from January 1996 to December 2004, we regress credit spreads and stock returns
on a set of variables listed below including either year dummies or firm fixed effects. Their coefficients
are not reported. ? denotes significance at the 10% level, ?? denotes significants at the 5% level and
? ? ? denotes significance at the 1% level. All estimations use autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity-
consistent t-statistics.
Credit Spreads Stock Returns
Constant 0.582??? 0.529??? 0.001??? 0.001???
[3.28] [4.49] [4.02] [4.09]
Individual DiB 0.739??? 0.787?? 0.010??? 0.011???
[6.99] [7.43] [5.10] [5.22]
Common DiB 0.323?? 0.312?? 0.003? 0.002?
[1.99] [2.01] [1.76] [1.84]
Implied Volatility 0.626? 0.642? −0.001 −0.001
[1.75] [1.86] [1.10] [1.02]
Implied Volatility Skew −0.213 −0.218 −0.021 −0.029
[-1.47] [-1.56] [-1.39] [-1.48]
Slope of Term Structure −0.134 −0.198
[-1.00] [-1.03]
Risk-free Rate −0.313?? −0.372??
[-1.99] [-2.01]
Non-Farm Payroll −0.355? −0.365? −0.003 −0.004
[-1.85] [-1.78] [-1.20] [-1.17]
Leverage 0.426??? 0.389?? 0.034? 0.038?
[3.31] [2.03] [1.83] [1.95]
Liquidity −0.183?? −0.121?? 0.027? 0.017?
[-2.19] [-2.18] [1.91] [1.83]
Rm −Rf −0.212 −0.272 0.001
?? 0.001??
[-1.00] [-1.04] [1.87] [1.93]
SMB 0.124? 0.120? 0.001?? 0.001??
[1.69] [1.94] [1.84] [1.90]
HML 0.124? 0.120? 0.001?? 0.001??
[1.63] [1.71] [1.98] [2.34]
Earnings Volatility 0.203? 0.201? −0.002 −0.001
[1.67] [1.68] [-1.21] [-0.99]
Adjusted R2 0.69 0.69 0.03 0.04
Year Dummies X X X X
Firm Dummies X X
Using a merged data-set of individual firm earning forecasts, credit spreads, and stock
returns, we test the model predictions using a set of panel and Logit regressions. Our
empirical study produces a number of results. First, disagreement increases corporate
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credit spreads through the risk-sharing mechanism in our model. This result is signif-
icant, both economically and statistically, and robust to the inclusion of a variety of
commonly used control variables.
Second, disagreement helps to explain the large frequencies of violations of capital struc-
ture no-arbitrage restrictions of single-factor credit risk models. These models imply a
negative relation between credit spreads and the price of equity. In our model, this
monotonic relation can be violated for some regions of leverage, due to a time–varying
risk-neutral skewness driven by the degree of heterogeneity in beliefs. The percentage
of no-arbitrage violations in our calibrated model is substantial and is comparable to
the one in the data. We investigate the extent to which belief disagreement explains the
conditional probability of these violations in a set of Logit regressions. In all regressions,
we find that the slope coefficient of both individual and common disagreement is positive
and highly significant.
Third, the empirical analysis identifies a significant positive relation between stock re-
turns and disagreement using aggregated data, but this relation is reversed and signifi-
cant for low leverage firms. This result is consistent with the predictions of our structural
model when leverage is introduced. The recent empirical literature has debated on the
sign of the relation between stock returns and divergence of opinions. Our analysis offers
a structural explanation for these mixed results in a frictionless economy where asset
prices reflect the risk-sharing behavior of disagreeing investors.
Our results rise some potentially interesting questions for future research. A first issue
is, e.g., the link between heterogeneity in beliefs and liquidity. When corporate credit
spreads began to surge in mid 2007, funding liquidity fell quite substantially; See, e.g.,
Brunnermeier (2009). Such increases in illiquidity were not confined to the 2008 credit
crisis.41 Routledge and Zin (2009) propose a model to study the impact of Knightian
uncertainty on liquidity risk in times of economic crises, and it is natural to expect that
disagreement and liquidity can interact in interesting ways in a setting with heteroge-
neous beliefs and market frictions. A surge in uncertainty might rise the incentives to
trade for symmetrically informed investors, but it might also make it more difficult to
distinguish informed from uninformed traders, and thus reduce the incentive of unin-
formed agents to trade. Empirically, the interaction of disagreement and liquidity is
41For instance, Acharya and Pedersen (2005) find that their proxy of illiquidity was particularly high
during the Iraqi invasion in 1990, the Asian crisis in 1997, and the Russian default in 1998. Bao, Pan,
and Wang (2011) obtain similar findings with a different illiquidity proxy.
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supported by the data. In preliminary results, we find that disagreement and illiquidity
proxies can predict a large portion of the variation of the asset swap spread across dif-
ferent sectors. These findings indicate an interesting empirical link that could constitute
an important topic of future work.
Chapter 3
When Uncertainty Blows in the Orchard:
Comovement and Volatility Risk Premia
joint with Andrea Buraschi and Fabio Trojani
Introduction
The pricing of index and individual stock options differs in a number of striking empirical
dimensions, which represent important challenges to modern asset pricing models. First,
as noted in Bakshi, Kapadia, and Madan (2003), the index option implied volatility smile
is on average steeper and more negatively skewed than the smile of single stock options.
Second, the average volatility risk premium of index options is typically larger than the
one of individual stock options. For instance, while the average at-the-money implied
volatility of S&P 100 index options has been about 19.2% on a yearly basis, the realized
volatility has been only about 16.7%, which implies an index volatility risk premium of
2.5%. In contrast, the average volatility risk premium of single-name S&P 100 stocks
has been only 0.9% in the same sample period. Third, such significant cross-sectional
differences in compensation for volatility risk result in large risk adjusted returns for a
number of option strategies. For instance, we find that dispersion portfolios being short
index volatility and long individual stock volatility can achieve an annualized Sharpe
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ratio of about 1.5 without an apparent exposure to standard risk factors.1 Similar
findings are obtained for spread portfolios of straddles, which are sorted with respect to
the differences of implied and realized volatilities.
Given this evidence, it may not appear surprising that variance and correlation have
emerged as new asset classes, for which trading strategies have been standardized to
create a novel generation of financial products, thus highlighting their potential eco-
nomic importance for economic risk-sharing. The recent financial crisis has shown even
more dramatically the need for a good understanding of the sources and the pricing
peculiarities of volatility and correlation. The Greek debt crisis and fears of contagion
caused investors to sell risky assets in the second quarter of 2010 which contributed
to a jump in not only market volatility (the VIX tripled between the first and second
quarter of 2010) but also realized and implied correlation: “The decision to reopen our
dispersion trading desk after shutting it down last year [2009] has largely been driven
by the macro environment. The disparity between implied and realized correlation has
really attracted a lot of attention, with correlation on the Dow Jones Eurostoxx 50 index
realizing on average 20 points below implied. Investors have looked to profit from the
carry, and there has been a lot of opportunity in this space,” says Cyrille Walter, head
of European equity trading at Morgan Stanley. For example, Och-Ziff Capital Man-
agement placed USD 12 bn in a dispersion trade in May 2011, which documents how
profitable variance and correlation trading is regarded in the industry.2
Whereas these empirical facts are well documented, little is known about their potential
explanation within a structural economic model. For example, while it is often argued
that the option implied volatility provides useful information about investors’ perception
of future uncertainty, the potential equilibrium mechanisms linking uncertainty and
volatility or correlation risk premia are still not fully understood. In this paper, we
motivate theoretically and explore empirically a distinct equilibrium channel for these
links, generated by the optimal risk sharing of investors having diverse opinions about
the degree of future uncertainty in the economy.
In order to produce a structural explanation for these links, we posit a two-trees Lucas
(1978) economy, in which heterogeneity in beliefs is a priced equilibrium risk factor. Our
1A dispersion portfolio involves a short position in the index volatility and a long position in the
constituents volatility, which can be based on either straddles or strangles. Since at-the-money strad-
dles have a delta exposure close to zero, a dispersion portfolio short an index straddle and long the
constituents straddles is well hedged against market movements.
2See Bloomberg News.
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model allows us to motivate a number of testable predictions for the relation between
difference in opinions and (i) the differential pricing of index and individual options,
(ii) the variance and correlation risk premia embedded in index and individual options
and (iii) the risk-return profile of option strategies creating exposure to volatility and
correlation risk. We make two key assumptions. First, the growth rates of firms’ div-
idend streams are unknown. Second, agents have heterogeneous perceptions about the
level of economic uncertainty. Because of these assumptions, agents process information
differently and eventually disagree, leading to a stochastic disagreement with a non-
degenerate asymptotic distribution. Agents’ optimal consumption share depends on the
level of disagreement, which becomes a priced state variable, and investors engage in
active risk sharing, in order to finance their optimal consumption plans.
In equilibrium, stock volatilities and correlations co-move with the degree of diversity
of investors’ opinions. Volatility is priced and volatility risk premia reflect both the
perceived level of investors’ uncertainty and the heterogeneity in beliefs. Moreover, the
volatility risk premium on index options is larger, because of an endogenous correlation
risk premium generated by investors’ optimal risk sharing.
Using the model solution, we derive a number of testable predictions. First, we show
that the difference in beliefs creates a wedge between risk-neutral and realized volatilities.
The larger the difference in beliefs, the larger the volatility risk premium of index options
relative to the volatility risk premium of individual options, because of the larger ex-ante
compensation required by the optimistic investor to hedge the pessimist in aggregate
bad states. Second, the difference between index and individual volatility risk premia
is driven by the correlation premium. The correlation risk premium depends on the
degree to which market-wide information is used by investors to form their beliefs on
dividends. During periods of market stress, it has been argued that agents are affected by
limited attention, thus increasing their reliance on market-wide signals to conduct their
inference and limiting attention to firm specific information. We model this element by
introducing a market-wide signal correlated with the aggregate dividend process. When
subjective economic uncertainty is greater and agents rely more on the common signal,
the correlation of beliefs as well as the correlation of disagreement over different firms is
larger. This implies greater correlation of asset prices and eventually a larger correlation
risk premium. Third, we find that a higher disagreement about future dividends induces
a larger negative difference in the skewness of index and individual options. This effect
is larger when agents disagree on the market-wide signal and market-wide uncertainty
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is high. Fourth, we study the risk-return features of model-implied option portfolio
strategies. We calibrate our economy and investigate the model-implied features of the
returns of these portfolios. We find that exposure to common disagreement components
can explain a large fraction of the excess returns of both spread straddle portfolios
and dispersion portfolios. At the same time, other standard risk factors, like, e.g., the
market return, have no apparent explanatory power. This is important since it suggests
a possible rational explanation for the failure of traditional models to explain the data.
We test the empirical predictions of our model and use data on S&P 100 index options
and single-stock options for all index constituents, in the period January 1996 to June
2007. We merge this dataset with analysts earning forecasts from the Institutional
Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) and stock return data from CRSP. We first compute
a belief disagreement proxy for each individual firm and then apply dynamic factor
analysis to construct a common factor that proxies for the common component of belief
disagreement across firms.
Our analysis produces a number of novel results. First, in line with our model we find
that individual and common disagreement proxies increase the difference of index and
individual option skews. This effect is both economically and statistically significant.
For instance, a one standard deviation change in individual disagreement implies about a
half standard deviation change in the difference of index and individual option slopes of
the smile. Second, consistent with the model predictions we find that diversity in beliefs
also significantly increases the difference of volatility risk premia of index and individual
stock options, as well as the correlation risk premium, in a way that is remarkably robust
to the inclusion of several other control variables. For instance, a one standard deviation
change in the individual disagreement proxy implies almost a one standard deviation
change in the difference of index and individual volatility risk premia. Similarly, common
disagreement is the most significant variable for the correlation risk premium, even
after controlling for demand pressure and sentiment effects, which have been studied
in the previous literature. Third, we study the risk-return tradeoff of dispersion and
spread straddle portfolios. A standard dispersion trade shorts index straddles and buys
straddles of individual stocks that compose the index. Since we investigate the effect
of dispersion in beliefs, we sort straddles by the difference in beliefs of the underlying
firms. Consistent with the model predictions, we find that spread straddle and dispersion
portfolios, in which the long leg is based on stocks with low individual difference in
beliefs, both generate attractive expected excess returns, without apparent exposure to
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standard risk factors typically used to explain cross-sectional differences of stock returns.
For example, the most profitable dispersion portfolio yields an annualized Sharpe ratio
of 1.5, which is 20% higher than the Sharpe ratio derived from investing all wealth in a
short index put. Goyal and Saretto (2009) find similar high returns and Sharpe ratios for
spread straddle portfolios, when sorting individual options according to the difference
of implied and realized volatility.
These findings are inconsistent with a single factor option-pricing setting, such as the
Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) model, but can be reproduced in our econ-
omy because of the additional systematic risk factor linked to disagreement risk. We
find that both spread straddle and dispersion portfolios feature an economically and
statistically significant exposure to the dynamic common component in the difference
of beliefs across firms. Finally, we formally investigate whether dispersion in beliefs is a
priced risk factor that helps to explain the cross-section of spread straddle and dispersion
option portfolio returns, as our model implies. We adopt the two-pass Fama and French
(1992) approach, with Shanken and Zhou (2007) correction for misspecification robust
standard errors. We first find that the price of risk for the common disagreement factor
is strongly economically and statistically significant: The point estimate of the factor
risk premium for the common disagreement is about 28% on an annual basis. Second,
we find that a large fraction of spread straddle and dispersion option portfolio returns
is explained by exposure to the common disagreement factor, while the risk premia es-
timated for other risk factors (such as the market, momentum, and HML factors) result
insignificant. Third, we find some evidence of a potential nonlinear relation between
option returns and common disagreement risk, indicating that infrequent but large in-
creases in disagreement risk can harm the return of option portfolios with exposure to
it. This finding follows from a negative estimated risk premium of the quadratic term
in a two-pass Fama and French (1992) model allowing for a quadratic link between op-
tion returns and the common disagreement factor. Overall, these results confirm the
hypothesis that a good fraction of the cross-section of option returns can be explained
by an exposure to priced common disagreement risk.
Related Literature. Our paper is related to different strands of the literature. The first
strand studies equilibrium models with multiple assets. Menzly, Santos, and Veronesi
(2004) and Santos and Veronesi (2010) study a multi-asset economy with external habit,
in which dividend shares are mean-reverting. Pavlova and Rigobon (2007) investi-
gate a two country two good economy with demand shocks and log-linear preferences.
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Cochrane, Longstaff, and Santa-Clara (2008) analyze a two-trees Lucas (1978) econ-
omy and the implications for stock returns, correlations, and the equity risk premium.
Martin (2011) extends this framework to a collection of Lucas trees, so called Lucas
orchards, with rare disasters. Our contribution departs from these papers along several
dimensions. First, our model not only generates comovement in asset prices, but also
a correlation risk premium. Second, we link the price of this risk to a quantity that is
related to the formation of expectations, as opposed to pure dividend shocks and the
relative size of the trees.
Our work is closely related to the literature that investigates the characteristics of the
volatility risk premium. The early literature on volatility risk premia is large and deals
mostly with index options. Fleming, Ostdiek, and Whaley (1995), Jackwerth and Ru-
binstein (1996), and Christensen and Prabhala (1998) observe that average realized in-
dex volatilities tend to be substantially lower than implied volatilities of index options.
Buraschi and Jackwerth (2001), Coval and Shumway (2001), and Bakshi and Kapa-
dia (2003a) find evidence that option returns are not spanned by dynamic delta hedging
strategies and that volatility risk is priced at the index level. These findings have ignited
a broader literature that studies also single-name options. There is empirical consen-
sus that volatility risk premia for single-name options are substantially smaller than
for index options (see Bakshi and Kapadia, 2003b, Duarte and Jones, 2007, and Carr
and Wu, 2009). Driessen, Maenhout, and Vilkov (2009) find insignificant differences
between implied and realized volatilities of single stocks based on average model-free
volatility measures. They interpret the significant difference between index and single
name options risk premia as evidence of a large correlation risk premium. They argue
that a simple option-based dispersion strategy earns large Sharpe ratios. An important
economic question is therefore related to the nature of these excess returns. We con-
tribute to this literature by finding that a single common disagreement factor helps to
understand the dynamics of both volatility and correlation risk premia, which reconciles
the findings in the literature.
Another important stream of the literature examines the cross-section of option returns.
Goyal and Saretto (2009), among others, find that long-short portfolios of straddles
sorted with respect to the individual differences of implied and realized volatilities can
produce attractive returns, with no apparent exposure to standard risk factors. They
interpret the result as a challenge to rational expectation models and evidence, instead,
of behavioral biases in the option market. We address this challenge by examining the
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role played by exposure to the common difference in beliefs factor in the context of a
Fama-MacBeth analysis. Our results indicate that a significant fraction of the cross-
sectional differences in excess returns can be explained by exposure to this common
factor. The evidence is consistent with intertemporal and state-dependent risk sharing.
Finally, we are not the first to study the impact of belief disagreement on the implied
volatility of options. Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006) demonstrate in a single-tree Lucas econ-
omy with heterogeneous beliefs that belief disagreement increases the implied volatility
smile of index options. This paper differs from their work in several dimensions. In an
economy with several stocks and diversity of opinions, we provide a structural explana-
tion for the difference in the volatility risk premia of index and single-stock options, the
different cross-sectional slopes of the smile, the correlation risk premium embedded in
index options, and the risk-return tradeoff of well-known option trading strategies. Em-
pirically, we employ a more structural proxy for the common disagreement, computed
as a dynamic common component out of the cross-section of individual differences in
firm earning forecasts, and show that the model predictions are broadly consistent with
the empirical evidence.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.1 provides the model setup.
Section 3.2 derives the main theoretical model predictions. Section 3.3 describes our
panel data set and Section 3.4 presents the results of our empirical study. Section 3.5
concludes.
3.1 The Economy with Uncertainty and Heterogeneous
Beliefs
We borrow from the single-firm model in Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal (2009) and extend
it to a two-tree Lucas economy with heterogenous beliefs, in which belief heterogeneity is
related to dividend shocks of both firms and to independent news of aggregate economic
growth. In this setting, we obtain a number of testable empirical predictions for (i)
the differential pricing of index and individual options and (ii) the link with index and
individual option volatility risk premia.
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3.1.1 State Dynamics
Uncertainty is driven by a Brownian motion W =
(
WDi ,Wz,WµDi ,Wµz
)′
i=1,2
on a fil-
tered probability space (Ω,F , {Ft}, P ). Two firms, indexed by i = 1, 2, produce their
perishable good and pay a dividend process with dynamics d logDi(t) = µDi(t)dt +
σDidWDi(t), with σDi > 0. The expected growth rates of dividends µDi(t) are unob-
servable and follow the dynamics:
dµDi(t) = (a0Di + a1DiµDi(t)) dt+ σµDidWµDi (t) .
By definition, parameter σµDi > 0 is a measure of economic uncertainty about firm i
individual growth rate.
In reality, investors are exposed to many potential sources of news, which can be relevant
to form their beliefs about future prospects of a firm. Some of this information can be
more firm-specific, focusing, e.g., on individual firm characteristics, while some other
news can have a more systematic character, producing information about the growth
rate of the economy as a whole. Since the degree of common information used has
important implications for the co-movement of beliefs about firms future prospects, we
embed this feature into our model by a signal dz(t) potentially related to the dividend
dynamics of both firms:
dz(t) = (αD1µD1(t) + αD2µD2(t) + βµz(t)) dt+ σzdWz(t),
dµz(t) = (a0z + a1zµz(t)) dt+ σµzdWµz (t),
where σz > 0. By definition, σµz > 0 measures the uncertainty linked with the expected
value of signal component dz(t).
If αD1 = αD2 = 0, dividends and signals are independent and investors use exclusively
dividend information to build their beliefs. If β = 0 and αD1 = αD2 , dz(t) is a signal
related to aggregate dividend growth, which is optimally used by rational investors to
forecast future dividends. Therefore, an heterogeneity in uncertainty parameter σµz
between agents implies a diverse weight attributed by investors to news generated from
aggregate dividend growth signals. Similarly, parameters β and αDi determine the
strength of the relation between dividends and signals: As αDi/β increases, the signal is
more informative for cash flows growth and agents use such information more and more
to build their dividend forecasts.
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Remark: When αD1 = αD2 , the relation between β and αDi can be interpreted as
a parsimonious parametrization of rational inattention features, in which a lower ratio
β/αDi parametrizes a higher degree of inattention. Rational inattention has been studied
by a large literature in psychology and finance, and has been shown to be linked to agents’
reaction to market-wide news. Peng and Xiong (2006) and Peng, Xiong, and Bollerslev
(2007) show that after a macroeconomic shock, investors mainly focus on information
about aggregate market indicators, while Gilbert, Kogan, Lochstoer, and Ozyildirim
(2011) find that the market response of investors focusing on summary statistics can
impact stock prices, volatility, and trading volume.
3.1.2 Specification of Disagreement
Two investors, indexed by n = A,B, update their beliefs following Bayes’ rule and
a standard Kalman-Bucy filter. To write the model dynamics in vector form, de-
note investor specific parameters by bn = diag(σµD1 , σµD2 , σ
n
µz) and parameters that
are common across investors by a0 = (a0D1 , a0D2 , a0z)
′, a1 = diag (a1D1 , a1D2 , a1z),
B = diag(σD1 , σD2 , σz), and
A =


1 0 0
0 1 0
αD1 αD2 β

 .
Y (t) := (logD1(t), logD2(t), z(t))
′ is the relevant state vector, FYt the information gen-
erated up to time t and En(·) the expectation operator under the subjective probability
of investor n.
The posterior belief for state µ(t) := (µD1(t), µD2(t), µz(t))
′ is mn(t) := En
(
µ(t)|FYt
)
.
Its posterior covariance matrix solves a matrix Riccati differential equation, with so-
lution dependent on the initial prior. We consider the steady state solution, which is
independent on agent’s prior. The posterior belief dynamics of agent A then follows as:
dmA(t) = (a0 + a1m
A(t))dt + γAA′B−1dWAY (t), with initial conditions m
A(0) = mA0 ,
where dWAY (t) is the innovation process from the perspective of investor A and γ
A the
corresponding steady state posterior covariance matrix.3.
3A formal proof of this result can be found in Liptser and Shiryaev (2000)
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In our model, disagreement can be summarized by the vector Ψ(t) := (ΨD1(t),ΨD2(t),Ψz(t))
′ :=
B−1
(
mA(t)−mB(t)). The first two components of Ψ(t) capture disagreement about
dividend growth rates, the third one disagreement related to signal dz(t). Using Itoˆ’s
Lemma, the dynamics of Ψ(t) are given by:
dΨ(t) = B−1
(
a1B + γ
BA′B−1
)
Ψ(t)dt+B−1(γA − γB)A′B−1dWAY (t), (3.1)
where γB is investor’s B steady state posterior covariance matrix. For interpretations
purposes, we often refer to the case αD1 = αD2 , so that dz(t) is effectively a signal of
economy-wide dividend growth and Ψz(t) ∝ 1σz (σD1ΨD1(t)+σD2ΨD2(t)). Even if ΨD1(t),
ΨD2(t), Ψz(t) are linearly related, signal news have economically distinct implications
from dividend news: From equation (3.1), we see that dividend shocks load exclusively
on the individual dynamics of dΨDi(t). They therefore generate idiosyncratic dividend
disagreement risk. In contrast, signal news load on both dΨD1(t) and dΨD2(t) and give
rise to a common systematic risk factor in dividend disagreement. To this end, the
covariance of the dividend disagreements, Cov(dΨD1(t), dΨD2(t)), directly depends on
how signal shocks are assumed to affect the beliefs dynamics: Even if dividends are
weakly dependent or independent, a correlation is generated whenever dz(t) is perceived
to produce information on aggregate dividend growth (αD1 , αD2 6= 0). This feature
further motivates the belief-driven channel for a commonality of stock returns in our
economy.
3.1.3 Co-movement of the Diversity in Beliefs
A co-movement of ΨD1(t) and ΨD2(t) arises when signal shock dz(t) is perceived as a
useful predictor for dividend growth. Figure 3.1 presents the comparative statics of the
model-implied correlation between dΨD1 and dΨD2 with respect to parameters αD1 and
αD2 .
4
According to intuition, ρ(dΨD1(t), dΨD2(t) is an increasing function of αD1 , αD2 , which
attains a maximum for αD1 = αD2 , i.e., when signal shocks dz(t) imply large belief
revisions about aggregate dividend growth. At the calibrated parameters, such excess
co-movement can be large: For αD1 = αD2 = 0.4 it can be as high as 30%, depending on
4For simplicity, we consider a symmetric economy with identically distributed dividends across firms.
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Figure 3.1: Uncertainty Correlation
The upper left panel plots the instantaneous correlation between the disagreement about firm 1, ΨD1 ,
and firm 2, ΨD2 , as a function of the weights αD1 and αD2 for different levels of difference in subjective
uncertainty (σµ1z − σµ2z ≡ ∆σµz ). The upper right panel plots the instantaneous correlation between
the disagreement about firm 1, ΨD1 , and the signal, Ψz, as a function of the weights αD1 and αD2 for
different levels of difference in subjective uncertainty (σµ1z − σµ2z ≡ ∆σµz ). The lower panels plot the
same correlations but for different levels of average economic uncertainty, (σ¯µz ) and ∆σµz fixed to 0.01.
The parameters chosen are summarized in Table 3.1.
parameters σAµz , σ
B
µz . ρ (dΨD1(t), dΨD2(t)) is also linked to the structure of the individual
uncertainty parameters σnµz across agents: As either the average uncertainty σ¯µz or the
uncertainty heterogeneity ∆σµz ≡ σAµz − σBµz increase, the correlation increases, because
signal shocks imply larger revisions of dividend beliefs for all agents.
Given that empirically rational inattention behavior appears to be more likely during
crisis periods, when agents focus more on aggregate information, the model offers a
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structural channel for the counter-cyclical co-movement of disagreement proxies across
firms. If the average perceived uncertainty or the uncertainty heterogeneity across in-
vestors increase in crisis times, these counter-cyclical co-movement features are even
stronger.
3.1.4 Equilibrium
We derive testable implications for the relation between belief disagreement and index
and individual options volatility risk premia using a simple two-trees exchange economy
with two consumption goods, in which investors maximize their life-time expected utility
subject to the budget constraint:
V n = sup
cnD1
,cnD2
En
(∫ ∞
0
e−δt
(
cnD1(t)
1−γ
1− γ +
cnD2(t)
1−γ
1− γ
)
dt
∣∣∣ FY0
)
, (3.2)
where cnDi(t) is the consumption of agent n of good i and γ, δ > 0 are the common
relative risk aversion and time preference parameters.
We shut down the distinction between risk aversion and elasticity of inter-temporal
substitution using a time-separable utility, in order to simplify the computation of the
equilibrium and the interpretation of some of the asset pricing implications of the het-
erogeneity in beliefs. By allowing each tree to produce its own fruit, we also introduce an
imperfect substitution rate between goods. Representative-agent models studying multi-
ple trees with a single fruit include, among others, Menzly, Santos, and Veronesi (2004),
Cochrane, Longstaff, and Santa-Clara (2008) and Martin (2011). In these economies,
co-movement of returns can arise through direct market clearing effects, which are how-
ever weak in our setting because of the imperfect substitution between goods. In our
model, return co-movement arises solely due to the equilibrium risk-sharing policies of
investors with diverse beliefs.
To identify a unique equilibrium stochastic discount factor, we assume that agents can
trade in a risk-free bond, in zero net supply, shares of the two firms, in positive supply,
and equity and index options, all in zero net supply. The equilibrium is solved using
standard martingale methods and produces closed-form expressions for the stochastic
discount factor of agent n, denoted by ξn(t), which is a function of a stochastic weighting
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process λ(t):5
ξA(t) =
e−δt
yA
D1(t)
−γ
(
1 + λ(t)1/γ
)γ
, ξB(t) =
e−δt
yB
D1(t)
−γ
(
1 + λ(t)1/γ
)γ
λ(t)−1,
(3.3)
where yA and yB are Lagrange multipliers in the (static) budget constraint of agent A
and B, respectively, and λ(t) := yAξ
A(t)/(yBξ
B(t)) follows the dynamics:
dλ(t)
λ(t)
= −
(
2∑
i=1
ΨDi(t)dW
A
Di(t) +
(
2∑
i=1
αDiΨDi(t)
σDi
σz
+ βΨz(t)
)
dWAz (t)
)
. (3.4)
The dynamics of λ(t) depends on perceived shocks WAD1(t), W
A
D2
(t) and WAz (t), which
load on λ(t) proportionally to ΨD1(t), ΨD2(t), and Ψz(t). The dependence of state prices
on signal shocks dWAz (t) increases when the relative precision of signals and dividends
increases (σDi/σz is large) or when the signal is more strongly related to expected
dividend growth (αD1 , αD2 increase).
State prices feature an endogenous stochastic volatility, which is increasing with respect
to all disagreement proxies. Thus, option prices and volatility risk premia also directly
depend on the belief disagreement. The intuition is simple. State prices reflect the
desire of pessimistic investors to ensure a satisfactory consumption level in bad states.
Since investors’ marginal utility must equate in each state, the consumption share of the
pessimistic investor is counter-cyclical and the protection seller (the optimist) must be
compensated ex-ante by a premium, which is state dependent because it is a function of
the degree of heterogeneity of beliefs.
Financial protection can be bought through individual stock or index put options. The
first contract gives protection against a low dividend of a single firm. The second con-
tract, against a low aggregate dividend. If dividends are perceived as more correlated,
low aggregate consumption states are more likely and protection against bad aggre-
gate dividend states becomes relatively more expensive. Thus, the protection premium
embedded in out-of-the-money put index options gets larger than the one implied by
individual put option prices. Through this mechanism, the model can create a wedge
5See Cox and Huang (1989). The extension to the case with heterogenous beliefs is due, among
others, to Cuoco and He (1994), Karatzas and Shreve (1998), and Basak and Cuoco (1998). In this
extension, the utility function of the representative agent is a weighted average of the utility functions
of the individual agents. In contrast to the standard setting, a stochastic relative weight λ(t) captures
the equilibrium effect of the heterogeneity in beliefs across agents.
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between the pricing of index and individual stock options, which can help to explain the
observed difference in volatility risk premia of index and individual option markets.
3.1.5 Pricing
Given the equilibrium state price densities, we can price any contingent claim in our
economy.6 State prices are functions of D1(t),D2(t) and λ(t). Therefore, the joint
density of these variables is needed for pricing purposes. This density is not analytically
tractable, but its Laplace transform can be computed in closed form. Borrowing from
the solution techniques in Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal (2009), we can characterize this
Laplace transform. Equilibrium stock and index prices are in semi-closed form, up
to a numerical integration. This feature largely reduces the computational costs of the
equilibrium. Option prices, which are derivatives written on equilibrium stock and index
values, require a Monte Carlo simulation step in their computation.
3.2 Model Predictions
We can now study the impact of belief disagreement on the volatility risk premia of
individual stocks and the index. To this end, we calibrate the model to the dividend
dynamics of the S&P 500 and assume for simplicity of exposition a symmetric economy.
The parameters are summarized in Table 3.1. Risk aversion is set to 2 and the dividend
volatility of firm 1 and 2 is 4%. We study comparative statistics for changes in belief
disagreement ΨD1 and Ψz between zero and 0.3.
3.2.1 The Link Between Stock Return Correlation and Common Dis-
agreement
Assets returns in our economy can be correlated even if dividends are only weakly
linked. In contrast to representative agent economies, such as Cochrane, Longstaff, and
Santa-Clara (2008) and Martin (2011), market clearing effects are not the key driver
of an endogenous stock co-movement. In our economy, the interdependence of market-
wide informational effects with the optimal risk-sharing among agents produces the
6For convenience, we compute all pricing expressions from the perspective of agent A, using the first
good as a nume´raire.
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Table 3.1: Choice of Parameter Values and Benchmark Values of State Variables
This table lists the parameter values used for all figures in the paper. We calibrate the model to the
mean and volatility of the dividends on the S&P 500. The average growth rate for the period 1996-2006
is 5.93% and the volatility is 3.52%. The initial values for the conditional variances are set to their
steady-state variances.
Parameters for Fundamentals
Long-term growth rate of dividend growth a0Di 0.01
Mean-reversion parameter of dividend growth a1Di -0.01
Volatility of dividend σDi 0.07
Initial level of dividend Di 1.00
Initial level of dividend growth mADi 0.01
Parameters for Signal
Long-term growth rate of signal a0z 0.01
Mean-reversion parameter of signal a1z -0.03
Volatility of signal σz 0.06
Agent specific Parameters
Relative risk aversion for both agents γ 2.00
Time Preference Parameter ρ 0.02
main channel for a co-movement of (i) belief disagreement across stocks and (ii) stock
returns. The first channel is potentially completely belief-driven: Rational inattention
behavior or a higher economic uncertainty produce a larger co-movement in beliefs, which
increases the aggregate cash-flow risk perceived by investors. The second channel works
through the endogenous risk-sharing across agents. In equilibrium, the more pessimistic
agent consumes a higher fraction of aggregate consumption in bad consumption states.
Therefore, she tries to reduce the exposure to stocks with a dividend process correlated
with aggregate consumption. To reach market clearing, those stocks are sold to the more
optimistic investor at a discount. When market-wide signals increase agents’ perception
of the degree of dividend correlation, the price adjustment needed for an ex-ante optimal
risk-sharing across agents implies a higher discount for both stocks. This risk-sharing
induced channel of co-movement is absent in Lucas economies with homogeneous agents.
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We can now solve for the conditional covariance between stock 1 and 2. Figure 3.2
presents the comparative statics of the stock return correlation.7
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Figure 3.2: Stock Return Correlation
This figure plots the return correlation of stock 1 and stock 2 as a function of belief disagreement ΨD1
and Ψz. The parameters chosen are summarized in Table 3.1.
Consistent with intuition, the stock correlation is increasing in ΨD1(t) and Ψz(t). In
absence of disagreement, the correlation is small, confirming the minor role of market
clearing-driven comovement effects in our economy. As expected, when (i) rational
inattention behavior is stronger (αD1 , αD2 increase) or (ii) market-wide uncertainty or
uncertainty heterogeneity rise (σµz or ∆σµz increase), the stock correlation is higher.
7We set ΨD2(t) = 0 for simplicity, which is a conservative assumption for the implied correlation
level.
Chapter 3. When Uncertainty Blows in the Orchard 82
3.2.2 The Differential Pricing of Index and Individual Option Smiles
A second key feature of the model is that it allows for an endogenously steeper smile for
index options than for individual stock options. Bakshi, Kapadia, and Madan (2003)
link the differential pricing of index and individual options to their different risk-neutral
skewness. In our model, risk-neutral skewness is generated by the asymmetrically in-
creased equilibrium state price of low relative to high dividend states: Since the more
optimistic agent sells financial protection at a premium, the price of low dividend states
increases with the degree of investors’ disagreement. Additivity of investors’ utility func-
tion implies that asymmetric state price adjustments are amplified when pricing aggre-
gate dividend states: The risk-neutral skewness of aggregate dividends is more negative
than the one of individual firm dividends. As a consequence, index returns feature an
even more negative risk-neutral skewness than individual stock returns. Moreover, when
dividends are perceived as more correlated under agents’ beliefs, the higher likelihood
of aggregate low dividend states further increases the difference between index and sin-
gle stock risk-neutral skewness. This endogenously generates a steeper smile for index
options. Figure 3.3 illustrates this intuition.
First, we see that the difference of index and single stock negative risk neutral skewness is
larger when ΨD1(t),Ψz(t) increase, and it is more sensitive to market-wide than dividend
disagreement shocks. Second, this difference is larger in presence of rational inattention
(larger parameters αD1 , αD2) and a higher average uncertainty or uncertainty hetero-
geneity (larger parameters σµz or ∆σµz). The more pronounced negative risk-neutral
skewness of index returns is directly mapped into a stronger skew of index option relative
to individual option smiles. Figure 3.4 shows that, at the calibrated model parameters,
index option smiles are steeper than individual stock smiles, as disagreement proxies
ΨD1(t) or Ψz(t) increase, where the difference in steepness is stronger either in pres-
ence of more pronounced rational inattention features or under a higher market-wide
uncertainty. We summarize these relations between option-implied volatility smiles and
proxies of investors’ disagreement as follows.
Model prediction I: A larger belief heterogeneity increases the (negative) difference of
index and individual slopes of the option smile, where the difference is larger in presence
of a larger common component in the cross section of individual disagreement proxies
about firm cash-flows.
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Figure 3.3: Risk-Neutral Skewness for Individual Stock and Index Options
These figures plot the difference in risk-neutral skewness of the returns of stock 1 (left panel) and the
index (right panel). The parameters chosen are summarized in Table 3.1.
In our empirical analysis, we take model prediction I systematically to the data, by
testing which fraction of the difference between index and individual risk-neutral skew-
ness can be explained by common and individual disagreement proxies extracted from
I/B/E/S data on professional earning forecasts.
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Figure 3.4: Index and Individual IV - RV
This figure plots the difference between the implied (IV) and realized (RV) volatility for the individual
stock and the index, for different levels of disagreement, average and difference in subjective uncertainty.
The volatility risk premium is defined as the difference between the implied volatility and the square
root of the integrated variance EAt
(∫ T
t
σ2(s)ds
)
. The parameters chosen are summarized in Table 3.1.
Moneyness is defined as ln
(
S
K
)
.
3.2.3 Variance and Correlation Risk Premia
The third key feature of the model is that correlation risk is priced in equilibrium.
Figure 3.4 indicates (i) that the difference of expected and at-the-money option-implied
variance is more negative for index than for individual options and (ii) that this pattern
is more apparent as the heterogeneity in beliefs, rational inattention behavior or market-
wide uncertainty increase. Is it well-known that the difference of expected and implied
volatility is naturally linked to the volatility risk premium of the option’s underlying
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(see, e.g., Carr and Wu, 2009). Similarly, the more negative volatility risk premium
of index options can be rationalized by a correlation risk premium embedded in the
index constituents.8 In this way, our model motivates a potential tight link between
commonality in dividend disagreement across firms, the more negative volatility risk
premium of index options and the implied correlation risk premium of the index basket.
Remark: The natural way to measure the correlation risk premium is using correlation
swaps. A swap buyer pays the implied correlation SCt,T at maturity T and receives the
average realized correlation RCt,T in a basket of stocks, where SCt,T = E
Q
t [RCt,T ], with
Q the relevant risk-neutral probability. The payoff of a (normalized) long correlation
swap is CRt,T = RCt,T − SCt,T and its expected value is the correlation risk premium:
CRPt,T = E
P
t [RCt,T ]−EQt [RCt,T ].
Absence of arbitrage implies that the correlation risk premium is given by:
CRPt,T = −Cov
(
ξ(T )
ξ(t)
, RCt,T
)
, (3.5)
where ζ is, without loss of generality, the risk-neutral density process of agent A in the
economy: A negative correlation risk premium arises because large correlation states are
more likely under the risk-neutral distribution, as disagreement increases.9 Observable
proxies for SCt,T can be inferred from the cross-section of index and individual variance
swaps. A long variance swap pays implied variance of a given asset at maturity T , i.e., the
variance swap rate SVt,T , and receives the average realized variance RVt,T . The payoff of
a (normalized) long variance swap is V Rt,T = RVt,T −EQt [RVt,T ] and its expected value
measures the variance risk premium: EPt [RVt,T ] − SVt,T .10 We synthesize the implied
correlation ICt,T using the relation: ICt,T ≈ SV
I
t,T−
∑m
i=1 w
2
i SV
i
t,T∑
i6=j wiwj
√
SV it,TSV
j
t,T
, where SV It,T and
SV it,T , i = 1, . . . , n are index and individual variance swap rates, respectively, and wi is
the market capitalization of stock i at time t. Index and individual variance swap rates
8If one can only observe stock correlations (as opposed to the correlation of the differences in beliefs
across stocks), the average stock return correlation will emerge as a risk factor explaining (in reduced-
form regressions) the spread between the volatility risk premium of index and individual options. A
related reduced-form argument is used by Driessen, Maenhout, and Vilkov (2009) to explain the difference
of index and individual volatility risk premia by the presence of a large (negative) correlation risk
premium.
9It is the equilibrium risk-sharing that increases stock correlations when disagreement among investors
rises, because low aggregate consumption states require a larger equilibrium reallocation of financial
protection.
10Volatility risk premia are simply defined as V OLRPt,T =
√
EPt [RVt,T ]−
√
SVt,T , both for individual
stocks and the index. Variance swaps are exposed to disagreement risk and pay a negative risk premium,
because realized variances and disagreement are in a positive relation in our economy.
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are synthesized from (listed) plain vanilla option prices.11 Figure 3.5 summarizes the
main predictions of our model for the relation between volatility risk premia, correlation
risk premia and belief heterogeneity.
Individual volatility risk premia are larger (the correlation risk premium is larger), in
absolute value, as disagreement, market-wide uncertainty, or rational inattention fea-
tures are more pronounced; see the left (right) Panels of Figure 3.5. For instance, the
correlation risk premium increases from nearly zero to about 1% (αDi = 0.1) and 1.6%
(αDi = 0.45) as market-wide and individual firm disagreement rise: The largest in-
creases are caused by shocks in the market-wide disagreement component, which tend
to be linked more strongly to stock correlation shocks. In summary, we obtain the
following model prediction.
Model prediction II: A higher heterogeneity in beliefs implies a more negative differ-
ence between index and individual volatility risk premia (a more negative correlation risk
premium). This feature is stronger under a larger co-movement in the heterogeneity of
beliefs across firms.
In the empirical part, we study model prediction II more systematically, by estimating
the part of (i) the correlation risk premium and (ii) the difference in index and individ-
ual variance risk premia, which can be explained by empirical proxies of common and
individual disagreement.
3.2.4 Simulated Option Trading Strategies
Since the model suggests the existence of a risk premium related to disagreement, it gen-
erates novel implications for expected excess returns on options strategies. We therefore
investigate the extent to which the abnormal excess returns documented in previous
empirical literature are explained by these risk premia. One of the most studied option
(volatility) strategies is related to straddles, which involve a long position in a call and
11Under the assumption of no arbitrage and a continuous swap rate process, the following relation is
exact (see, e.g., Carr and Madan, 1998, Britten-Jones and Neuberger, 2000 and Carr and Wu, 2009):
SVt,T = E
Q
t (RVt,T ) =
2
(T − t)B(t, T )
∫ ∞
0
P (K,T )
K2
dK, (3.6)
where B(t, T ) is the price of a zero coupon bond with maturity T and P (K,T ) the price of an out-
of-the-money put option with strike K and maturity T . We define the 30-days realized variance as:
RVt,t+30 =
365
30
∑30
i=1R
2
tnwhere t = t0 < t1 < · · · < tN = T and Rtn = log
(
Stn/Stn−1
)
.
Chapter 3. When Uncertainty Blows in the Orchard 87
0
0.075
0.15
0.225
0.3 0
0.075
0.15
0.225
0.3
0   
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Ψz
Correlation Risk Premium, αD1 = αD2 = 0.1
ΨD1
C
o
rr
el
a
ti
o
n
R
is
k
P
re
m
iu
m
,
%
0
0.075
0.15
0.225
0.3 0
0.075
0.15
0.225
0.3
0  
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
ΨD1
IV - RV of Firm 1, αD1 = αD2 = 0.1
Ψz
IV
-
R
V
,
%
∆σµz = 0.02
∆σµz = 0.01
∆σµz = 0.01
∆σµz = 0.02
0 0.075 0.15 0.225 0.3 0
0.075
0.15
0.225
0.3
0   
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
Ψz
ΨD1
Correlation Risk Premium, αD1 = αD2 = 0.45
C
o
rr
el
a
ti
o
n
R
is
k
P
re
m
iu
m
,
%
0
0.075
0.15
0.225
0.3 0
0.075
0.15
0.225
0.3
0   
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
ΨD1
IV - RV of Firm 1, αD1 = αD2 = 0.45
Ψz
IV
-
R
V
,
%
σ¯µz = 0.02
σ¯µz = 0.10
σ¯µz = 0.10
σ¯µz = 0.02
Figure 3.5: Volatility and Correlation Risk Premia
The left panels plot the volatility risk premium for firm 1 as a function of the disagreement about the
growth rate of firm 1, ΨD1 , and the disagreement about the signal, Ψz. The volatility risk premium is
calculated as the difference between the volatility swap rate and the 30 day realized volatility. The 30
day realized volatility is calculated from running 10,000 simulations and averaging. The right panel plot
the correlation risk premium which are synthesized using correlation swaps as in equation (3.5). The
parameters chosen are summarized in Table 3.1.
a put, with identical moneyness and underlying. Straddle portfolios have been analyzed
extensively in the literature; see, among others, Coval and Shumway (2001) and Driessen
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and Maenhout (2007). A straddle generates positive (negative) expected excess returns
if the variance risk premium is positive (negative). A second well-known (correlation)
option strategy is a dispersion portfolio, i.e., a combined position in (i) a short straddle
of index options and (ii) a long straddle portfolio of individual stock options. The short
index straddle earns on average the index volatility risk premium. The long individual
straddles pay an average of the individual volatility risk premia. Since the index volatil-
ity risk premium is more negative than the average individual volatility risk premium,
a dispersion portfolio has a positive expected excess return and earns the negative cor-
relation premium embedded in short index straddles. Instead of purchasing the whole
basket of constituent straddles, a dispersion strategy can be enhanced by selecting a
subset of individual options with low implied volatility relative to the expected volatil-
ity. Since expected volatility is unobservable, correlation option traders often proxy
it by the current realized volatility, because volatilities feature a substantial degree of
autocorrelation.
Previous literature has often highlighted that it is difficult to reconcile the excess re-
turns of these strategies with traditional risk factors (see Goyal and Saretto, 2009).
Our model suggest a simple alternative explanation. The cheapest options are those of
stocks with the lowest degree of dividend disagreement: When belief disagreement is
large, the negative volatility risk premium of that particular firm tends to be large as
well, because investors want to be compensated for holding disagreement risk. There-
fore, if our model predictions are correct, dispersion portfolios sorted with respect to
the degree of disagreement of stocks in the option straddles of their long side should
yield sorted expected excess returns. Similarly, the spread between sorted dispersion
portfolios with respect to high and low disagreement should yield positive expected ex-
cess returns. Finally, the excess returns of these option strategies should depend on
risk factors related to (common) disagreement components. We verify these predictions
within our calibrated model.
To be broadly consistent with the main features of our data, we simulate return time
series of 11 years and 5 months (2,877 days). At the beginning of each month, at-the-
money index straddles are sold and at-the-money straddles on one of the two individual
stocks are bought, in a way that makes the portfolio vega neutral with respect to the
individual stock volatility. To construct individual straddles and the sorted dispersion
portfolios, we consider both the stock with the lowest and the highest dividend dis-
agreement at the beginning of each month. The position is held for one month and is
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dynamically delta hedged, by buying a corresponding amount of the individual stock
and investing the remainder in the risk-free bond. We obtain simulated time series of
137 monthly returns of sorted dispersion trades. We also study the returns of a short
index put strategy, which is known to generate high returns and Sharpe ratios in the
data. This strategy is a natural benchmark for our sorted dispersion portfolios. Table
3.2 summarizes our findings.
Dispersion portfolios sorted with respect to the lowest stock disagreement yield the
most attractive risk-return (mean-variance) profile. Their annualized Sharpe ratio is
approximately 1.9 (1.65) in the economy with low (high) rational inattention parameters
αD1 , αD2 : The economy with more pronounced rational inattention implies a slightly
higher expected return, but also a clearly higher volatility, leading to the lower Sharpe
ratio. All dispersion portfolios provide a larger Sharpe ratio than both short index
put and sorted straddle portfolios of individual stocks. Compared to short index puts,
they also feature a lower kurtosis and negative skewness, indicating a slightly lower tail
risk. In contrast to dispersion strategies, sorted straddle returns feature no pronounced
tail risk exposure and, in particular, a positive skewness. In our model, each contingent
claim is priced at its fair price and excess returns arise because of exposure to systematic
risk factors: Disagreement risk is priced and can motivate the emergence of non-zero
excess returns in equilibrium. We study whether part of the excess return of the option
strategies in Table 3.2 is linked to (common) disagreement risk exposure. We proxy
common-disagreement risk by the weighted average of the dividend disagreements ΨD1(t)
and ΨD2(t) of the two firms. We then perform regressions analysis of excess returns on
risk factors, controlling for (i) the market return, (ii) the monthly change in the common
disagreement proxy and (iii) a nonlinear common disagreement effect, modeled by the
squared change in the common disagreement proxy. Estimated coefficients for factor
regressions are summarized in the last four rows of Table 3.2.
We find that all sorted dispersion and straddle strategies have a zero market beta. The
short index put is the only strategy with a positive market exposure. This is consistent
with the well known (delta) exposure of short put returns to large markets drops (see
Broadie, Chernov, and Johannes (2007) ). All strategies have a positive beta with
respect to the common disagreement factor. Strategies with the highest disagreement
beta are, respectively, the dispersion portfolios sorted with respect to low and high
disagreement, the short index put and the sorted portfolio of individual straddles. These
betas are highest in the economy with more pronounced rational inattention behavior
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Table 3.2: Moments of Simulated Option Strategies
This table reports summary statistics of the simulated strategy returns mean, standard deviation, skewness,
kurtosis and Sharpe ratio. The DiB sorted straddle portfolio is long the stock with the lower disagreement and
short the stock with the higher disagreement. The DiB sorted dispersion portfolio is formed by investing 100% of
the wealth in shorting index straddles and investing a fraction of wealth into the options of the firm with either
the lowest or highest belief disagreement such that the portfolio is vega neutral. The remainder is invested in the
individual stock of this particular firm such that the portfolio is delta neutral. The index consists of two equally
weighted stocks. We simulate 2,877 trading days and 1,000 simulation runs. All options are at-the-money with
a maturity of 28 trading days. We run the following regression: exreti(t) = αi + β
M
i MRKT (t) + β
D
i 
D(t) +
β
(D)2
i
(
D(t)
)2
+ ui(t), where exreti(t) is the return in excess of the one month risk-free rate, MRKT (t) is the
index excess return, D(t) is the monthly change in the common disagreement factor, and
(
D(t)
)2
is the monthly
change in the common disagreement squared. The market excess return is defined as the return on the index (i.e.,
the equal weighted sum of both stocks) and the common disagreement is a weighted average of the firm-specific
disagreement proxies.
Less rational inattention: αDi = 0.1 More rational inattention: αDi = 0.45
DiB Low DiB High DiB Short DiB Low DiB High DiB Short Index
Strdl Disp Disp Put Strdl Disp Disp Put
Mean 0.081 0.127 0.087 0.117 0.079 0.137 0.098 0.114 0.010
StDev 0.273 0.231 0.242 0.653 0.269 0.288 0.250 0.598 0.038
Kurtosis 6.938 7.532 7.146 8.477 5.487 7.814 7.417 7.879 5.819
Skewness 1.102 -3.127 -4.154 -8.239 1.144 -3.130 -4.014 -8.743 -7.423
Sharpe Ratio 1.03 1.90 1.25 0.62 1.02 1.65 1.36 0.66 0.91
Alpha 0.081 0.079 0.065 0.091 0.071 0.074 0.061 0.094
(1.77) (1.89) (1.87) (2.02) (1.71) (2.04) (1.87) (1.98)
MRKT 1.942 -0.975 -0.889 4.290 1.647 -0.984 -0.841 3.478
(1.25) (-0.99) (-1.04) (2.00) (1.04) (-1.04) (-1.46) (2.40)
D 2.784 4.105 3.475 3.144 2.414 5.017 4.071 3.020
(2.67) (3.04) (2.48) (2.07) (2.55) (3.05) (3.12) (2.20)(
D
)2
-0.081 -0.104 -0.214 -0.115 -0.150 -0.142 -0.211 -0.514
(-1.88) (-1.61) (-1.55) (-1.64) (-1.70) (-1.72) (-1.67) (-1.44)
(αD1 = αD2 = 0.45). We find weak evidence of a potentially negative dependence on
squared common disagreement shocks, highlighting a potential nonlinear dependence of
option expected returns on disagreement risk. In summary, these findings give rise to
the following model prediction.
Model prediction III: The returns of sorted straddle and dispersion portfolios feature
a zero beta to market risk, but a positive beta with respect to the common proxy of stock
disagreement.
Empirically, we can test model prediction III by studying whether the excess returns of
straddle and dispersion portfolios feature a systematic exposure to empirical proxies of
common disagreement in the time series or in the cross-section.
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3.3 Data
In order to test empirically the main predictions of our model, we build a monthly
merged panel data set, consisting of option and stock prices on all constituents of the
S&P 100 index, the time-series of index spot and option prices, and analysts’ forecasts
of future earnings from the I/B/E/S database. The sample period of our study goes
from January 1996 to June 2007.
Options Data: We use option information from the OptionMetrics Ivy DB database.
Our option sample contains trades and quotes of S&P 100 index options and all individ-
ual options on all constituents of the S&P 100, traded on the Chicago Board Options
Exchange (CBOE). The S&P 100 is a capitalization-weighted index with quarterly re-
balancing. Options on the index are European style and expire on the third Friday of
the contract month. Individual stock options are American style and usually expire on
the Saturday following the third Friday of the contract month. We apply a number of
data filters to our option data, which are explained in a supplemental data Appendix.
Stock Returns Data: In order to calculate the realized volatility of the index and indi-
vidual stocks, we use daily returns from CRSP for single-stocks and from OptionMetrics
for the index. We calculate the realized volatility over 21-day windows, requiring that
the stock has at least 15 non-zero return observations within each window.
Uncertainty and Differences in Beliefs Proxies: We use standard measures of
belief disagreement using forecast data from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System
(I/B/E/S) database (see e.g. Yu, 2011). For each firm i in each month t, we calcu-
late the cross-sectional standard deviation and consensus estimate of analyst forecasts
of earnings per share from the unadjusted I/B/E/S detail database. Firm-specific dis-
agreement is then defined as the ratio between the cross-sectional standard deviation
and the consensus estimate. Finally, common disagreement is defined as the market
capitalization weighted average of all firms. Market capitalization data is taken from
the COMPUSTAT database.12
12An alternative to use market capitalization would be to use an equally weighted average. We note
however that the unconditional correlation is almost 1.
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While in our regressions we use the level of disagreement, we use innovations in common
disagreement in our portfolio sorting exercise. Innovations in common disagreement are
constructed as first differences.13
Other Control Variables: It is well-known that cross-sectional differences in option
implied volatilities are related to firm-specific CAPM Betas (see e.g. Chang, Christof-
fersen, Jacobs, and Vainberg, 2011). In order to control for such effects, we compute
monthly conditional betas, using historical returns over a window of 180 days, and in-
clude them as explanatory variables in our regressions.
We control for liquidity effects using two different proxies. To control for option liquidity
effects, we calculate the ratio of option trading volume and the number of shares in the
underlying outstanding. In order to account for equity market liquidity effects, we use
the Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) measure of liquidity.
In volatility risk premium regressions, we control for jump risk by explicitly proxying for
differences in risk neutral skewness across stocks. As a proxy for risk neutral skewness,
we use the difference between the implied volatility of a put with 0.92 strike-to-spot
ratio (or the closest available) and the implied volatility of an at-the-money put, divided
by the absolute difference in strike-to-spot ratios.
An alternative explanation for the emergence of volatility risk premia of single-stock and
index options is the demand-based argument in Bollen and Whaley (2004). We there-
fore consider buying pressure as an additional explanatory variable in our regressions.
Following Bollen and Whaley (2004), we define net buying pressure as the number of
contracts traded during the month at prices higher than the prevailing bid/ask quote
midpoint, minus the number of contracts traded during the month at prices below the
prevailing bid/ask quote midpoint, multiplied by the absolute value of the option’s delta
and scaled by the total trading volume across all option series.
An additional alternative hypothesis for time-varying endogenous correlation is sug-
gested by Shiller (1984) and Shleifer and Summers (1990). They argue that the dynamic
interaction of noise traders and rational arbitrageurs can lead to price formation pro-
cesses in which arbitrage activity may not fully absorb correlated demand shocks. In
this context, investors’ sentiment may induce endogenous (realized) return correlation.
13As a robustness check, we also considered a model with shocks in the common disagreement proxy
defined by the residuals of a linear AR(2) dynamics. Results do not change quantitatively.
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We control for this effect and quantify the different roles played by differences in be-
liefs versus investors sentiment. To this end, we follow Baker and Wurgler (2007) and
proxy sentiment by the first principal component of trading volume (as measured by
NYSE turnover), the dividend premium, the closed-end fund discount, the number and
first-day returns on IPOs and the equity share in new issues; see Baker and Wurgler
(2007).14
Finally, we control for other standard risk factors in the literature using the two Fama
and French (1993) and the momentum factors. Business-cycle effects are captured by a
number of other variables, including the market price-earning ratio, industrial produc-
tion, housing start number, the producer price index, and non-farm employment.15 Our
macro proxy is then the first principal component estimated from these variables.
3.4 Empirical Analysis
We test empirically the main predictions of our model and start by focusing on an
initial set of predictions using panel regression methods. First, we study the extent
to which the individual and common belief disagreement components help to explain
(i) the difference between index and individual stock volatility risk premia and (ii) the
difference in the slope of the smile of index and individual stock options (risk neutral
skewness). Second, we investigate whether the common disagreement component helps
to explain correlation risk premia.
A second set of predictions is related to the fact that belief disagreement is priced. We
tackle this question both in the time-series and the cross-section: In the time series,
we estimate the beta of excess returns of option-based trading strategies (dispersion
and straddle portfolios) with respect to unexpected variations in common disagreement.
Then, in the cross-section, we sort the returns of these portfolios with respect to their
beta on differences in beliefs and investigate the extent to which cross-sectional differ-
ences in risk adjusted returns are explained by their exposure to disagreement. Finally,
we quantify the price of disagreement risk in option returns using a Fama-MacBeth
(1973) approach.
14These data are available on Jeffrey Wurgler’s webpage.
15Since the price-earning ratio for the S&P 100 does not exist, we use price-earning data from the S&P
500. We retrieve S&P 500 price-earnings data from the S&P webpage, while all other macro variables
from FRED.
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3.4.1 Disagreement and Variance Risk Premium
Our model predicts that the difference between index and individual volatility risk pre-
mia is increasing in the degree of heterogeneity in beliefs. We denote by IVi(t)−RVi(t+
1) ≡ V RPi(t) the difference between the implied and realized volatility, at time t and
t+1, respectively, for firm i.16 Similarly, IV (t)−RV (t+1) ≡ V RP (t) is the correspond-
ing difference for the index. Note that Et(RV (t+1)−IV (t)) and Et(RVi(t+1)−IVi(t))
are proxies for the volatility risk premium on index and individual stock stock, respec-
tively. Therefore, a regression with V RP (t)−V RPi(t) as an endogenous variable should
imply a positive regression parameter with respect to individual and common proxies of
heterogeneity in beliefs.17 We consider the following panel regression model:
V RP (t)− V RPi(t) = β0 + βi1DIBi(t) + β2DIB(t) +
5∑
j=3
βijControlij(t)
+
3∑
k=1
γkControlk(t) + i(t), (3.7)
where DIBi(t) is the proxy of belief disagreement of each individual firm i at time t,
DIB(t) is the common disagreement proxy at time t, Controli(t) is a vector of control
variables for firm i at time t, and Control(t) is a vector of time-series determinants at
time t, such as market volatility, the macro factor, and the sentiment index. Table 3.3
(first three columns) summarizes the results.
Consistent with the model predictions, parameter estimates in column 1 of Table 3.3 for
individual and common disagreement proxies are positive and significant, both econom-
ically and statistically. For instance, a one standard deviation change in the individual
DiB proxy implies almost a 3/4 standard deviation change in the difference between the
index and individual volatility risk premia. In order to control for potential biases due
to spurious time-series correlation, we also add time dummies to the baseline regression
(column 2 in Table 3.3) and find that they have a negligible effect on the estimated coef-
ficients for the individual disagreement proxy. The estimated coefficient for the common
disagreement proxy drops by approximately 20% and remains significant at the 10%
level. This is consistent with the fact that the common disagreement proxy picks up
16To simplify notation, we denote IVi(t, t+ 1) by IVi(t) and RVi(t, t+ 1) by RVi(t+ 1).
17In a supplemental Appendix, we present also panel regression results using as endogenous variable
the difference of [IV (t) − RV (t)] and [IVi(t) − RVi(t)]. Because of the high autocorrelation of the
monthly realized volatility, [RV (t)− IV (t, t+1)] and [RVi(t)− IVi(t)] are natural alternative proxies of
index and individual volatility risk premia. However, the results for the impact of disagreement on the
cross-sectional differences in index and individual volatility risk premia do not change.
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time variation effects only. Similar findings apply to the other time-series variables, like
market volatility or the macro factor. To learn more about the degree of cross-sectional
variation explained, we finally run a fixed effects panel regression (column 3 in Table
3.3) and find that the coefficient estimate of the individual DiB proxy is virtually un-
changed and still significant. This finding indicates that individual DiB likely captures
a time-varying cross sectional heterogeneity in the difference of index and individual
volatility risk premia, rather than a pure time-independent cross sectional effect.
3.4.1.1 Disagreement and the Skew of Index and Individual Options
Our model also predicts that cross sectional differences in the slope of the smile of index
and individual options are explained by the heterogeneity in beliefs: A larger degree of
disagreement is linked coeteris paribus to a more negative difference between the slopes
of index and individual option smiles. We compute a standardized measure of slope of
the smile, both for index and individual options, as the difference between the implied
volatility of a put with 0.92 strike-to-spot ratio (or the closest available) and the implied
volatility of an at-the-money put, divided by the absolute difference in strike-to-spot
ratios. According to this metric, a larger negative skewness is equivalent to a larger
positive slope of the smile. Therefore, a larger disagreement is expected to increase the
difference between the index and individual proxies for the slope of the smile in the
following panel regressions:
Slope(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Slope Index
− Slopei(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Slope Individual
= β0 + βi1DIBi(t) + β2DIB(t)
+
5∑
j=3
βijControlij(t) +
3∑
k=1
γkControlk(t) + i(t), (3.8)
where Slope(t)−Slopei(t) is the difference between index and individual slopes. Further
explanatory and control variables are identical to those in model (3.7) with, in addition,
the index and individual at-the-money implied volatilities, which control for the direct
impact of the volatility level on the skew of the smile. Table 3.3 (columns 4 to 6) reports
the results.
We find a positive relation between disagreement and the difference of index and individ-
ual option slopes (column 4 of Table 3.3). Individual and common DiB proxies are both
economically and statistically significant. For instance, a one standard deviation change
in the individual DiB proxies implies about a half standard deviation change in the
difference between index and individual option slopes. Regressions including time and
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fixed effects (column 5 and 6 of Table 3.3) show that the coefficient estimate of individ-
ual DiB is not driven by spurious time-series correlations or by simple time-independent
cross sectional features.
3.4.1.2 Disagreement and Correlation Risk Premium
Our model predicts that the correlation risk premium embedded in the cross-section of
index and individual options is explained by the common component in the heterogeneity
of beliefs. We denote by IC(t) − RC(t + 1) the difference between the option implied
and the average realized correlation at time t and t+1, respectively.18 According to the
model predictions, a linear regression model:
IC(t)−RC(t+ 1) = β0 + β1DIB(t) +
5∑
k=2
βkControlk(t) + (t) , (3.9)
should imply a positive parameter for the common disagreement proxy. Table 3.4 sum-
marizes the results.
We find that common disagreement components have a significant positive impact on
the (negative) correlation risk premium (column 1 of Table 3.4). Common disagreement
is the most significant variable, also after controlling for demand pressure (column 2
of table 3.4) and sentiment (column 3 of Table 3.4) proxies, which are natural control
variables, because (i) buying pressure is known to be related to the implied volatility of
index versus individual options (Bollen and Whaley, 2004 and Gaˆrleanu, Pedersen, and
Poteshman, 2009) and (ii) sentiment is a known systematic factor driving correlation
shocks. While we find that demand pressure has little impact on correlation risk premia,
we find that sentiment is positively related to the negative correlation risk premium.
3.4.2 Option Strategy Returns
We now take the previous results a step further by studying the excess returns of volatil-
ity and correlation strategies. If systematic disagreement risk is priced and helps to ex-
plain volatility (correlation) then Low-minus-High straddle (dispersion) portfolios sorted
with respect to difference in beliefs will generate positive excess returns. This should
18To simplify notation, we denote IC(t, t+ 1) by IC(t) and RC(t, t+ 1) by RC(t+ 1).
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occur both in the time-series and in the cross-section. The properties of these excess
returns are the focus of the following analysis.
3.4.2.1 Disagreement and the Time Series of Straddle Portfolio Returns
Goyal and Saretto (2009) study option trading strategies that take advantage of cross-
sectional differences in stock volatility: They show that portfolios long (short) the op-
tions with the largest (smallest) difference between realized and implied volatility yield
economically significant returns, with no apparent exposure to standard systematic risk
factors. Our model suggests a novel potential explanation for these findings: If the
common factor driving stock disagreement is correlated with states of active risk shar-
ing among agents, straddle returns might reflect a compensation for bearing systematic
disagreement risk.
To test empirically this hypothesis, we run a similar exercise as in Goyal and Saretto
(2009) and construct quintile sorted straddle portfolios, in dependence of the level of
individual disagreement: Each month, quintile 1 (5) consists of firms with the lowest
(highest) disagreement proxy. For each stock in each quintile, we compute individual
straddle portfolio returns. Finally, we average the straddle returns within each quintile
and obtain equally weighted straddle portfolio returns sorted with respect to individual
stock disagreement.19 Then, we regress the corresponding excess returns on our common
disagreement proxy, D(t), after controlling for traditional risk factors:
exreti(t) = αi + β
M
i MRKT (t) + β
S
i SMB(t) + β
BM
i HML(t) + β
MOM
i MOM(t)
+βVi 
V (t) + βLi 
L(t) + βSi 
S(t) + βCi 
C(t) + βDi 
D(t) + ui(t), (3.10)
where exreti(t) is the monthly excess return of quintile straddle portfolio i, i = 1, 5, 1−5,
MRKT (t) is the market excess return, and SMB(t), HML(t) and MOM(t) are the
size, book-to-market and momentum factors, respectively. Table 3.5 summarizes the
results of straddle returns in quintiles 1 (low) and 5 (high), together with those of a
spread straddle portfolio (LmH), consisting of a long position in quintile 1 straddles and
a short position in quintile 5 straddles.
19In a supplemental Appendix, we repeat this procedure using as sorting criterion the difference of
realized and implied volatility, as in Goyal and Saretto (2009), and obtain very similar results.
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First, we find that the straddle average excess return decreases from 7.2% for quintile
1 to -8.7% for quintile 5, implying a return of 15.9% and a Sharpe ratio of about 1.32
for the spread straddle portfolio. Second, none of the traditional risk factors is sig-
nificant at standard confidence levels (see the third column of Table 3.5). The most
significant explanatory variable for the dynamics of spread straddle returns is D(t), the
common disagreement proxy, which has a t-statistics equal to 1.98 and a positive slope
coefficient. Third, we consider the impact of additional proxies of potentially relevant
systematic risks that might affect straddle returns. We use monthly changes in the VIX
index V (t) (realized stock correlation C(t)) to capture potential time-varying volatil-
ity (correlation) risk effects, while we use monthly changes L(t) and S(t) in liquidity
and sentiment proxies to capture unexpected shocks in overall liquidity and sentiment
conditions. As the third column of Table 3.5 shows, these risk factors are also largely
insignificant in explaining the spread straddle portfolio returns. The only exception is
the slope coefficient on realized correlation which is significant at the 10% probability
level.
This empirical evidence is consistent with the main predictions of the calibrated model-
implied straddle returns in Table 3.2. Overall, we cannot reject the hypothesis that
spread straddle returns contain a systematic return component that is positively linked
to unexpected changes in systematic disagreement risk.
3.4.2.2 Disagreement and the Time Series of Dispersion Portfolio Returns
By construction, dispersion strategies generate a risk exposure to changes in correlation.
Our model predicts an economic link between dispersion returns and their exposure to
common disagreement shocks, which we address in this section. Our empirical tests start
from the simple practical consideration that trading a whole book of constituent volatil-
ities can either generate unattractive transaction costs or be difficult due to illiquidity
issues: It is more appropriate to trade a sub basket of individual stock volatilities, by
means of so-called proxy hedging.20 We adopt a number of different criteria to sort into
quintiles the individual options for the long position in the dispersion portfolio. First,
we sort based on the degree of individual firm disagreement (DiB sorting). Second, we
20The art of such a trade is to find criteria to select the cheapest options to form the basket. A
successful choice of cheap options allows the dispersion trader to partly disentangle excess return com-
ponents for average correlation risk from those for average individual volatility risk, while at the same
time producing attractive excess returns.
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sort according to the CAPM beta (Beta sorting) of each underlying stock, since the re-
sults in Table 3.3 indicate a positive link between CAPM beta and individual volatility
risk premia. Third, we sort based on the degree of illiquidity of the underlying stock
(Liquidity sorting), since more liquid stocks are likely associated with cheaper options.
Fourth, we sort based on the difference between implied and realized volatility (VRP
sorting), as suggested in Goyal and Saretto (2009). Finally, we select the stocks in each
bottom quintile to build the long side of the dispersion portfolio in our empirical tests.
For comparison purposes, for the DiB sorting, we present the evidence for two cases:
Dispersion returns for a portfolio with a long side consisting of options of stocks in the
top and bottom quintile.21 Table 3.5 (columns 4 and 5) summarizes the properties of
dispersion returns.
We find that the DiB sorted low quintile dispersion portfolio features the most attractive
average return (16.54%) and unconditional Sharpe ratio (1.51). Estimated regressions
of factor model (3.10) for dispersion returns highlight additional interesting features.
First, dispersion portfolios have no apparent exposure to standard risk factors, such
as the market return or the size, book-to-market and momentum factors, and to liq-
uidity shocks. Second, they feature a slightly significant negative (positive) exposure
to aggregate implied volatility (sentiment) shocks. Third, the most significant positive
(negative) exposure arises with respect to shocks in common disagreement components
(average realized stock correlation). Fourth, the economic impact of common disagree-
ment shocks on the average return of a dispersion portfolio is economically large: For
instance, a one standard deviation shock implies an increase of the average return of DiB
sorted dispersion portfolios of about 3.5%. Consistently with the model predictions, we
conclude that (i) dispersion excess returns are not easily explained by traditional eco-
nomic sources of risk and that (ii) they feature a distinct and economically important
exposure to common disagreement shocks.
21We fix the portfolio weights of the individual options by hedging away individual volatility risks
using a vega-neutral position. We then determine delta-neutral portfolio weights for the individual
stocks and invest the residual wealth in the risk-free asset. Thus, each dispersion portfolio shorts an
(index) straddle and invests the residual wealth in (individual) straddles, individual stocks and the
risk-free bond. We circumvent microstructure biases and initiate all option strategies on Tuesdays, as
opposed to the first trading day (Monday). Returns are computed using as a reference initial price the
average of the closing bid and ask quotes on the previous day. As a reference final price for all options in
the portfolio, we compute the realized value of the terminal payoff at the option’s expiration date. After
expiration of each option, a new option is selected and a new monthly return is calculated following
the above procedure. We use equally weighted monthly returns on calls and puts. Such a procedure is
repeated for each month.
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3.4.2.3 Double Sorted Dispersion Portfolios
According to the empirical evidence in Table 3.5, different exposures to common dis-
agreement shocks in the time series might be linked to systematically different excess
returns in the cross-section of dispersion returns. For instance, dispersion returns for the
bottom DiB quintile have both a larger exposure to disagreement shocks and a higher
excess return than dispersion returns for the top DiB quintile. Are such cross-sectional
differences significant, after controlling for other common risk factors, such as, e.g., liq-
uidity risk? We address this question with a simple nonparametric approach: In each
month, we construct double sorted straddle portfolios for the long side of the dispersion
trades. The first sort is based on the degree of exposure to common disagreement risk.
The second sort is with respect to the degree of exposure to some of the other system-
atic risk factors in regression model (3.10). In order to keep the double sorted portfolios
sufficiently well populated, we double sort options into terciles, rather than quintiles,
along each sorting dimension.
Each column in Panel A of Table 3.6 reports aggregated average returns (and related
t-statistics) for double sorted dispersion portfolios: Average returns in each row of Panel
A are obtained by aggregating the corresponding double sorted portfolio returns along
the Market, Size, Book-to-Market, Momentum, Liquidity and Volatility risk premium
sorting dimension.
First, we find that differences in dispersion returns between bottom and top terciles
of common DiB exposure are significant and economically relevant, irrespective of the
second sorting criterion: Differences in returns range from about 1.9% to 5.6%. Second,
while in each tercile of common DiB exposure there is some return variability along
terciles of the second sorting dimension, this variability is typically lower than the one
observed along the DiB exposure dimension. Panel B and C of Table 3.6 summarize these
findings for the double sorted portfolios with respect to the market (Panel B) and liq-
uidity (Panel C) risk exposure: While the average return of the high-minus-low portfolio
with respect to common DiB exposure is 5.4% (4.3%) in the double sorting with respect
to market (liquidity) exposure, the aggregate high-minus-low portfolio with respect to
market (liquidity) exposure has an average return of only 1.3% (1.4%).22 Overall, this
22Intuitively, the very low return differences for the market sorting reflect the fact that dispersion
trades try to achieve a market neutral position by delta hedging market risk.
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analysis shows that an economically relevant fraction of cross sectional variation in dis-
persion returns is driven by a conditional exposure to systematic disagreement risk.
3.4.2.4 The Economic Relevance of Disagreement Risk
Section IV.3.4.2.3 and Table 3.5 document an increasing cross-sectional pattern in the
average return of quintile dispersion portfolios, which is unrelated to cross-sectional
differences in standard risk factor exposures and positively linked to an increasing beta
with respect to common disagreement shocks. A natural question is whether the cross-
section of dispersion returns is linked to other nonlinear sources of systematic risk, e.g.,
downside risk, which could provide a rationale for the different cross-sectional dispersion
returns as a compensation for hidden downside risk. A potentially important downside
risk component in dispersion returns is motivated, e.g., by the nonlinear structure of
option straddle payoffs and the pronounced negative skewness of dispersion returns in
the data.
We investigate the relation between disagreement risk and downside risk in dispersion
returns, borrowing from the Koenker and Basset (1978) quantile regression approach,
and specify each conditional quantile of dispersion returns as a linear function of the
relevant risk factors.23 This methodology allows us to estimate the potentially different
effect of systematic disagreement components on distinct quantiles of the conditional
distribution of dispersion returns. Table 3.7 presents estimated quantile regression co-
efficients, together with the corresponding lower and upper 10% and 90% confidence
bounds.
For brevity, we focus on regression estimates for the 0.25, the 0.5, and the 0.75 quantiles
and present results only for regressors that are significant in explaining at least one of
these quantiles.24
23Quantile regression extends standard least squares estimation of the conditional mean function
to a collection of linear regression models for each conditional quantile of the endogenous variable.
By combining the quantile regression results for different quantiles, we thus obtain a more complete
description of the impact of disagreement on the conditional distribution of dispersion returns.
24Standard errors are computed by a (x, y)-pair bootstrap procedure (see Koenker and Hallock, 2001).
By construction, the regression quantile point estimates for the 0.5 quantile are identical to the OLS
point estimates presented in Table 3.5.
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Table 3.3: Difference between the Index and Individual VolRP and Slope
Using data from January 1996 to June 2007, we run regressions of proxies for the difference between
the index and individual volatility risk premium (and the slope) on a number of determinants. DiB is
our proxy for difference in beliefs for each firm, defined as the mean absolute difference among analysts’
forecasts. Common DiB is our proxy for the common component in difference in beliefs for the market,
Market Vola is the 21 day realized volatility of the index, Skewness is measured as the difference between
the implied volatility of a put with 0.92 strike-to-spot ratio (or the closest available) and the implied
volatility of an at-the-money put, dividend by the difference in strike-to-spot ratios. CAPM Beta is
estimated from a regression using a window of 180 daily returns. Liquidity is the ratio between trading
volume and shares outstanding. DP is demand pressure and is defined as the difference between the
number of contracts traded during the month at prices higher than the prevailing bid/ask quote midpoint
and the number of contracts traded during the month at prices below the prevailing bid/ask quote
midpoint, times the absolute value of the option’s delta, then scaled this difference by the total trading
volume across all option series. Macro Factor is a dynamic factor from IP, Housing Starts, S&P 500 P/E
ratio, and PPI. Sentiment is the first principal component from trading volume as measured by NYSE
turnover, the dividend premium, the closed-end fund discount, the number and first-day returns on IPOs
and the equity share in new issues. We use logarithmic changes over the past twelve months. ? denotes
significance at the 10% level, ?? denotes significance at the 5% level and ? ? ? denotes significance at
the 1% level. All estimations use autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics reported
in parenthesis below the estimated coefficient.
Difference in VRP Difference in Slope
Constant 0.009??? 0.008??? 0.009??? 0.003??? 0.004??? 0.004???
(4.10) (3.85) (4.01) (15.68) (16.14) (15.87)
DiB 0.131??? 0.127??? 0.127??? 0.104??? 0.105??? 0.106???
(3.94) (4.28) (4.14) (4.51) (5.00) (4.89)
Common DiB 0.099?? 0.082?? 0.075?? 0.101?? 0.072?? 0.077??
(2.50) (2.22) (2.41) (2.48) (2.06) (1.99)
Market Vola 0.104?? 0.092?? 0.092?? 0.422?? 0.399?? 0.386??
(2.12) (1.97) (1.98) (2.51) (2.43) (1.99)
ATM Vol Index 0.422??? 0.402??? 0.399???
(6.29) (5.18) (5.10)
ATM Vol Indvidual −0.107??? −0.1??? −0.097???
(-3.02) (-2.94) (-2.98)
Macro Factor −0.098?? −0.101? −0.101? −0.105? −0.089? −0.086?
(-1.99) (-1.73) (-1.76) (-1.84) (-1.74) (-1.73)
Liquidity -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-0.91) (-0.61) (-0.60) (-0.01) (-0.02) (-0.03)
CAPM Beta 0.021? 0.018? 0.017? 0.010? 0.009? 0.008?
(1.83) (1.80) (1.81) (1.76) (1.67) (1.65)
Skewness -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-1.03) (-0.83) (-0.82) (-1.03) (-0.83) (-0.82)
DP Calls -0.043 -0.032 -0.033 -0.002 -0.004 -0.007
(-1.61) (-1.20) (-1.19) (-1.07) (-1.04) (-1.03)
DP Puts -0.082 -0.010 -0.009 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006
(-1.19) (-0.38) (-0.39) (-0.89) (-0.88) (-0.86)
Sentiment 0.101? 0.097? 0.099? 0.102? 0.089? 0.090?
(1.73) (1.80) (1.81) (2.01) (1.76) (1.75)
Adj. R2 0.25 0.20 0.20 0.33 0.32 0.31
Year Dummies x x x x
Firm Dummies x x
Observations 11,318 11,318 11,318 11,318 11,318 11,318
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Table 3.4: Correlation Risk Premium Regressions
Using data from January 1996 to June 2007, we run regressions from the correlation risk premium
on a number of determinants (see equation (13)). The correlation risk premium is approximated
by the difference between the index volatility risk premium and a weighted average of the con-
stituents volatility risk premia. Common DiB is our proxy for the common component in the
difference in beliefs for the market, Market Vola is the 21 day realized volatility of the index,
Demand Pressure is defined as the ratio of the open interest for the out-of-money index put
options to the open interest for the near and at-the-money index options. Sentiment is the first
principal component from trading volume as measured by NYSE turnover, the dividend pre-
mium, the closed-end fund discount, the number and first-day returns on IPOs and the equity
share in new issues. ? denotes significance at the 10% level, ?? denotes significance at the 5%
level and ? ? ? denotes significance at the 1% level. All estimations use autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics reported in parenthesis below the estimated coefficient.
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 0.002??? 0.002??? 0.001???
(3.45) (3.47) (3.78)
Common DiB 0.104??? 0.112??? 0.108???
(2.71) (2.65) (2.74)
Market Vola 0.057?? 0.068?? 0.055??
(2.45) (2.21) (2.01)
Macro Factor -0.079 -0.065 -0.065
(-1.49) (-1.41) (-1.12)
Demand Pressure 0.875
(0.89)
Sentiment 0.888??
(2.46)
Adj. R2 0.10 0.09 0.13
Observations 138 138 138
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Table 3.5: Returns on Straddles and Dispersion Sorted on Disagreement
This table reports the monthly mean and annualized Sharpe ratio of the straddle and dispersion
portfolio returns. Portfolios are sorted according to the size of each firm’s individual DiB.
Quintile 1 (5) consists of stocks with the lowest (largest) DiB. Option returns of single-stocks are
sampled between January 1996 and June 2007. The alpha and beta coefficients are estimated
from the following least-squares regression:
exreti(t) = αi + β
M
i MRKT (t) + β
S
i SMB(t) + β
BM
i HML(t) + β
MOM
i MOM(t)
+βVi 
V (t) + βLi 
L(t) + βSi 
S(t) + βDi 
D(t) + βCi 
C(t) + ui(t),
where exreti(t) is the strategy return in excess of the one month Libor, MRKT is the value-
weighted excess return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks , SMB is the size factor,
HML is the book-to-market factor and MOM is the momentum factor. V is the monthly
change of the VIX, L the monthly change of the aggregate liquidity measure, D the change of
the common disagreement factor, and C the change in the realized correlation.
Straddles Dispersion
Low High LmH Low High
Mean 0.0719 -0.0872 0.1591 0.1654 0.1038
Sharpe Ratio 0.6072 -1.5635 1.3249 1.5097 1.1940
Alpha 0.083?? −0.104? 0.186? 0.094 0.067
(2.01) (-1.75) (1.92) (2.58) (2.04)
MRKT 0.928 -1.192 2.120 -0.060 -0.103
(1.02) (-1.24) (1.04) (-0.42) (-0.33)
SMB −1.293? 1.823 -3.116 1.621 1.384
(-1.93) (1.02) (-0.14) (1.20) (1.39)
HML -0.193 -0.299 0.106 -0.639 -0.552
(-0.33) (-0.92) (0.94) (-0.50) (-0.99)
MOM 0.102 −0.373? 0.475 -1.301 -1.208
(0.41) (-1.84) (1.38) (-0.39) (-1.08)
D 0.934?? 0.680? 0.252?? 4.841??? 4.142??
(2.12) (1.67) (1.98) (2.58) (2.14)
L 1.001 0.098 0.903 -0.202 -0.372
(0.83) (0.97) (1.02) (-0.22) (-0.28)
V -0.195 1.235 -1.430 −2.184? −2.842?
(-1.04) (1.03) (-0.55) (-1.84) (-1.73)
S 0.287? 0.302? -0.015 3.833? 2.377??
(1.78) (1.93) (-1.03) (1.90) (2.01)
C −0.183? −0.199? 0.016? −0.005??? −0.011???
(-1.82) (-1.77) (1.69) (-3.01) (-2.45)
Adj. R2 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.06
Observations 132 132 132 132 132
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Table 3.6: Returns on Double-Sorted Option Strategies
This table reports average monthly returns of double sorted dispersion portfolio returns. Dispersion
portfolios are formed by investing 100% of the wealth in shorting index straddles and investing a fraction
of wealth into double-sorted stocks. Each month, we first sort according to exposure to Common DiB.
Then, within each tercile, we sort stocks into terciles based on the exposure to the market return, the
size, book-to-market, momentum, and aggregate liquidity factor in Panel A. The returns on the double
sorted dispersion portfolios are then averaged over each of the six stock characteristic portfolios. Panels
B and C report the break-downs of average returns for the Market and Liquidity double sort, respectively.
The t-statistics reported in parenthesis are based on Newey-West adjusted standard errors using 12 lags.
The returns are sampled between January 1996 and June 2007.
Panel A: Average Returns
Control Low Med High HmL
MRKT 0.099 0.135 0.155 0.056
(3.30) (2.92) (2.23) (4.30)
SMB 0.111 0.135 0.155 0.044
(1.94) (2.01) (1.80) (2.17)
HML 0.114 0.134 0.162 0.048
(3.40) (4.30) (3.20) (4.04)
MOM 0.093 0.117 0.129 0.036
(2.67) (2.31) (1.76) (2.70)
L 0.124 0.148 0.161 0.037
(4.11) (3.74) (2.50) (3.87)
V 0.145 0.146 0.164 0.019
(5.30) (4.11) (4.20) (5.11)
Panel B1: Market
Low 0.094 0.124 0.145 0.051
(2.50) (2.85) (3.02) (2.41)
Med 0.100 0.135 0.154 0.054
(2.74) (3.01) (2.44) (2.85)
High 0.102 0.140 0.161 0.059
(3.22) (2.41) (3.45) (2.47)
HmL 0.008 0.016 0.016
(2.50) (2.44) (2.48)
Panel B2: Liquidity
Low 0.112 0.135 0.160 0.048
(2.44) (2.48) (2.35) (2.61)
Med 0.122 0.147 0.166 0.044
(1.98) (2.11) (2.50) (2.38)
High 0.130 0.151 0.169 0.039
(2.19) (2.57) (2.14) (2.22)
HmL 0.018 0.016 0.009
(1.88) (2.04) (2.81)
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Table 3.7: Quantile Regressions on Dispersion Portfolio Returns
This table presents estimated coefficients from running quantile regressions of the returns of disagreement sorted dispersion portfolios on changes in
common DiB, D, changes in the VIX, V , changes in sentiment, S , and finally changes in realized correlation, C . The upper (lower) row for each
determinant consists of the 10% (90%) confidence bound. Bold numbers indicate estimated coefficients.
DiB Bin 1 2 3 4 5
Quantile 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.25 0.5 0.75
1.633 8.487 10.420 2.028 7.943 9.858 2.133 7.698 9.726 2.066 7.759 9.503 2.132 7.425 7.840
D -2.013 4.841 6.774 -1.255 4.660 6.575 -1.150 4.415 6.443 -1.217 4.476 6.220 -1.151 4.142 4.557
-5.659 1.195 3.128 -4.901 1.014 2.929 -4.796 0.769 2.797 -4.863 0.830 2.574 -4.434 0.859 1.274
0.318 0.142 0.075 0.125 0.075 0.004 0.039 -0.153 -0.225 -0.332 -0.351 -0.407 -0.802 -0.898 0.237
V -2.008 -2.184 -2.251 -2.201 -2.251 -2.322 -2.287 -2.479 -2.551 -2.658 -2.677 -2.733 -2.762 -2.858 -2.983
-4.334 -4.510 -4.577 -4.527 -4.577 -4.648 -4.613 -4.805 -4.877 -4.984 -5.003 -5.059 -4.722 -4.818 -4.943
5.205 7.791 8.439 5.501 7.430 8.357 5.505 7.003 7.292 5.443 6.853 7.079 3.999 4.695 5.320
S 1.251 3.837 4.485 1.547 3.476 4.403 1.551 3.049 3.338 1.489 2.899 3.125 1.681 2.377 3.002
-2.703 -0.117 0.531 -2.407 -0.478 0.449 -2.403 -0.905 -0.616 -0.829 0.581 0.807 -0.637 0.059 0.684
-0.006 -0.001 0.000 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.006 -0.003 -0.004 -0.008 -0.005 -0.006 -0.003 -0.002 0.001
C -0.009 -0.004 -0.003 -0.007 -0.006 -0.005 -0.009 -0.006 -0.007 -0.011 -0.008 -0.009 -0.012 -0.011 -0.008
-0.012 -0.007 -0.006 -0.010 -0.009 -0.008 -0.012 -0.009 -0.010 -0.014 -0.011 -0.012 -0.021 -0.020 -0.017
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We find that shocks in the VIX, the sentiment proxy, and the realized correlation proxy
all have a similar estimated coefficient, with identical sign across the different quantiles
of dispersion portfolios: While the point estimates for V and C are all negative, those
for S are all positive. Shocks to realized correlation have a significant impact on each
quantile of dispersion portfolios. Shocks to sentiment (the VIX index) have some signifi-
cant explanatory power only for the 75% quantiles of dispersion portfolios (the quantiles
of the fourth and fifth quintile portfolios).
Shocks in the common disagreement proxy D, on the other hand, have an economically
and statistically significant positive impact on the upper (0.75) and central (0.5) quan-
tiles, but they tend to imply a negative impact on the bottom (0.25) return quantile of
all dispersion portfolios. An increase in disagreement increases expected returns in aver-
age and good states (0.50 and 0.75 quantiles), while in bad states (bottom 0.25 quantile)
stocks associated with largest increase in disagreement generate losses. This evidence
suggests the existence of a potentially infrequent downside risk linked to systematic
disagreement shocks. According to these findings, the positive effect of disagreement
risk on the top 50% dispersion returns might be interpreted as a compensation for its
negative impact on rare, but potentially large, dispersion losses.
3.4.3 The Price of Disagreement Risk
The basic intuition of our model for a cross-sectional differential pricing of index and
individual options is based on the presence of priced disagreement components, generated
by the optimal equilibrium risk sharing among disagreeing agents, which explains a
fraction of the excess returns of option volatility and correlation strategies based on,
e.g., straddle and dispersion portfolios. We conclude our empirical analysis by testing
whether disagreement risk is a priced risk factor in the cross-section of these option
strategy returns.
Similar to Breeden, Gibbons, and Litzenberger (1989) and Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and
Zhang (2006), we build a factor-mimicking portfolio of innovations in common disagree-
ment. By having a traded factor at hand, we are able to study the factor price of
risk in a natural way. To obtain the factor mimicking portfolio (CDiB), we regress
innovations in the common disagreement on the excess returns of the dispersion port-
folio: D(t + 1) = a + b′rx(t+1) + u(t + 1), where rx(t+1) is the vector of excess
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returns on the dispersion portfolios. The factor mimicking factor is then given by
CDiB(t+ 1) = bˆ′rx(t+1).
We estimate the price of disagreement risk components using a two-pass Fama-MacBeth
(1973) regression approach, in which we consider the return of a factor mimicking port-
folio for common disagreement risk. Following Fama and French (1992), the factor
mimicking portfolio is long (short) the quintile of stocks having the highest (lowest)
beta with respect to our common DiB (CDiB) proxy. In the first stage of the two-pass
methodology, we regress the time-series of monthly excess returns of straddle option
quintile portfolios in Table 3.5 on a number of potential pricing factors, in order to esti-
mate the corresponding factor betas. We follow the same procedure for the cross-section
of dispersion quintile portfolios, in which the long side simply consists of the five quin-
tile straddle portfolios in Table 3.5, respectively. In addition to standard risk factors
like, e.g., the market return, in these regressions we additionally include as explanatory
variables the return and the squared return of the factor-mimicking portfolio for com-
mon DiB, in order to account for potential nonlinearities of option strategy returns with
respect to common DiB shocks. In the second stage of the two-pass methodology, we
regress each month the cross-section of excess returns of straddle and dispersion portfo-
lios on their estimated factor betas from the first step. In this way, we obtain monthly
estimates of the price of risk for each factor. Finally, we average monthly point estimates
of prices of risk over time to obtain unconditional estimates of factor risk premia.
For each time point t = 1 . . . , T , in the second step of the two-pass methodology we
estimate the following cross-sectional regressions, in the full model specification:
exreti(t) = αi + β
MRKT
i λMRKT + β
SML
i λSML + β
HML
i λHML
+βMOMi λMOM + β
CDiB
i λCDiB + β
CDiB2
i λCDiB2 + ui(t), (3.11)
where exreti(t) denotes the excess returns of option straddle or dispersion portfolio
i = 1, . . . , N and Table 3.8 summarizes our findings.25
Panel A reports estimated prices of risk from the second step of the procedure, both for
(i) the full factor specification (3.11) and (ii) a CAPM-type factor specification, extended
only by the betas for the return and the squared return of the factor-mimicking portfolio
25We adopt standard refinements of the two-pass methodology by using a Shanken (1992) correction
in order to obtain errors-in-variables robust standard errors. We also compute Shanken and Zhou (2007)
correction, in order to obtain standard errors robust against misspecification, however, the results remain
quantitatively the same.
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Table 3.8: The Price of Disagreement Risk
Panel A reports the Fama-MacBeth (1973) factor premia of sorted straddle and dispersion portfolios.
MRKT is the excess return on the market portfolio, SMB and HML are the Fama and French (1993)
size and value factors, MOM is the momentum factor, and CDiB is the mimicking factor for common
disagreement. CDiB is constructed as a zero cost portfolio which is long the quintile of stocks with
highest exposure to Common DiB and short the quintile with lowest exposure to Common DiB. In Panel
B, we report factor loadings from the time-series regression on the MRKT factor, CDiB and CDiB2.
The t-statistics are corrected for estimation error in the first stage as proposed by Shanken (1992). The
data covers January 1996 until June 2007.
Panel A: Fama and MacBeth (1973) Factor Premia
Alpha MRKT SMB HML MOM CDiB CDiB2
A.I. 0.025 0.371 0.311 -0.045
(0.45) (1.47) (3.41) (-1.65)
A.II 0.041 0.414 0.387 0.141 -0.530
(3.14) (1.77) (2.47) (0.47) (-1.01)
A.III 0.030 0.410 0.224 0.317 -0.458 0.222 -0.014
(1.47) (0.88) (1.45) (0.33) (-0.56) (2.58) (-1.15)
Panel B: Factor Exposures Straddles
1 2 3 4 5 1-5
βMRKT 0.971 0.210 -0.410 -1.147 -1.251 2.222
(1.22) (1.47) (-1.18) (-1.47) (-1.66) (1.47)
βCDiB 0.501 0.314 -0.001 -0.142 -0.155 0.656
(5.14) (2.48) (3.01) (4.27) (3.87) (3.56)
βCDiB2 -0.014 -0.018 -0.005 0.005 0.017 -0.031
(-1.45) (-1.48) (-1.66) (1.25) (1.47) (-1.44)
Panel B: Factor Exposures Dispersion
βMRKT -0.075 -0.017 -0.055 -0.159 -0.167 0.092
(-0.40) (-0.12) (-0.47) (-0.82) (-0.11) (-0.45)
βCDiB 0.298 0.235 0.014 -0.144 -0.149 0.447
(3.45) (2.45) (2.74) (-1.97) (-2.01) (2.85)
βCDiB2 -0.146 -0.455 -0.211 -0.044 0.001 -0.147
(-1.11) (-1.45) (-0.55) (-0.26) (-0.33) (-1.10)
for common DiB. Overall, we find that exposure to the return of the CDiB factor-
mimicking portfolio is the only one implying a strongly significant positive price of
risk: When the CDiB mimicking portfolio return is included in the regression, exposure
to market risk and all other standard risk factors has no significant impact on the
cross-section of option portfolio returns. The estimated market price for CDiB risk of
26% is instead strongly significant, both economically and statistically. In the CAPM-
type factor specification (row A.I), the results also produce some (weak) evidence of
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a negative market price of risk for the squared returns of the CDiB factor-mimicking
portfolio, indicating a potential nonlinearity in the relation between some option returns
and disagreement risk.
Panel B reports for brevity the cross-section of estimated betas for the CAPM-type
extended specification. We find that the CDiB beta of straddle (dispersion) quintile
portfolios ranges from 0.501 to -0.155 (0.398 to -0.149). Thus, cross-sectional variations
in factor betas for common DiB are responsible for differences in average excess returns of
sorted straddle (dispersion) portfolios of about (0.501−0.155) · (0.26) = 8.99% ((0.298−
0.149) · (0.26) = 3.87%). This amounts to about two third (half) of the total cross-
sectional variation of 15% (6%) in the excess returns of straddle (dispersion) portfolios.
In summary, we conclude that the cross-section of option portfolio returns contains
an economically relevant component generated by different cross-sectional exposures
to systematic disagreement risk. When neglecting exposures to common disagreement
components, average alphas of dispersion and straddle returns are significantly different
from zero. However, this finding seems more related to the presence of an uncovered
systematic disagreement risk factor than to an evident option mispricing.
3.5 Conclusion
The interaction of incomplete information and disagreement give rise to a number of
novel implications for the dynamics and cross-section of volatility and correlation risk
premia. In this paper, we depart from the previous literature by investigating a two-
trees Lucas economy in which the growth rates of firms’ dividend streams are unknown
and investors have different perceptions of future market-wide uncertainty. Agents agree
to disagree and equilibrium consumption plans depend on the degree of disagreement
among investors, who engage in active risk sharing to finance their optimal policies. In
this setting, investors’ disagreement about a market-wide economic signal can generate
substantial stock return co-movement, even when underlying fundamentals are weakly
related. This generally occurs in presence of greater subjective uncertainty. Even more
important, volatility and correlation risk are priced and their risk premia are driven
by the degree of heterogeneity in beliefs among investors and affected by the level of
perceived market-wide uncertainty. The equilibrium volatility risk premium on index op-
tions is larger, because of an endogenous correlation risk premium generated by investors’
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optimal risk sharing, and model-implied index option smiles are steeper than individual
option smiles. These features produce option volatility and correlation strategies that
can generate large risk-adjusted excess returns, as a consequence of their exposure to
unexpected changes in the degree of diversity in beliefs in the economy. While these
strategies have no apparent exposure to standard risk factors, they produce an econom-
ically and statistically significant exposure to proxies of systematic disagreement risk.
This is important since it has the potential to explain some puzzles highlighted by the
extant empirical literature.
Using analyst forecast data on future earnings to construct a proxy of disagreement,
we find that disagreement has strong predictive power in explaining (a) the spread
between index and individual volatility risk premia, (b) the skewness of implied volatility
smiles and (c) option-implied correlation risk premia. Option trading strategies that
exploit these risk premia yield very attractive Sharpe ratios. At the same time, these
excess returns are explained by a significant exposure to unexpected changes in the
common disagreement component, while exposure to market risk and a number of other
traditional systematic risk factors are not statistically significant. After we control
for common disagreement, Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression alphas are no longer
statistically different from zero.
The results in this paper support the notion that beliefs heterogeneity add an economi-
cally important dimension to neoclassical asset pricing and to our understanding of the
dynamics and cross-section of volatility and correlation risk premia.
Appendix A
Appendix A
A.1 Beliefs Disagreement Dynamics and Learning
Given the parametric structure of the dynamics for dividends and signals in our model,
it is possible to solve the filtering problem of a Bayesian investor that believes in this
dynamics. Since the relevant state variables define a multivariate Gaussian process,
this problem is standard. In particular, with Gaussian initial conditions the implied
conditional beliefs are Gaussian; see Rogers and Williams (1987) Sec. 6.9, and Liptser
and Shiryaev (2000), Theorem 12.7.
Lemma A.1. Let m(t) = E
(
µ(t)|FYt
)
and γ(t) = E
(
(µ(t)−m(t)) (µ(t)−m(t))′ |FYt
)
.
It then follows that m(t) and γ(t) are continuous FYt -measurable for any t solutions of
the system of equations:
dm(t) = (a0 + a1m(t))dt+ γ(t)A
′(BB′)−1(dY (t)−Am(t)dt), (A.1)
dγ(t)/dt = a1γ(t) + γ(t)a
′
1 + bb
′ − γ(t)A′(BB′)−1Aγ(t), (A.2)
subject to the initial conditions m(0) = E(µ0|FY0 ) and γ(0) = E
(
(µ0 −m(0)) (µ0 −m(0))′ |FY0
)
.
Moreover, if the matrix γ(0) is positive definite, then the matrices γ(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T , have
the same property.
Closed form solutions of the matrix Riccati equation1 for γ(t) in Lemma A.1 are ob-
tained, via Radon’s Lemma, by linearizing the flow of the differential equation (A.2).
1For a review of Riccati equations, see Freiling (2002).
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Lemma A.2. Let(
g11(t) g12(t)
g21(t) g22(t)
)
= exp
(
t
(
a1 A
′(BB′)−1A
bb′ −a′1
))
.
Then the solution of equation (A.2) can be written as:
γ(t) = (γ(0)g12(t) + g22(t))
−1 (γ(0)g11(t) + g21(t)) .
Proof: Let γ(t) = F (t)−1G(t), for two differentiable functions F (t) and G(t) such that
G(t) is invertible and F (0) = id2×2. It then follows:
d
dt
[F (t)γ(t)] − d
dt
[F (t)] γ(t) = F (t)
d
dt
γ(t),
and
d
dt
G(t) − d
dt
[F (t)]γ(t) = bb′F (t) +G(t)a1 +
(
F (t)a′1 +G(t)A
′(BB′)−1A
)
γ(t). (A.3)
The last ordinary differential equation leads to the following system of linear equations:
d
dt
G(t) = F (t)bb′ +G(t)a′1,
d
dt
F (t) = −F (t)a1 +G(t)A′(BB′)−1A .
The solution of this system of differential equations is:
(G(t) F (t)) = (G(0) F (0)) exp
(
t
(
a1 A
′(BB′)−1A
bb′ −a′1
))
,
= (γ(0)g11(t) + g21(t) γ(0)g12(t) + g22(t)) .
It then follows that the closed form solution of the matrix Riccati equation (A.2) is:
γ(t) = (γ(0)g12(t) + g22(t))
−1 (γ(0)g11(t) + g21(t)).
If γ(t) is at the steady-state, then the matrix Riccati becomes an algebraic Riccati
equation (ARE) of the form:
0 = a1γ + γa
′
1 + bb
′ − γA′(BB′)−1Aγ , (A.4)
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which is equivalent to the following system of equations:
0 = 2a1AγA + σ
2
µA
− γ
2
A
σ2A
− (αγA + βγAz)
2
σ2z
,
0 = 2a1zγz + σ
2
µz −
γ2Az
σ2A
− (αγAz + βγz)
2
σ2z
,
0 = (a1A + a1z) γAz − γAzγA
σ2A
− αγAz (αγA + βγAz) + βγz (αγA + βγAz)
σ2z
.
Lemma A.3. Let
F = bb′A′(BB′)−1A+ a1a
′
1, (A.5)
then the solution to equation (A.4) is given by:
γ =
(
F 1/2 − (a′1 + a1) /2)−1 bb′. (A.6)
Proof: Analytical solutions to ARE are in general not available, however, under the
condition that bb′ is non-singular and bb′a1 is a symmetric matrix, Incertis (1981) derives
analytical solutions for equation (A.4). Applying the steps in the paper, we find that
the closed-form solution of γ is given by (A.6), where F 1/2 is the square root of the
matrix F , which is defined in (A.5). In the special case β = 0, the solution takes the
particularly simple form γAz = 0 and:
γA =
a1A +
√
a21A + σ
2
µA
(
σ2z+α
2σ2A
σ2Aσ
2
z
)
(
σ2z+α
2σ2A
σ2Aσz
) ,
γz = −
σ2µz
2a1z
.
From Lemma A.1, the disagreement dynamics in our economy follows in a straightfor-
ward way, by applying the above results individually to the filtering problems of the two
investors in our economy. The dynamics of the individual beliefs are:
dm1(t) = (a0 + a1m
1(t))dt+ γ1(t)A′B−1dW 1Y (t),
dm2(t) = (a0 + a1m
2(t))dt+ γ2(t)A′(BB′)−1(m1(t)−m2(t))dt+ γ2(t)A′B−1dW 1Y (t) ,
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using the symmetry of B. The dynamics of Ψ(t) = B−1(m1(t)−m2(t)) follows, as:
dΨ(t) = B−1
(
a1 + γ
2(t)A′(BB′)−1
)
(m1(t)−m2(t))dt+B−1 (γ1(t)− γ2(t))A′B−1dW 1Y (t)
= B−1
(
a1B + γ
2(t)A′B−1
)
Ψ(t)dt+B−1
(
γ1(t)− γ2(t))A′B−1dW 1Y (t),
with initial condition Ψ(0) = B−1(m1(0) − m2(0)). The solution of this stochastic
differential condition is:
Ψ(t) = exp
{∫ t
0
M(s)ds
}
Ψ(0) +
∫ t
0
exp
{∫ s
0
M(u)du
}
B−1
(
γ1(s)− γ2(s))A′B−1dW 1Y (s),(A.7)
where M(s) = B−1
(
a1B + γ
2(s)A′B−1
)
. It follows that Ψ(t) is normally distributed
as:
Ψ(t) ∼ N
(
e
∫
t
0
M(s)dsΨ(0),
∫ t
0
e
∫
s
0
M(u)duB−1(γ1(s)− γ2(s))A′(BB′)−1A (γ1(s)− γ2(s))′B−1e∫ s0 M(u)duds).
The parameter b = diag(σµA , σµz ) in the dynamics for γ(t) in Lemma A.1 impacts the
distribution of m(t) only indirectly, by influencing the Riccati differential equation for
γ(t). Therefore, when we assume that this parameter is perceived identically by all in-
vestors, we can model a setting of rational Bayesian investors that can disagree because
of different priors at time zero. If we assume that this parameter is perceived differ-
ently by some investor, we can model parsimoniously an economy with overconfidence,
in which, e.g., some investor perceives a lower variance for the expected consumption
growth or the expected change in the signal. To this end, we just need to use an investor–
dependent parameter bi = diag(σiµA , σ
i
µz ) in the matrix Riccati differential equation for
γi(t), where i = 1, 2.
For i = 1, 2, define:
γi(t) =
(
γiA(t) γ
i
Az(t)
γiAz(t) γ
i
z(t)
)
. (A.8)
From the vector dynamics for Ψ(t), the dynamics for ΨA(t) and Ψz(t) read explicitly:
dΨA(t) =
((
a1A +
γ2A(t)
σ2A
)
ΨA(t) +
αγ2A(t) + βγ
2
Az(t)
σAσz
Ψz(t)
)
dt
+
γ1A(t)− γ2A(t)
σ2A
dW 1A(t) +
α(γ1A(t)− γ2A(t)) + β(γ1Az(t)− γ2Az(t))
σAσz
dW 1z (t) ,
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and
dΨz(t) =
(
γ2Az(t)
σAσz
ΨA(t) +
(
a1z +
αγ2Az(t) + βγ
2
z (t)
σ2z
)
Ψz(t)
)
dt
+
γ1Az(t)− γ2Az(t)
σAσz
dW 1A(t) +
α(γ1Az(t)− γ2Az(t)) + β(γ1z (t)− γ2z (t))
σ2z
dW 1z (t) .
Similarly, the dynamics for m1A(t) and m
1
z(t) read explicitly:
dm1A(t) =
(
a0A + a1Am
1
A(t)
)
dt+
γ1A(t)
σA
dW 1A(t) +
αγ1A(t) + βγ
1
Az(t)
σz
dW 1z (t) ,
and
dm1z(t) =
(
a0z + a1zm
1
z(t)
)
dt+
γ1Az(t)
σA
dW 1A(t) +
αγ1Az(t) + βγ
1
z (t)
σz
dW 1z (t) .
This concludes the discussion of the disagreement dynamics in our model.

A.2 Equilibrium Quantities
For completeness, we derive all equilibrium quantities in this Appendix. The proofs
follow grossly Basak (2005).
(i) Dynamics of the stochastic weighting process λ: Itoˆ’s Lemma applied to
η(t) = ξ1(t)/ξ2(t) gives:
dη(t) =
dξ1(t)
ξ2(t)
− ξ
1(t)
(ξ1(t))2
dξ2(t) +
1
2
2ξ1(t)
(ξ2(t))3
(
dξ2(t)
)2 − 1
(ξ2(t))2
dξ2(t)dξ1(t).
Since markets are complete, there exists a unique stochastic discount factor for each
agent. Absence of arbitrage implies for i = 1, 2:
dξi(t)
ξi(t)
= −r(t)dt− θi(A(t), z(t))′dW iY ,
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where θi = (θiA(t), θ
i
z(t))
′ is the vector of market prices of risk perceived by agent i. It
then follows,
dη(t) =
ξ1(t)
ξ2(t)
dξ1(t)
ξ1(t)
− ξ
1(t)
ξ2(t)
dξ2(t)
ξ2(t)
+
ξ1(t)
ξ2(t)
(
dξ2(t)
ξ2(t)
)2
− 1
(ξ2(t))2
dξ2(t)dξ1(t),
= η(t)
(
− r(t)dt− θ1A(t)dWA(t)− θ1z(t)dWz(t)−
(−r(t)dt− θ2A(t)dWA(t)− θ2z(t)dWz(t))
+
((
θ2A(t)
)2
+
(
θ2z(t)
)2 − θ1A(t)θ2A(t)− θ1z(t)θ2z(t)) dt
)
. (A.9)
The prices of the stock and the senior bond in our economy follow the dynamics:
dS(t) = S(t) (µS(t)dt+ σSAdWA(t) + σSzdWz(t)) , (A.10)
dBS(t) = BS(t) (µBS (t)dt+ σBSAdWA(t) + σBSzdWz(t)) , (A.11)
where S(t) is the price of equity and Bs(t) the price of the senior bond, and the expected
growth rates µS(t) and µBs(t) and the volatility coefficients σSA, σBSA, σSz and σBSz
are determined in equilibrium. It is easily shown that the difference in the perceived
rates of return have to satisfy the consistency condition:
µ1n(t)− µ2n(t) = σn
(
ΨA(t), αΨA(t)
σA
σz
+ βΨz(t)
)′
,
where n denotes security n. The definition of market price of risk yields:
σnAθ
i
A(t) + σnzθ
i
z(t) = µ
i
n(t)− r(t).
After some simple algebra, we obtain:
σnA(t)
(
θ1A(t)− θ2A
)
+σnz(t)
(
θ1z(t)− θ2z(t)
)
= σnA(t)ΨA(t)+σnz(t)
(
αΨA(t)
σA
σz
+ βΨz(t)
)
.
Since this equation has to hold for any σnA(t) and σnz(t), it follows:
θ1A(t)− θ2A(t) = ΨA(t),
θ1z(t)− θ2z(t) =
(
αΨA(t)
σA
σz
+ βΨz(t)
)
.
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By construction, we also have:
dWA(t) =
miA(t)− µA(t)
σA
dt+dW iA(t), dWz(t) =
(
α
miA(t)− µA(t)
σz
+ β
miz(t)− µz(t)
σz
+ dW iz(t)
)
.
Therefore, after substituting in equation (A.9), we get:
dη(t)
η(t)
= −dW 1A(t)ΨA(t)− θ1z(t)dW 1z (t) + θ2z(t)
(
dW 1z (t) + αΨA(t)
σA
σz
+ βΨz(t)
)
+
((
θ1A(t)−ΨA(t)
)2
+ θ2z(t)
(
θ2z(t)− θ1z(t)
)− θ1A(t) (θ1A(t)−ΨA(t))) dt,
= −dW 1A(t)ΨA(t)− dW 1z (t)
(
αΨA(t)
σA
σz
+ βΨz(t)
)
.
(ii) Representative investor optimization and optimal consumption policies:
The representative agent in the economy faces the following optimization problem:
sup
c1(t)+c2(t)=A(t)
U(c1(t), c2(t), λ(t)) =
c1(t)
1−γ
1− γ + λ(t)
c2(t)
1−γ
1− γ , (A.12)
where λ(t) > 0. Optimality of individual consumption plans implies that the stochastic
weight takes the following form:
λ(t) = u′(c1(t))/u
′(c2(t)) = y1ξ
1(t)/y2ξ
2(t),
where u′(c(t)) = c(t)−1/γ is the marginal utility function, which is assumed identical
across agents. The first order condition for agent one is:
e−ρtc1(t)
−γ = y1ξ
1(t).
The first order condition for agent two is:
η(t)e−ρtc2(t)
−γ = y2ξ
1(t).
The aggregate resource constraint can now be easily derived as:
(
y2ξ
1(t)eρt
η(t)
)−1/γ
+
(
y1ξ
1(t)eρt
)−1/γ
= A(t).
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Thus, the solutions for the individual state price densities are:
ξ1(t) = e−ρt
1
y1
A(t)−γ
(
1 + λ(t)1/γ
)γ
, ξ2(t) = e−ρt
1
y2
A(t)−γ
(
1 + λ(t)1/γ
)γ
λ(t)−1.
To solve for the optimal consumption policy of each agent, we plug in the functional
forms for the individual state price densities:
c1(t) = (y1ξ
1(t)eρt)−1/γ = A(t)
(
1 + λ(t)1/γ
)−1
.
Good’s market clearing, finally implies:
c2(t) = A(t)− c1(t) = A(t)λ(t)1/γ
(
1 + λ(t)1/γ
)−1
.
This concludes the proof.

Remark A.4 (Equilibrium risk-less interest rate). The expression for the equilibrium
interest rate can be now easily obtained from the above results, using the same
arguments as in Basak (2005):
r(t) = ρ+ γ
(
1
1 + λ(t)1/γ
µ1A(t) +
λ(t)1/γ
1 + λ(t)1/γ
µ2A(t)
)
− 1
2
(1 + γ)γσ2A
+
γ − 1
2γ
λ(t)1/γ(
1 + λ(t)1/γ
)2
(
(αΨA(t)
σA
σz
+ βΨz(t))
2 +ΨA(t)
2
)
. (A.13)
In particular, one can see that for a relative risk aversion γ > 1 the contribution of
disagreement to the equilibrium interest rate is positive.
A.3 Market Prices of Risk
The optimal consumption policy of agent i is:
ci(t) = I(yiξ
i(t)),
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where I(h) = h−1/γ is the inverse marginal utility function of consumption, which is
identical across agents. Applying Itoˆ’s Lemma to this equation yields:
dci(t) =
∂I(yiξ
i(t))
∂ξi(t)
dξi(t) +
1
2
∂2I(yiξ
i(t))
∂(ξi(t))2
(
dξi(t)
)2
,
= µci(t)dt+ σciA(t)dWA(t) + σciz(t)dWz(t). (A.14)
Good market clearing and equation (A.14) imply:
c1(t)
γ
θ1A(t) +
c2(t)
γ
θ2A(t) = σAA(t).
and
θ1A(t) =
(
c1(t)
γ
+
c2(t)
γ
)−1(
σAA(t) + ΨA(t)
c2(t)
γ
)
= γσA +
c2(t)
A(t)
ΨA(t).
The market price of risk of cash flow for the second agent follows easily as:
θ2A(t) = γσA −
c1(t)
A(t)
ΨA(t).
By inserting in these formulas the optimal consumption policies, the individual market
prices of risk for cash flow risk are:
θ1A(t) = γσA +ΨA(t)
(
1 + λ(t)1/γ
)−1
λ(t)1/γ , θ2A(t) = γσA −ΨA(t)
(
1 + λ(t)1/γ
)−1
.
For the market prices of signal risk we first obtain, using good market clearing:
c1(t)
γ
θ1z(t) +
c2(t)
γ
θ2z(t) = 0 .
Since, by construction:
θ1z(t)− θ2z(t) =
(
αΨA(t)
σA
σz
+ βΨz(t)
)
,
we immediately obtain:
θ1z(t) =
c2(t)
A(t)
(
αΨA(t)
σA
σz
+ βΨz(t)
)
, θ2z(t) = −
c1(t)
A(t)
(
αΨA(t)
σA
σz
+ βΨz(t)
)
.
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By inserting in these formulas the form of the optimal consumption policies, the
market prices of signal risk follow in closed form:
θ1z(t) =
(
1 + λ(t)1/γ
)−1
λ(t)1/γ
(
αΨA(t)
σA
σz
+ βΨz(t)
)
,
θ2z(t) = −
(
1 + λ(t)1/γ
)−1(
αΨA(t)
σA
σz
+ βΨz(t)
)
.
This concludes the discussion.

A.4 Proof of Lemma 2.2 (Joint Laplace Transform of A(t)
and η(t))
We want to compute the following moment-generating function
F
(
A, η,m1A,ΨA,Ψz, t, u; , χ
)
= EA,η,m1A,ΨA,Ψz
(A(u)η(u)χ) .
This function satisfies the following partial differential equation (PDE):
0 ≡ DF (A, η,m1A,ΨA,Ψz, t, u; , χ) + ∂F∂t (A, η,m1A,ΨA,Ψz, t, u; , χ) , (A.15)
with the initial condition F
(
A, η,m1A,ΨA,Ψz, t, t; , χ
)
= Aηχ, and where D is the
differential generator of the multivariate process
(
A(t), η(t),m1A(t),ΨA(t),Ψz(t)
)
under
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the probability measure of agent 1. Spelling out Feynman-Kacˇ (A.16), we get
0 =
∂F
∂A
Am1A +
∂F
∂m1A
(
a0A + a1Am
1
A
)
+
∂F
∂ΨA
((
a1A +
γ2A
σ2A
)
ΨA +
(
αγ2A + βγ
2
Az
σAσz
)
Ψz
)
+
∂F
∂Ψz
((
a1z +
αγ2Az + βγ
2
z
σ2z
)
Ψz +
γ2Az
σAσz
ΨA
)
+
1
2
∂2F
∂A2
(AσA)
2
+
1
2
∂2F
∂
(
m1A
)2
((
γ1A
σA
)2
+
(
αγ1A + βγ
1
Az
σz
)2)
+
1
2
∂2F
(∂ΨA)
2

(γ1A − γ2A
σ2A
)2
+
(
α
(
γ1A − γ2A
)
+ β
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
)
σAσz
)2
+
1
2
∂2F
(∂Ψz)
2

(γ1Az − γ2Az
σAσz
)2
+
(
α
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
)
+ β
(
γ1z − γ2z
)
σ2z
)2
+
1
2
∂2F
(∂η)2
η2
(
Ψ2A +
(
α
σA
σz
ΨA + βΨz
)2)
+
∂2F
∂A∂m1A
γ1AA+
∂2F
∂A∂ΨA
(
γ1A − γ2A
σA
)
A+
∂2F
∂A∂Ψz
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
σz
)
A− ∂
2F
∂A∂η
AηΨAσA
+
∂2F
∂m1A∂ΨA
(
γ1A
(
γ1A − γ2A
)
σ3A
+
(
αγ1A + βγ
1
Az
σz
)(
α
(
γ1A − γ2A
)
+ β
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
)
σAσz
))
+
∂2F
∂m1A∂Ψz
(
γ1A
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
)
σ2Aσz
+
(
αγ1A + βγ
1
Az
σz
)(
α
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
)
+ β
(
γ1z − γ2z
)
σ2z
))
− ∂
2F
∂m1A∂η
η
(
ΨA
γ1A
σA
+
(
αγ1A + βγ
1
Az
σz
)(
αΨA
σA
σz
+ βΨz
))
− ∂
2F
∂ΨA∂η
η
(
ΨA
γ1A − γ2A
σ2A
+
(
α
(
γ1A − γ2A
)
+ β
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
)
σAσz
)(
αΨA
σA
σz
+ βΨz
))
− ∂
2F
∂Ψz∂η
η
(
ΨA
γ1Az − γ2Az
σzσA
+
(
α
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
)
+ β
(
γ1z − γ2z
)
σ2z
)(
αΨA
σA
σz
+ βΨz
))
+
∂2F
∂ΨA∂Ψz
((
γ1A − γ2A
σ2A
)(
γ1Az − γ2Az
σAσz
)
+
(
α
(
γ1A − γ2A
)
+ β
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
)
σAσz
)(
α
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
)
+ β
(
γ1z − γ2z
)
σ2z
))
+
∂F
∂t
.
The solution to this PDE takes the functional form
F (A, η,m1A,ΨA,Ψz, t, u; , χ) = A
ηχFm1A
(
m1A, t, u; 
)
FΨA,Ψz (ΨA,Ψz, t, u; , χ) ,
=: AηχF˜
(
m1A,ΨA,Ψz, t, u; , , χ
)
.
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Plugging in this expression into equation (A.16), yields:
0 = F˜ m1A +
∂F˜
∂m1A
(
a0A + a1Am
1
A
)
+
∂F˜
∂ΨA
((
a1A +
γ2A
σ2A
)
ΨA +
(
αγ2A + βγ
2
Az
σAσz
)
Ψz
)
+
∂F˜
∂Ψz
((
a1z +
αγ2Az + βγ
2
z
σ2z
)
Ψz +
γ2Az
σAσz
ΨA
)
+
1
2
(− 1)F˜ σ2A
+
1
2
∂2F˜
∂
(
m1A
)2
((
γ1A
σA
)2
+
(
αγ1A + βγ
1
Az
σz
)2)
+
1
2
∂2F˜
(∂ΨA)
2

(γ1A − γ2A
σ2A
)2
+
(
α
(
γ1A − γ2A
)
+ β
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
)
σAσz
)2
+
1
2
∂2F˜
(∂Ψz)
2

(γ1Az − γ2Az
σAσz
)2
+
(
α
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
)
+ β
(
γ1z − γ2z
)
σ2z
)2
+
1
2
χ(χ− 1)F˜
(
Ψ2A +
(
α
σA
σz
ΨA + βΨz
)2)
+
∂F˜
∂m1A
γ1A +
∂F˜
∂ΨA
(
γ1A − γ2A
σA
)
+
∂F˜
∂Ψz
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
σz
)
− χF˜ΨAσA
+
∂2F˜
∂m1A∂ΨA
(
γ1A
(
γ1A − γ2A
)
σ3A
+
(
αγ1A + βγ
1
Az
σz
)(
α
(
γ1A − γ2A
)
+ β
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
)
σAσz
))
+
∂2F˜
∂m1A∂Ψz
(
γ1A
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
)
σ2Aσz
+
(
αγ1A + βγ
1
Az
σz
)(
α
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
)
+ β
(
γ1z − γ2z
)
σ2z
))
− ∂F˜
∂m1A
χ
(
ΨA
γ1A
σA
+
(
αγ1A + βγ
1
Az
σz
)(
αΨA
σA
σz
+ βΨz
))
− ∂F˜
∂ΨA
χ
(
ΨA
γ1A − γ2A
σ2A
+
(
α
(
γ1A − γ2A
)
+ β
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
)
σAσz
)(
αΨA
σA
σz
+ βΨz
))
− ∂F˜
∂Ψz
χ
(
ΨA
γ1Az − γ2Az
σzσA
+
(
α
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
)
+ β
(
γ1z − γ2z
)
σ2z
)(
αΨA
σA
σz
+ βΨz
))
+
∂2F˜
∂ΨA∂Ψz
((
γ1A − γ2A
σ2A
)(
γ1Az − γ2Az
σAσz
)
+
(
α
(
γ1A − γ2A
)
+ β
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
)
σAσz
)(
α
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
)
+ β
(
γ1z − γ2z
)
σ2z
))
+
∂F˜
∂t
.
We can first factor out the expressions that do not involve η and Ψ (given in blue) and
solve for Fm1A
by direct integration. To this end, we guess the following functional form:
Fm1A
(m1A, t, u, ) = exp(A(, u − t)m1A + C(, u− t)),
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with the explicit solutions for A(, τ) and C(, τ) given by:
A(, u− t) = 
(
ea1A(u−t) − 1)
a1A
,
C(, u− t) = 1
2
 (− 1) σA (u− t) + 1
a1A
(
a0A + γ
1
A
) (
e−a1A(u−t) + u− t
)
+
1
a1A
((
γ1A
σA
)2
+
(
αγ1A + βγ
1
Az
σz
)2)(
3
2
ea1A(u−t) − a1A (u− t)
)
.
Next, we guess the following functional form:
FΨA,Ψz(ΨA,Ψz, t, , χ, u) = exp
(
A0(, χ, u− t) +B1(, χ, u− t)ΨA +B2(, χ, u− t)Ψz
+C1(, χ, u − t)Ψ2A + C2(, χ, u− t)Ψ2z +D0(, χ, u− t)ΨA(t)Ψz
)
.
From this guess, we obtain the derivatives:
∂F˜
∂ΨA
= F˜ (B1(u− t) + 2C1(u− t)ΨA +D0(u− t)Ψz) ,
∂2F˜
∂Ψ2A
= F˜
(
(B1(u− t) + 2C1(u− t)ΨA +D0(u− t)Ψz)2 + 2C1(u− t)
)
,
∂F˜
∂Ψz
= F˜ (B2(u− t) + 2C2(u− t)Ψz +D0(u− t)ΨA) ,
∂2F˜
∂Ψ2z
= F˜
(
(B2(u− t) + 2C2(u− t)Ψz +D0(u− t)ΨA)2 + 2C2(u− t)
)
,
∂F˜
∂ΨA∂Ψz
= F˜
(
(B1(u− t) + 2C1(u− t)ΨA +D0(u− t)Ψz)
(
B2(u− t) + 2C2(u− t)Ψz
+D0(u− t)ΨA
)
+D0(u− t)
)
,
∂F˜
∂t
= −F˜
(
A′0(u− t) +B′1(u− t)ΨA +B′2(u− t)Ψz + C ′1(u− t)Ψ2A + C ′2(u− t)Ψ2z
+D′0(u− t)ΨAΨz
)
,
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which, plugged–in into the initial differential equation imply:
0 = (B1(τ) + 2C1(τ)ΨA +D0(τ)Ψz)
((
a1A +
γ2A
σ2A
)
ΨA +
(
αγ2A + βγ
2
Az
σAσz
)
Ψz
)
+(B2(τ) + 2C2(τ)Ψz +D0(τ)ΨA)
((
a1z +
αγ2Az + βγ
2
z
σ2z
)
Ψz +
γ2Az
σAσz
ΨA
)
+
+
1
2
(
(B1(τ) + 2C1(τ)ΨA +D0(τ)Ψz)
2 + 2C1(τ)
)
×

(γ1A − γ2A
σ2A
)2
+
(
α
(
γ1A − γ2A
)
+ β
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
)
σAσz
)2
+
1
2
(
(B2(τ) + 2C2(τ)Ψz +D0(τ)ΨA)
2 + 2C2(τ)
)
×

(γ1Az − γ2Az
σAσz
)2
+
(
α
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
)
+ β
(
γ1z − γ2z
)
σ2z
)2
+
1
2
χ(χ− 1)
(
Ψ2A +
(
α
σA
σz
ΨA + βΨz
)2)
+ (B1(τ) + 2C1(τ)ΨA +D0(τ)Ψz)
(
γ1A − γ2A
σA
)

+(B2(τ) + 2C2(τ)Ψz +D0(τ)ΨA)
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
σz
)
− χΨAσA
+A(, τ) (B1(τ) + 2C1(τ)ΨA +D0(τ)Ψz)
×
(
γ1A
(
γ1A − γ2A
)
σ3A
+
(
αγ1A + βγ
1
Az
σz
)(
α
(
γ1A − γ2A
)
+ β
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
)
σAσz
))
+A(, τ) (B2(τ) + 2C2(τ)Ψz +D0(τ)ΨA)
×
(
γ1A
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
)
σ2Aσz
+
(
αγ1A + βγ
1
Az
σz
)(
α
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
)
+ β
(
γ1z − γ2z
)
σ2z
))
−A(, τ)χ
(
ΨA
γ1A
σA
+
(
αγ1A + βγ
1
Az
σz
)(
αΨA
σA
σz
+ βΨz
))
− (B1(τ) + 2C1(τ)ΨA +D0(τ)Ψz)χ
×
(
ΨA
γ1A − γ2A
σ2A
+
(
α
(
γ1A − γ2A
)
+ β
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
)
σAσz
)(
αΨA
σA
σz
+ βΨz
))
− (B2(τ) + 2C2(τ)Ψz +D0(τ)ΨA)χ
×
(
ΨA
γ1Az − γ2Az
σzσA
+
(
α
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
)
+ β
(
γ1z − γ2z
)
σ2z
)(
αΨA
σA
σz
+ βΨz
))
+((B1(τ) + 2C1(τ)ΨA +D0(τ)Ψz) (B2(τ) + 2C2(τ)Ψz +D0(τ)ΨA) +D0(τ))
×
((
γ1A − γ2A
σ2A
)(
γ1Az − γ2Az
σAσz
)
+
(
α
(
γ1A − γ2A
)
+ β
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
)
σAσz
)(
α
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
)
+ β
(
γ1z − γ2z
)
σ2z
))
− (A′0(τ) +B′1(τ)ΨA +B′2(τ)Ψz + C ′1(τ)Ψ2A + C ′2(τ)Ψ2z +D′0(τ)ΨAΨz) .
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It follows that functions A0, B1, B2, C1, C2 and D0 must solve the following system of
ODEs.
C ′1(τ) = 2a1C
2
1 (τ) + 2b1C1(τ) +
1
2
a˜1D
2
0(τ) + b˜1D0(τ) + 2c1C1(τ)D0(τ) + d1, (A.16)
C ′2(τ) = 2a˜1C
2
2 (τ) + 2b2C2(τ) +
1
2
a1D
2
0(τ) + b˜2D0(τ) + 2c1C2(τ)D0(τ) + d2, (A.17)
D′0(τ) = c1D
2
0(τ) +
1
2
(b1 + b2)D0(τ) + 2b˜1C2(τ) + 2b˜2C1(τ) + 2a1C1(τ)D0(τ) + 2a˜1C2(τ)D0(τ)
+4c1C1(τ)C2(τ) + d5, (A.18)
B′1(τ) = b1B1(τ) + b˜1B2(τ) + a1B1(τ)C1(τ) + a˜1B2D0(τ) + c1B1(τ)D0(τ) + 2c1C1(τ)B2(τ)
+d3 − ea1Aτ d˜3 + C1(τ)
(
b˜3e
a1Aτ − b3
)
+D0(τ) (c˜3e
a1Aτ − c3) + d3, (A.19)
B′2(τ) = b2B2(τ) + b1B1(τ) + a1B1(τ)D0(τ) + a˜1B2C2(τ) + (2B1(τ)C2(τ) +B2(τ)D0(τ)) c1
+C2(τ)
(
b˜3e
a1Aτ − b3
)
+D0(τ) (c˜3e
a1Aτ − c3) + d4 (ea1Aτ − 1) , (A.20)
A′0(τ) =
1
2
a1B
2
1(τ) +
1
2
a˜1B
2
2(τ) + a˜1C2(τ) + b3B1(τ) +
1
2
c3B2(τ) + c1B1(τ)B2(τ), (A.21)
subject to the initial condition:
C1(0) = C2(0) = B1(0) = B2(0) = D0(0) = A0(0) = 0.
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In these equations, the coefficients are given explicitly by:
a1 =
(
γ1A − γ2A
σ2A
)2
+
(
α
(
γ1A − γ2A
)
+ β
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
)
σAσz
)2
,
b1 = a1A +
γ2A
σ2A
− χ
(
γ1A − γ2A
σA
+
ασA
σz
(
α
(
γ1A − γ2A
)
+ β
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
)
σAσz
))
,
a˜1 =
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
σAσz
)2
+
(
α
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
)
+ β
(
γ1z − γ2z
)
σ2z
)2
,
b˜1 =
γ2Az
σAσz
− χ
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
σAσz
+
(
ασA
σz
)(
α
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
)
+ β
(
γ1z − γ2z
)
σ2z
))
,
c1 =
(
γ1A − γ2A
σ2A
)(
γ1Az − γ2Az
σAσz
)
+
(
α
(
γ1A − γ2A
)
+ β
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
)
σAσz
)(
α
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
)
+ β
(
γ1z − γ2z
)
σ2z
)
,
d1 =
1
2
χ (χ− 1)
(
1 +
(
ασA
σz
)2)
,
b2 = a1z +
αγ2Az − χβγ2Az
σ2z
+ β
(
α
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
)
+ β
(
γ1z − γ2z
)
σ2z
)
,
b˜2 =
αγ2A + βγ
2
Az
σAσz
− χβ
(
α
(
γ1A − γ2A
)
+ β
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
)
σAσz
)
,
d2 =
1
2
χ (χ− 1) β2,
b3 = 
(
γ1A − γ2A
σA
)
− 
a1A
(
γ1A
(
γ1A − γ2A
)
γ3A
+
(
αγ1A + βγ
1
Az
σz
)(
α
(
γ1A − γ2A
)
+ β
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
)
σAσz
))
,
b˜3 =

a1A
(
γ1A
(
γ1A − γ2A
)
σ3A
+
(
αγ1A + βγ
1
Az
σz
)(
α
(
γ1A − γ2A
)
+ β
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
)
σAσz
))
,
c3 = 2
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
σz
)
− 2
a1A
(
γ1A
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
)
σ2Aσz
+
(
αγ1A + βγ
1
Az
σz
)(
α
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
)
+ β
(
γ1z − γ2z
)
σ2z
))
,
c˜3 =
2
a1A
(
γ1A
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
)
σ2Aσz
+
(
αγ1A + βγ
1
Az
σz
)(
α
(
γ1Az − γ2Az
)
+ β
(
γ1z − γ2z
)
σz
))
,
d3 = χ
(
σA − 1
a1A
(
γ1A
σA
+
αγ1A + βγ
1
Az
σz
)(
ασA
σz
))
,
d˜3 = − χ
a1a
(
γ1A
σA
+
(
αγ1A + βγ
1
Az
σz
)(
ασA
σz
))
,
d5 =
ασA
σz
χ (χ− 1) .
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To solve the system of equations (A.16)-(A.21), we first solve equations (A.16)-(A.18).
First, we observe that the system of differential equations (A.16)-(A.18) can be written
as the following matrix Riccati equation:
dA
dτ
= AM ′MA+AP + P ′A+D (A.22)
with coefficient matrices defined by:
A =
(
C1 D0
D0 C2
)
, M =

 2√a1 0
c1√
a1
√
2a˜1 − c
2
1
a1

 , P =
(
2b1 b˜2
b˜1 2b2
)
D =
(
d1 d5
d5 d1
)
.
The matrix Riccati equation (A.22) can be solved in closed form by transforming it
into a locally equivalent linear system of ordinary differential equations by a
homogenization procedure (Radon’s Lemma). Let
(
C11(t) C12(t)
C21(t) C22(t)
)
= exp
(
t
(
P M ′M
D −P ′
))
.
Then, the solution of differential equation (A.22) is:
A(t) = C22(t)
−1C21(t), (A.23)
using the fact that A(0) = 0. The solutions for B1, B2, and A0 follow by direct
integration. This concludes the proof.

A.5 Proof of Lemma 2.3 (Security Prices)
By definition, the risk-less zero coupon bond price is given by:
B(t, T ) =
1
ξ1(t)
E1t
(
e−ρ(T−t)ξ1(T )
)
.
Using the expression for ξ1(t), we get:
B(t, T ) = E1t
(
e−ρ(T−t)
(
A(T )
A(t)
)−γ (1 + λ(T )1/γ
1 + λ(t)1/γ
)γ)
. (A.24)
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Let
G(t, T, x; ΨA,Ψz) ≡
∫ ∞
0
(
1 + λ(T )1/γ
1 + λ(t)1/γ
)γ [
1
2pi
∫ +∞
−∞
(
λ(T )
λ(t)
)−iχ
FΨA,Ψz (ΨA,Ψz, t, T ;−γ, iχ)dχ
]
dλ(T )
λ(T )
.
By Fourier inversion, it then follows:
B(t, T ) = e−ρ(T−t)Fm1A(m
1
A, t, T ;−γ)G(t, T,−γ; ΨA,Ψz).
In a similar way, the firm value is:
V (t) = E1t
(∫ ∞
t
e−ρ(u−t)
ξ1(u)
ξ1(t)
A(u)du
)
,
= A(t)E1t
(∫ ∞
t
e−ρ(u−t)
(
1 + λ(t)1/γ
1 + λ(t)1/γ
)γ (
A(u)
A(t)
)1−γ
du
)
,
= A(t)
∫ ∞
t
(
e−ρ(u−t)Fm1A(m
1
A, t, u; 1 − γ)G(u, T, 1 − γ; ΨA,Ψz)
)
du.
The price of the senior bond is:
Bs(t, T ) = K1B(t, T )− E1t
(
e−ρ(T−t)
ξ1(T )
ξ1(t)
(K1 − V (T ))+
)
,
= K1B(t, T )− E1t
(
e−ρ(T−t)
(
A(T )
A(t)
)−γ (1 + λ(T )1/γ
1 + λ(t)1/γ
)γ
(K1 − V (T ))+
)
,
= K1B(t, T )− P (t, T,K1),
where P (t, T,K1) is the price of the put option on the firm value. The price of the
junior bond is:
Bj(t, T ) = E1t
(
e−ρ(T−t)
ξ1(T )
ξ1(t)
(V (T )−K1)+
)
− E1t
(
e−ρ(T−t)
ξ1(T )
ξ1(t)
(V (T )− (K1 +K2))+
)
,
= C(t, T,K1)− C(t, T,K1 +K2),
where C(t, T,K1) and C(t, T,K1 +K2) are call options on the firm value with strikes
K1 and K1 +K2, respectively. Equity in our economy is a call option on the firm value
with strike price K1 +K2. Therefore:
S(t) = E1t
(
e−ρ(T−t)
ξ1(T )
ξ1(t)
(V (T )− (K1 +K2))+
)
= C(t, T,K1 +K2).
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A European call option on the equity value is derived in the following way:
O(t, T ) = E1t
(
e−ρ(T−t)
ξ1(T )
ξ1(t)
(S(T )−Ke)+
)
.
This concludes the proof.

A.6 Risk-neutral Skewness and Volatility Formulas
It follows from Bakshi and Madan (2000) that the entire collection of
twice-continuously differentiable payoff functions with bounded expectation can be
spanned algebraically. Applying this result to the firm value V (t) (or equivalently to
the stock value S(t)) yields:
G(V ) = G(V˜ )+(V − V˜ )GV (V˜ )+
∫ ∞
V˜
GV V (K)(V −K)+dK+
∫ V˜
0
GV V (K)(K−V )+dK,
where GV is the partial derivative of the payoff function G(V ) with respect to V and
GV V the corresponding second-order partial derivative. By setting V˜ = V (t) we obtain
the final formula for the firm value risk-neutral skewness, after applying the same steps
as in Bakshi, Kapadia, and Madan (2003) (Theorem 1, p. 137).
Proposition A.5. Let v(t, T ) = ln (V (t+ T ))− ln (V (t)) be the firm value return
between time t and T . The risk-neutral skewness of v(t, T ) is given by:
skew(t, T ) =
Et
(
(v(t, T )− Et (v(t, T )))3
)
(
Et (v(t, T )− Et (v(t, T )))2
)3/2 = erTW (t, T )− 2µ(t, T )erTR(t, T ) + 2µ(t, T )3(erTR(t, T )− µ(t, T )2)3/2 ,
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where
R(t, T ) =
∫ ∞
V (t)
2
(
1− ln
(
K
V (t)
))
K2
(V (T )−K)+ dK +
∫ V (t)
0
2
(
1 + ln
(
V (t)
K
))
K2
(K − V (T ))+ dK,
W (t, T ) =
∫ ∞
V (t)
6 ln
(
K
V (t)
)
− 3
(
ln
(
K
V (t)
))2
K2
(V (T )−K)+ dK
−
∫ V (t)
0
6 ln
(
V (t)
K
)
− 3
(
ln
(
V (t)
K
))2
K2
(K − V (T ))+ dK ,
and
X(t, T ) =
∫ ∞
V (t)
12
(
ln
(
K
V (t)
))2 − 4(ln( KV (t)))3
K2
(V (T )−K)+ dK
−
∫ V (t)
0
12
(
ln
(
V (t)
K
))2
− 4
(
ln
(
V (t)
K
))3
K2
(K − V (T ))+ dK,
µ(t, T ) = Et
(
ln
(
V (t+ T )
V (t)
))
≈ erT − 1− e
rT
2
R(t, T )− e
rT
6
W (t, T )− e
rT
24
X(t, T ).
The expression for the stock returns volatility in the paper follows from a
straight-forward application of Itoˆ’s Lemma.2 The price of the stock, defined in
equation (A.10), satisfies a diffusion process given by:
dS
S
= µ1S(t)dt+ σSA(t)dW
1
A(t) + σSz(t)dW
1
z (t),
Therefore, the diffusion term in this dynamics is characterized by:
dS(t)− S(t)µ1S(t)dt =
∂S
∂A
(dA(t)−E1t (dA(t))) +
∂S
∂m1A
(dm1A(t)−E
1
t (dm
1
A(t)))
+
∂S
∂ΨA
(dΨA(t)− E
1
t (dΨA(t))) +
∂S
∂Ψz
(dΨz(t)− E
1
t (dΨz(t)))
=
∂S
∂A
A(t)σAdW
1
A(t) +
∂S
∂m1A
(
γ1A(t)
σA
dW 1A(t) +
(
αγ1A(t) + βγ
1
Az(t)
σz
)
dW 1z (t)
)
+
∂S
∂ΨA
(
γ1A(t)− γ
2
A(t)
σ2A
dW 1A(t) +
(
α(γ1A(t)− γ
2
A(t)) + β(γ
1
Az(t)− γ
2
Az(t))
σAσz
)
dW 1z (t)
)
+
∂S
∂Ψz
(
γ1Az(t)− γ
2
Az(t)
σAσz
dW 1A(t) +
(
α(γ1Az(t)− γ
2
Az(t)) + β(γ
1
z (t)− γ
2
z (t))
σ2z
)
dW 1z (t)
)
.
2With the same procedure one also obtains the volatility of firm value returns.
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By matching coefficients, we obtain:
σSA(t) =
1
S(t)
(
∂S
∂A
A(t)σA +
∂S
∂m1A
γ1A(t)
σA
+
∂S
∂ΨA
γ1A(t)− γ2A(t)
σ2A
+
∂S
∂Ψz
γ1Az(t)− γ2Az(t)
σAσz
)
and
σSz(t) =
1
S(t)
(
∂S
∂m1A
αγ1A(t) + βγ
1
Az(t)
σz
+
∂S
∂ΨA
α(γ1A(t)− γ2A(t)) + β(γ1Az(t)− γ2Az(t))
σAσz
)
+
1
S(t)
∂S
∂Ψz
α(γ1Az(t)− γ2Az(t)) + β(γ1z (t)− γ2z (t))
σ2z
Thus, the volatility of stock returns at time t is (σ2SA(t) + σ
2
Sz(t))
1/2, with σSA and σSz
given above. For the special case, in which β = 0, the second of these expressions
simplifies:
σSz(t) =
1
S(t)
(
∂S
∂m1A
αγ1A(t)
σz
+
∂S
∂ΨA
α(γ1A(t)− γ2A(t))
σAσz
+
∂S
∂Ψz
α(γ1Az(t)− γ2Az(t))
σ2z
)
.
This concludes the discussion of the risk-neutral skewness and the volatility of stock
returns in our model.
Appendix B
Appendix B
B.1 Technical Proofs
To save space, details of most calculations are presented in a technical Appendix to
this paper, which is available on the authors’ webpage.
Lemma B.1. Let
G(t, T, xD1 , xD2 ; Ψ) ≡
∫ ∞
0
(
1 + λ(T )1/γ
1 + λ(t)1/γ
)γ [
1
2pi
∫ +∞
−∞
(
λ(T )
λ(t)
)−iχ
FΨ (Ψ, t, T ;x, iχ) dχ
]
dλ(T )
λ(T )
.
1. The equilibrium price of stock 1 is:
S1(t) := S1
(
D1,m
A,Ψ
)
,
= D1(t)
∫
∞
t
e−δ(u−t)FmA(m
A, t, u; 1− γ, 0)G (t, u, 1− γ, 0; ,Ψ)du.
2. The equilibrium price of stock 2 is:
S2(t) := S2
(
D1, D2,m
A,Ψ
)
,
= D2(t)
∫
∞
t
e−δ(u−t)FmA
(
mA, t, u;−2γ, 1+ γ)G (t, u,−2γ, 1 + γ; ,Ψ)du.
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3. The equilibrium price of the index is:
ID(t) := ID
(
D1, D2,m
A,Ψ
)
= ω1S1(t) + ω2S2(t).
4. The equilibrium price of the European option on stock 1 is:
O1(t) := O1
(
D1,m
A,Ψ
)
,
= EAt
(
e−δ(T−t)
(
D1(t)
D1(T )
1 + λ(T )1/γ
1 + λ(t)1/γ
)γ
(S1(T )−K1)+
)
.
The formula for the option on stock 2 is identical with the corresponding replacements,
and with S2(T ) and K2 replacing S1(T ) and K1, respectively.
5. The equilibrium price of the European option on the index is:
I(t) := I
(
D1, D2,m
A,Ψ
)
,
= EAt
(
e−δ(T−t)
(
D1(t)
D1(T )
1 + λ(T )1/γ
1 + λ(t)1/γ
)γ
(ID(T )−KID)+
)
.
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